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Introduction: The time 
of the portrait is now
Melinda Hinkson
In December 2008, Australia celebrated the opening of a new 
national cultural institution. A striking new building in Canberra’s 
parliamentary  triangle declared portraiture to have achieved a rare 
political outcome: a $76 million building cemented the genre’s status 
in our national consciousness. The process leading to the opening 
of this building had commenced a decade and a half earlier with the 
advocacy of arts philanthropists Gordon and Marilyn Darling and the 
mounting of a travelling exhibition, Uncommon Australians: Towards an 
Australian national portrait gallery, which opened at the National Gallery 
of Victoria and then toured to Canberra, Brisbane, Sydney and Adelaide. 
Funding was subsequently allocated to enable the establishment of 
a fledgling national portrait gallery in three rooms of Old Parliament 
House. In 1997, then Prime Minister John Howard declared  his 
enthusiasm for a freestanding institution dedicated to portraiture 
and allocated the funds required to plan and erect the new building.1 
Portraiture was the art form that seemed to speak most compellingly to 
the cultural moment; in terms of the public politics fostered by Howard, 
the actions and achievements of individual ‘great Australians’, whether 
past prime ministers, cricket players, entrepreneurs or neighbourhood 
heroes, were to be lauded over ‘lofty ideas’ or ‘culture’. In this context 
it was observed that the new institution enjoyed a dream run of political 
support and public acclaim.2 
1  See ‘Gallery history’, National Portrait Gallery, www.portrait.gov.au/content/gallery-history/, 
nd, accessed 1 November 2015.
2  John Thompson, ‘At the national portrait gallery: Art or history?’, Recollections, vol. 5 
no.  1, 2010, recollections.nma.gov.au/issues/vol_5_no_1/notes_and_comments/at_the_national_
portrait_ gallery_art_or_history, accessed 1 November 2015.
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The government’s backing of the gallery turned out to be an inspired 
move. People came in large numbers—300,000 passed through the 
doors in the first three months—and they have continued to come in 
good numbers since. Yet the reason for the gallery’s success as a new 
place of the people may well rest on a more complex conjunction of 
factors than its champions had in mind. 
Following the opening of the gallery, I wrote an essay in which I posed 
the question, ‘What is this new institution?’
Part of its interest and potential surely lies in its very ambiguity: this is 
not simply another fine art gallery, nor a museum in the conventional 
sense of the term ... the very idea of a portrait gallery built around the 
recognition of ‘notable’ individuals and their contribution to nation 
making has been scorned by some as an exercise in barren elitism, and 
the gallery’s ambiguous status accused of giving rise to nothing more 
than a mix of ‘bad history and inadequate psychology with inferior 
art’.3 Yet such criticism seems to miss a fundamental point: this is a 
gallery born in an era of accelerated technological mediation. Part of 
the aim of the Gallery requires it to eschew the values of high art in 
favour of forms of image-making drawn from a wider public domain. 
In a society that measures social achievement in large part through 
a  person’s attainment of status as image, most often attended to in 
the form of the face, a portrait gallery is likely to have a particular 
appeal, especially for its direct engagement with the cult of celebrity, 
with forms of image culture that are embraced in the world beyond 
art galleries.4
In an age of digital mediation the portraiture recognised by and 
displayed within the art museum cannot but collide with and be 
shaped by a swirl of images and image-based practices that circulate 
beyond its doors. Faces of advertising and consumer culture, the 
reconfiguration of public/private spheres found in the new self-
fashioning and presentation techniques of social networking, 
3  Humphrey McQueen, ‘In for “‘higher art’ I’d go’’ at the National Portrait Gallery’, Australian 
Book Review, May 2009, pp. 41–3.
4  Melinda Hinkson, ‘Seeing more than black and white: Picturing Aboriginality at Australia’s 
National Portrait Gallery’, Australian Humanities Review, no. 49, 2010, pp. 5–28.
3
InTRoDuCTIon
a burgeoning industry in cosmetic surgery, the increase in surveillance 
technologies dealing in facial recognition all indicate a collective 
heightened attention to faces.5 
From a diverse range of perspectives, the essays in this book consider 
why it is that portraits—pictures of faces—continue to have such 
galvanising appeal and perform such fundamental work across myriad 
social settings. In doing so, they look beyond conventional ideas of 
the portrait as a medium for celebrating individual and national 
achievement to the wider cultural contexts, governmental practices 
and intimate experiences that shape relationships between persons 
and pictures. 
These essays have their origins in an international symposium held at 
the National Portrait Gallery in Canberra over three days in July 2010. 
Strongly interdisciplinary in its focus, that event brought together 
anthropologists, artists, art historians, literary and media scholars, 
and curators to explore a conjunction of interests and paradoxes at 
work in contemporary image-making practices and visual experience. 
While preserving the diversity of perspective and concerns of the 
2010 symposium, the essays collected here also traverse considerable 
shared ground. They are written by artists, anthropologists, art 
historians and media scholars. At the heart of their collective concern 
is a commitment to understanding interactions between persons and 
images as an elemental component of what it is to be human, and to 
grapple with what is distinctive in such interactions in the present, 
a time when digital forms of imaging and interaction have become 
ubiquitous, contradictory, constitutive elements of everyday life. 
Attending to the many ways in which identity is ‘imaged’ in the 
present, contributors find various degrees of analytical traction in the 
concept of portraiture. Portraiture has been crucial to the formation 
and articulation of modern individualism;6 it might be seen as a 
primary genre through which the culture of western modernity has 
5  Martyn Jolly, ‘The face in digital space’, in Anne Marsh, Melissa Miles and Daniel Palmer 
(eds), The Culture of Photography in Public Space, Bristol, Intellect, 2014, pp. 144–57; Justin 
Clemens and Adam Nash, ‘Take a good hard look at yourself: Autoscopia and the networked 
image’, in  New imaging: Transdisciplinary strategies for art beyond the new media, Sydney, 
Australian Network for Art and Technology, 2011, pp. 40–51.




been animated and reinforced. As a genre of European art, portraiture 
is a well-travelled field.7 Yet as Ernst van Alphen observes, artists 
have continued to push the boundaries of the medium as they have 
grappled with a changing world of human experience, and especially 
with the dislocation and diasporic experience that is a cornerstone 
of modernity. Just as what it is to be human has continued to be 
reshaped by technological intervention and other transformations in 
our world, artists have grappled with such change by re-imagining 
and reformulating the medium of portraiture. In the words of van 
Alphen, ‘the project of “portraying somebody in her/his individuality 
or quality or essence” is no longer the sanctifying function of 
portraiture’. But this is not to say that portraiture is an exhausted 
medium; a genre can be liberated from its history.8 
The portrait returns but with a difference, now in order to expose the 
bourgeious self, historically anchored and naturalized, instead of its 
authority; to show a loss of self instead of its consolidation; to shape 
the subject as simulacrum instead of as origin.9
While not all contributors would agree with van Alphen’s 
interpretation of the nature of contemporary subjectivity, they do 
agree that portraiture as a genre is necessarily remade to capture new 
kinds of persons and new perspectives on human experience in new 
times and places. In the essays that follow, this work occurs along 
four analytic fronts. Firstly, there is a decentring of focus from the 
object of portrayal (the authority of the sitter) to the effects of the 
picture, or in the words of philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, its 
‘increase of being’.10 Secondly, there is an exploration of the medium 
from the inside: for practising artists, portraiture becomes an activity 
in autobiographical sense-making. Thirdly, portraiture and images of 
the face are taken up as a medium for exploring larger social relations; 
for example, the practices of governmentality and biopolitics that are 
7  Richard Brilliant, Portraiture: Essays in art and culture, London, Reaktion Books, 1991; 
Woodall; Tony Halliday, Facing the public: Portraiture in the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999; Shearer West, Portraiture, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; Stephen Perkinson, The likeness of the King: A prehistory of portraiture in 
late medieval France, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2009; Cynthia Freeland, Portraits and 
persons, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010.
8  Ernst van Alphen, ‘The portrait’s dispersal’, Art in mind: How contemporary images shape 
thought, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2005, p. 47.
9  van Alphen, 2005, p. 25.
10  Cited in van Alphen, 2005, pp. 23–4.
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seen to characterise our times.11 And finally, anthropologists explore 
the elasticity of portraiture as a medium, testing the genre’s capacity to 
convey ontologically different modes of personhood and relationships 
between human and other beings and the environments they inhabit. 
While working from diverse disciplinary bases and with different 
materials and influences, all the contributors to this book are firmly 
focused upon the intersubjective space of the portrait image. In each 
of the essays, people are considered to enter into highly intimate and 
potentially transformative relations through images. In declaring ‘the 
time of the portrait is now’, Didier Maleuvre foregrounds the ‘now 
of encounter’, the moment of embodied meeting between person and 
picture. For artists/authors John Conomos and Gali Weiss, portraiture 
is approached as a practice through which shape and meaning might 
be given to elusive diasporic life trajectories. Jennifer Deger is more 
circumspect about the capacity of portraiture to capture the dense 
intergenerational and intercultural relations between persons, spirits 
and environment in eastern Arnhem Land, but the multi-mediated 
‘BarkTV’ she produced with her Yolngu collaborators presents a 
compelling instantiation through which to contemplate such a 
constellation of relations. She alerts us to the difficulty of grappling 
with cross-cultural portraits, reminding us via Jean-Luc Nancy that 
while portraits are places of encounter between self and other, they 
‘await viewers already imprinted with the echo of encounter’. In other 
words, crucially, we have already learned how to look at pictures, and 
what to look for in them, before we come to gaze upon any particular 
portrait.
One avenue of consideration opened up somewhat differently in 
essays by Didier Maleuvre and Melinda Hinkson is the importance 
of distinguishing the material presence and ‘still’ pictures of painting 
from photographs and the ‘fleeting’ images we commonly confront 
in digital format on the screens of computers and mobile phones. 
Paintings ‘allow us to reflect from a distance and visually grasp the 
whole’,12 whereas digital images travel before our eyes at speeds at 
which we can only grasp them partially, fleetingly. The distinction 
11  Pasi Väliaho, Biopolitical screens: Image, power and the neoliberal brain, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2014. 




between these two differently structured visual experiences marks 
a crucial element of portraiture’s crisis, and simultaneously its renewed 
interest for the contributors to this volume.
Didier Maleuvre responds provocatively to our concern with 
the specificity of the digital. The time of the portrait is now, he 
declares, but the portrait he champions is not the transforming and 
fleeting digital image but rather the classical, painted portraiture of 
Rembrandt. He finds the special potency of Rembrandt’s portraits in 
the nature of encounter they call out between viewer and painting, 
as well as the fragility they convey. Drawing our attention to the 
cultural context in which Rembrandt’s commissions were produced, 
Maleuvre observes the ‘pained need for confirmation’ in these ‘faces 
of people who lived by the esteem of others’. Rembrandt’s portraiture 
distils a significant moment of social transformation when an emergent 
merchant class looked to secure public recognition. Thus, Maleuvre 
suggests, Rembrandt’s picture-making marks the emergence of 
acknowledgement-based identity in the Netherlands—the coming 
into being of the social gaze that lies at the heart of modern European 
subjectivity. Rembrandt’s portraits do not observe but rather 
recommend a face for our attention. Rembrandt’s method turns upon 
‘a labour of becoming acquainted’ involving months of grappling in 
paint with a sitter’s face. For Maleuvre, Rembrandt’s paintings call out 
mutuality. 
Didier Maleuvre juxtaposes this dense painterly activity with 
the practice of photography, which lacks duration. Photography’s 
incapacity to ‘wait on the face’ cannot produce portraits. Here 
Maleuvre articulates the ultimate moral argument for distinguishing 
technological modes of mediation: while the practice of painting 
provides a vehicle for the sustained care of the other, photography 
is distracted, fleeting, superficial; it turns away, calling on technical 
skills, not human engagement. The portrait, Maleuvre concludes, ‘is a 
modality of human solidarity’ and thus the term must be reserved for 
the medium of paint and activity required of it. 
For artists/writers, such distinctions between media are not 
necessarily so straightforward. Moving between and across the 
methods of drawing, painting, photography and video, artists often 
adopt a variety of practices and processes as a means to work through 
problems. Such practices of sense-making are highly intimate and 
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evolve organically, but are also rigorously tested against a wider field 
of ideas and scholarship. Melinda Hinkson’s essay explores these 
processes at work in the practice of three Canberra-based artists, all 
of whom identify first and foremost as painters. In this ethnographic 
engagement with artists in their studios, photography emerges as 
technical prop, as escape from the intensity of painting and also 
as facilitator of human interaction and the making of portraits. In 
watching painters wrestle with the challenge of creative work—with 
the conundrum of how to make something that is absent present in 
the form of a picture—the interplay between photography, on the 
one hand, and the hand-based practices of painting and drawing, on 
the other, emerges as vital and highly contingent. In one case, the 
intervention of photography is essential to artist Jude Rae’s being able 
to gain sufficient distance on her subject to produce a satisfactory 
picture. For Micky Allan, photography facilitates creative social 
interaction in a period when painting is difficult and alienating. For 
Vanessa Barbay, the use of scanner and projector in the making of 
pictures that speak back to abstract engagements between persons 
and animals is a necessary compromise to help her meet the formal 
requirements of her PhD painting program. These intimate glimpses 
of creative work reveal that portrait-making cannot but shadow the 
artist’s own subjectivity. The works and working methods of Allan, 
Barbay and Rae show image-making to be a product of habitus,13 the 
location of the enactment of personhood where life experience and 
social constraints come together in processes of mutual constitution. 
Artist and writer Gali Weiss explores portraiture as a medium for 
grappling with her own and others’ diasporic subjectivities. Drawing 
on the work of Stuart Hall, Weiss adopts a view of diasporic experience 
as a constant process of becoming through creative action—a form of 
identification, rather than identity. Diasporic experience is necessarily 
intersubjective: it ‘cannot be represented from the viewpoint of one-
point perspective’. The space of diaspora encompasses ‘those who 
leave as well as those who stay and those who return’. Taking that 
observation as a central force in her work, Weiss has developed a 
portrait practice that incorporates this ‘doubling reference’, producing 
pictures that distil the relationship between a sitter and an absent 
relative, as well as herself as image-maker. Working between the media 
13  Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a theory of practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.
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of photography, photocopying and drawing, Weiss’ portraits become 
meeting places—of two individuals separated by space yet connected 
by a shared history of familial and emotional ties, brought together 
in the activity of making the picture. Art, and portrait-making 
in particular, are regarded here not as representation but rather as 
performative agency. 
The digital is a crucial medium for Weiss’ mode of exploration, 
as it is also for Chinese-Australian artist Lindy Lee, with whose work 
Weiss closely identifies. In Lee’s portraits, the photocopy works as a 
metaphor for the diasporic experience of unbelonging and cultural 
displacement—the impossibility of reaching the ‘original’. Lee speaks 
back to the conventional portrait and the illusion of the authentic 
subject it celebrates, appropriating images of European Old Master 
portraits and reworking their clarity and their visibility. New modes 
of identification and experience as well as indeterminate futures are 
attended to once the space of portraiture is reconfigured to shadow 
the space of diaspora. 
John Conomos reflects upon four decades of his own film- and video-
making and the evolution of a mode of practice consonant with his 
‘poly-cultural’ or ‘hybrid alien’ Greek-Australian identifications. 
In  this deeply personal essay, Conomos tracks his adoption of the 
video or film essay as the truest, most open creative form in which to 
wrestle with and express who he is. He gives us the image of himself 
as a small boy hanging about in his parents’ suburban milk bar, 
watching the doorway that would ‘magically transform into a movie 
screen, a world of enchantment’ as he waited for the next customer. 
For Conomos the diasporic experience of being in-between calls out 
a distinctive imagination and need to write and make films as acts 
of ‘interior emigration’. 
In declaring the video essay as his chosen mode of self-portraiture 
or autobiography, Conomos adopts a practice of creative exploration 
that is at once intimate and ‘dear’, yet theoretically significant. In the 
presentation of his life trajectory, we witness not an unfolding of 
technological developments but rather a splicing of the analogue and 
digital as ‘one continuous dialogue of art-making’. Conomos pays 
homage to Montaigne’s idea of the essay as a vehicle for ‘speculating 
aloud and testing ideas on paramount questions of life, culture, 
politics, human fragility and society’, with what he sees as a play 
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between ‘fact and fiction’ that later writers such as Georg Lukacs and 
Theodor Adorno honed into an aesthetic that privileged ‘fragmentary, 
wandering concerns and stylistics’. Imagination, the unreliability 
of memory and pastiche are all crucial elements of Conomos’ 
production. In his work the portrait emerges as a highly elastic and 
fluid set of traces:  blurred images of encounters and experiences, 
lines of text, sequences of film, the influences of absent persons, 
his own mimetic performances—enfolded in the video essay. There 
is a strong moral element to Conomos’ work that references artists, 
scholars and filmmakers of earlier eras as an ‘antidote’ to what he sees 
as ‘the  underlying institutionalised amnesia’ characterising much 
of the contemporary interest in ‘new’ media. While his approach as 
‘rag-picker’ gives him a predilection for seeing a continuous flow 
between and across forms of media, he nevertheless wants to make 
visible the history of genre and form that informs such intertextuality. 
Consequently, Conomos’ images lead the viewer away from their 
surfaces, tracking art and life as a form of personalised interrogation 
of the past. 
Michele Barker and Anna Munster take us to another, related field 
of exploration in their examination of the links between nineteenth-
century scientific pursuits and contemporary adaptations of 
facial-imaging techniques. They do this by way of their own video 
installation, Duchenne’s smile. The subject matter of this work are certain 
photographs in Charles Darwin’s 1872 The expression of the emotions 
in man and animals, and in particular a series made by neurologist 
Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne, who photographed his own 
experiments with electrical stimulation of facial muscles of patients 
suffering from various neurological conditions. Taking up the camera 
when the technology was in its infancy, Duchenne’s experiments 
required him to work with long shutter speeds. He thus devised 
techniques to prolong the electrically charged expressions on his 
patients’ faces so that they could be captured, making their responses 
conform to the technical constraints of the camera. Michele Barker and 
Anna Munster draw our attention to the doubled process by which a 
scientist would experiment with a technical treatment for an affliction 
at the same time as ensuring that the results of his experiments were 
recordable and thus visible to his peers. Drawing a link from Duchenne’s 
experiments to contemporary facial-recognition software, Barker and 
Munster explore the incorporation of a typology of emotions into the 
workings of diverse corporate, governmental and policing practices. 
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Digitisation has been crucial to these developments, enabling the rise 
of a new biopolitics in which the face ‘becomes the dominant surface 
for tracking, tracing and controlling the subject’. 
Along with the other contributors to this volume who see the portrait 
as a genre ceaselessly being refigured across time and space to grapple 
with distinctive and evolving forms of personhood, Barker and Munster 
observe how the ‘the abstract machine of faciality’, as elucidated by 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is refigured, made subject to new 
techniques and technologies as new circumstances arise. They observe 
in the post-9/11 security environment an extraordinary expansion of 
the application of facial-recognition techniques. The developments 
they track call to mind the work of WJT Mitchell,14 who identifies 
images as living organisms and argues that a recent biocybernetic turn 
in imaging has supplanted earlier representational modes. Endorsing 
this interpretation, Pasi Väliaho has recently written that ‘images today 
proliferate and evolve in parallel with the production and promotion 
of the neoliberal way of life, with its notions of threat, contingency 
and emergency’.15
As they trace echoes of Duchenne’s experiment in the workings of 
present-day surveillance technologies, Barker and Munster reveal the 
distinctive regime of truth constructed for reading emotions, a regime 
that operates entirely at the level of technological abstraction. This 
is the real-world nightmare of securitisation, which dovetails with 
Maleuvre’s critique of photography. 
The final essay in this volume draws our concerns with the 
intersubjective nature of person–image relations into the space of 
cross-cultural collaboration. Jennifer Deger revisits the process 
of producing, with her long-term Yolngu research associates and 
adoptive family, a ‘BarkTV’ to honour the remarkable intercultural life 
and legacy of their deceased husband, father and adoptive brother, 
Dhalwangu community leader and media maker, Bangana, who died 
suddenly in 2002. Djalkiri #1 is a multimedia work, a bark painting 
in acrylic, the first of its kind produced at Gapuwiak, and even more 
unusual, incorporating a blank panel through the middle—a screen 
14  WJT Mitchell, What do pictures want? The lives and loves of images, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 2005.
15  Väliaho, 2014, p. xii.
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onto which video footage is projected of the headstone-laying ceremony 
that completed the formal period of mourning for this man. His is the 
only headstone in Gapuwiak to incorporate a portrait photograph, 
declaring Bangana’s role as a man of ‘modern technologies’, as he used 
to describe himself. In turn, Deger recounts how this grave became a 
favoured site for family portraits, enabling the deceased to be explicitly 
enfolded in the imaging practices of the living. 
Jennifer Deger eloquently traces the strands of dense symbolic 
significance and the relationships between persons, ancestors and 
forms of image-making that converge in Djalkiri #1, as well as the 
weight of feeling behind its production. In so doing, she produces an 
idea of the portrait that, in order to truly be a portrait in this context, 
must enact a whole complex of intergenerational, interspecies and 
intercultural relationships. By contrast, some photographs of persons, 
including family photographs, may be regarded as ‘simply snapshots’. 
Only when a photograph is taken up and assembled, activated within 
a fundamental set of relationships—linking an image of a person to 
his place, to the ancestors that confer his character, to other qualities 
of personality as well as authority, to the activities and pleasures for 
which he is known, to the people who miss him—only then is a picture 
transformed into a portrait. Thus in Yolngu reckoning we see the 
accepted face of the portrait flipped—the immediacy of recognition is 
dismissed in favour of ‘the pulsing substrates that extend beyond and 
beneath the span of a single life’. There are strong resonances between 
Deger’s project and those of Conomos and Weiss, all three transcending 
accepted parameters of image-making and ways of seeing persons to 
explore modes of identification that are deeply held, defy fixed or 
conventional categories, and call out new visual forms of articulation 
and expression.
Like Maleuvre, Deger foregrounds the idea of the portrait as encounter, 
invoking the work of philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy’s writings 
are particularly pertinent to the interests of all the essays in this 
collection, as becomes clear in his observation that portraits are 
a special instance of the wider phenomena of images:
a portrait touches, or else it is only an identification photo, 
a descriptive record, not an image. What touches is something that 
is borne to the surface from out of an intimacy. But here the portrait 
is only an example. Every image is in some way a ‘portrait’, not in 
that it would reproduce the traits of a person, but in that it pulls and 
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draws … in that it extracts something, an intimacy, a force. And, to 
extract it, it subtracts or removes it from homogeneity, it distracts 
it from it, distinguishes it and casts it forth. It throws it in front of 
us and this throwing, this projection, makes its mark, its very trait 
and its stigma: its tracing, its lines, its style, its incision, its scar, its 
signature, all of this at once.16
Nancy goes on to elaborate this weight that the image brings to bear 
upon those who encounter it: the ultimate significance of the image is 
that it offers up ‘a world we enter while remaining before it ... a world, 
which is to say: an indefinite totality of meaning (and not merely an 
environment)’.17
The essays that follow are all engaged with this power of portraits to 
draw us into worlds. Their overriding common purpose is to reveal 
a  fundamental symbiosis; to understand the workings of images is 
to understand something vital of what it is to be human.
16  Jean-Luc Nancy, The ground of the image, trans. Jeff Fort, New York, Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 4, original emphasis.
17  Nancy, 2005, p. 5.





Rembrandt, or the 
portrait as encounter
Didier Maleuvre
‘A good painter’, says Leonardo da Vinci, ‘is to paint two main 
things, namely man and the workings of man’s mind. The first is 
easy, the second difficult’.1 As portraiture came into its own during 
the Renaissance, it became accepted that a good likeness alone does 
not make a portrait. The able painter must convey, besides mood and 
affect, a sense of who the sitter is: their personality and, deeper still, 
the sense of what it is like to exist as this person. In other words, 
portraiture is a matter not just of aesthetic proficiency but also of moral 
and psychological attunement. But how does the painter step into the 
sitter’s subjectivity? How does s/he paint acknowledgement? It seems 
the artist here must depart from the familiar province of seeming 
and enter the unmarked domain of being—a puzzling transition if 
we consider that art traditionally pairs with imagination and make-
believe.
In this essay, I argue that imagination isn’t an impediment to moral 
perception. In fact, imaginative depiction plays a crucial role in 
apprehending others as persons. I develop this line of argument by 
reflecting on a key feature of portraiture: likeness. Likeness is normally 
understood to be a property of a person’s appearance; but it is also 
1  Leonardo da Vinci, Notebooks, London, Oxford Classics, 1980, p. 168.
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clear that, by definition, likeness refers to a model of comparison 
beyond appearance proper. A person doesn’t look like herself—this 
is a tautology; she looks like the image of herself we mentally draw 
for her. At first blush a portrait presents the likeness of a person; 
on consideration this likeness cannot pre-exist the portrait. Thus 
portraiture is essential to having a likeness, of looking like oneself.
Of interest here is that likeness shifts from the singular to the plural, 
from the personal to the interpersonal. My likeness relies on another 
person’s creative witnessing. How does the intersubjective nature 
of likeness inform portrait painting? How, in particular, does the 
painter represent their commitment to offering the gift of likeness 
(which is ultimately the gift of personhood) to their sitter? I examine 
this question through a selective discussion of portrait paintings of 
Rembrandt, paying special attention to those instances where likeness 
breaks down for the sake of, paradoxically, preserving the uniqueness 
of the represented person.
I
It is no use trying to hide the elephant in the room—not an elephant 
this size. Rembrandt cuts an anachronistic figure in a volume of essays 
addressing portraiture in the digital age. Next to digital photography, 
facial-recognition software and web imagery, Rembrandt is bound to 
look a tad passé. Yet anachronism is far from being the subject of this 
essay. For nothing about a Rembrandt portrait is out of date; nothing 
in what I propose to convey about Rembrandt is indifferent to our 
present circumstances. The time of the portrait, I want to show, is 
now—the now of encounter, the now of the human conversation. 
And this moment, this now, is the beating heart of great portraiture.
This idea that an excellent portrait radiates personal presence is 
actually rather uncontroversial outside of academia. Hopefully, the 
experience I propose to describe isn’t foreign to even the gimlet-eyed 
connoisseur. Wandering through a picture gallery, your eye grazes on 
seascapes and genre scenes, gods and queens, crucifixions, abductions, 
rapture and woe, a repentant Magdalene, a defiantly murderous 
Judith, a congress of happy shepherds. From the corner of your eye 
you wearily spot a portrait. You lumber up to it. You gaze.
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Then it happens. Suddenly, or perhaps slowly, but surely unawares, 
you are drawn into a hypnotic face-to-face. The walls melt away, 
the shuffling crowd vanishes, the world becomes background and 
you are alone in the presence, no longer of a picture, but of a face, a 
person—a person who wants something from you. At last you shake 
yourself free of the spell. You readjust your gaze: once again it is 
just a picture you are looking at. And yet it has become much more. 
The portrait seems to hold the presence, the aura, the heft (there is 
no right word for it) of a real person. Though it falls short of the real 
person, in another sense it feels like too much of one. His or her demand 
on our attention feels unconditional, agonisingly more pressing than 
the real presences we allow to intrude into our everyday attention. 
We seem to have had an ‘encounter’—a word, and an experience, 
on which we will want to cast light.
Not that this encounter is unusual. In fact, the subject of Rembrandt’s 
human realism is, rather, a commonplace of art history. But to say 
that it is commonplace doesn’t mean there is anything ordinary about 
it or that it has been properly looked into. One might even say it 
has been easier to dismiss, for there is something about the achingly 
pressing presence of a Rembrandt portrait that outstrips the remit of 
art historians. It seems to call on the joint counsel of psychologists, 
philosophers, spiritual teachers and saints. It asks for our reckoning, 
but reckoning isn’t the business of art criticism. Whereas the art 
critic will often privately admit the bliss of an encounter, professional 
training, academic discourse and the distinctions of art history journals 
do not really make room for the language to describe it. Specialised 
and technical to a fault, the language of criticism is inimical to the 
‘subjective’ haze of encounter. 
Rather than emotions and intimations, the professional critic prefers 
facts, among which, certifiably, is the artefact. Of one thing the learned 
critic is sure, a painting is a thing. For all its likeness to a person, 
a portrait is an image, and images don’t speak, see or feel. To forget 
this is to wander off into a magic forest where statues walk and plaster 
Madonnas weep. But representations are first and foremost facsimiles. 
However we dig into them we will find pigments and oil and canvas 
and the imaginary reconstruction of an artist. The hard kernel of 
reality is out of the picture. Any attempt to recover it is sentimental 
indulgence; it belongs in the bottom drawer of criticism known as the 
pathetic fallacy, the mistake of attributing an emotion to the object 
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that evokes it rather than the person who feels it. In sum, if you want 
a real person, go to a singles’ bar, not a museum, and by all means stop 
trying to have encounters with dry old paint.2
In search of scientific facts, art criticism latches onto the social and 
material context of art. Rembrandt scholars invite us to focus on the 
conditions of workshop production, the buying and selling of pictures, 
public taste—indeed any contextual element that helps bury the fact 
that for three months a human being sat before another, the first to 
offer their likeness, the second to ponder and recreate it in paint. 
You may call this portrait a Rembrandt, says the critic, but it is really 
‘market conditions’, ‘stylistic conventions’ and ‘set programmes’ that 
created the paintings.3 But, of course, this is a will o’ the wisp—and 
most unscientific to boot. Abstractions like ‘the market’ or ‘public 
taste’ do not make pictures. Men and women do. Indeed, to dismiss 
this plain fact is to commit a pathetic fallacy, and on balance it is 
probably more scientific to believe in weeping icons than historical 
abstractions that paint. Of course it is not my intention to lead us to 
forget that an image isn’t what it represents. I am, however, going to 
look at the person inside the portrait to see what lies at the bottom of 
this naive encounter. Is it a misapprehension? If so, is it pathetic and 
perverse, or benign and necessary? 
II
Some conceptual work is in order if we are to develop the discussion 
further. In essence, I want to show that looking at a portrait and seeing 
a face aren’t dissimilar actions. To see the face as a person is to see the 
portrait in it. My hunch is that the realism we naively maintain at 
the portrait gallery is the same naive realism that allows us to see one 
another as persons and not things.
2  TJ Clark, The site of death: An experiment in art writing, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
2008; James Elkins, Pictures and tears: A history of people who have cried in front of paintings, 
London, Routledge, 2004.
3  Chief among the anti-psychological school of portrait criticism, see Ernst van de Wetering, 
‘The multiple functions  of Rembrandt’s self portraits’, in Christopher White and Quentin 
Buvelot (eds), Rembrandt by himself, London, National Gallery, 1999; H-J. Raupp, Selbstbildnisse 
und Künstlerporträts von Lucas van Leyden bis Anton Raphael Mengs, Brunswick, Herzog Anton 
Ulrich-Museum, 1980.
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Figure 1.1: Portrait of Johannes Wtenbogaert (detail), Rembrandt 
Harmensz. van Rijn, 1633, 130 x 103 cm.
source: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, public domain images. 
A portrait, we are told, is a thing. This is quite true, but empirically 
speaking a face too is a thing—ridges and dips and holes tied to muscle 
attachments. It is realist naivety—our sympathetic tendency to project 
form, intention, sense and feeling—that transforms those ridges and 
holes into a face. Unless we imagine into its surface, unless we take it 
as manifesting consciousness, a face is a hunk of flesh. Our everyday 
approach to the human face is, in a restrictive sense, aesthetic: it draws 
the material data into a portrait, and believes in it.4
Infants are precocious portrait-makers when they interpret the blur 
of eye-mouth-cheek-nose as mother’s face.5 And when young children 
begin drawing, they start by squiggling faces. Representation starts 
spontaneously as portraiture. And this isn’t because a face is a quaint 
and interesting circle. Rather children draw a circle because they see 
a face in it, and drawing it allows them to enact the transfer from 
mind to mother. We begin our toddler-doodler career as naive realists. 
We do not depict in order to cover up or look away from human reality 
but to relate to it through other means. On this score, to insist that a 
portrait is just a system of paint smears is like the sinister pedantry 
that would consist in teaching a child to say not ‘this is mum’, but 
‘this is a shower of photons bouncing off a face, hitting my optic nerve 
4  On the subject of subjective projection see James Elkins, The object stares back: On the 
nature of seeing, New York, Harvest Books, 1997.
5  See John Willats, Making sense of children’s drawings, Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence 




and forming into a mental pattern that denotes another object called 
mum’. In everyday life we elaborate portraits of each other; we see the 
face as figuring forth a human being.
This is not to deny that the human brain somehow gets tricked into 
projecting personality into a two-dimensional facsimile; it is to insist 
that this sort of emphatic naive projection quickens the normal 
process of seeing actual faces. My worry is that when critics deny the 
person in the portrait they undermine the representational thinking 
that sustains ordinary moral intelligence—the intelligence that allows 
us to imagine constructively the life of others and behold the face 
as a portraying-forth. Now this is all very well, but a portrait is a 
thing, and the face quite another. The former we hang on the wall; 
the latter we hang not, or else only to punish. But let us look again 
into the distinction between face and portrait. Our ways of speaking 
often betray us, and in this instance reveal that the difference isn’t 
a hard-and-fast one. 
Of both a portrait and a face we say that they present a likeness. This, 
we say pointing at a photograph, is a likeness of Winston Churchill, 
and we thereby designate an object. But we also use the word ‘likeness’ 
in another sense; for instance, when we say ‘this photograph captures 
Sir Winston’s likeness’ or ‘Sir Winston and Sir Randolph, his son, 
share a likeness’. We can also say a likeness binds the young, middle-
aged, and elderly Winstons. In these instances we are referring not to 
an artefact but to an abstraction. This abstraction is no fancy conceit; 
it is how we identify a person. To recognise Winston Churchill is to 
check his face against an enduring likeness—a likeness that exists 
independently of Winston since, as we have seen, Randolph also 
has a claim to it. Does young Winston look like old Winston, or is 
it old Winston who looks like his younger self? Randolph looks like 
Winston, but this is because Winston looks like Randolph. The point 
is that a likeness doesn’t really belong to the person proper. But, then, 
to whom does it belong?
The observer, of course, and our ability to make a mental portrait out 
of the living person. All in all, and so far as we recognise one another, 
we are the artists of each other’s likeness. This, we are beginning to 
see, has an interesting bearing on personal identity. For if identity 
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assumes being identical to oneself, and if such similarity is construed 
by an observer, then identity will surely involve a strong interpersonal 
element. It takes at least two persons to look like oneself.
Let’s summarise this way: first, a mug becomes a human face insofar as 
we mentally portray it; second, identity is conditional on recognition; 
and third, recognition requires the imaginative projection of a portrait 
onto the face.
III
Let’s now carry these abstractions back to the painter’s studio. 
At  the heart of Rembrandt’s art—I think this is true of all great 
portrait painters—is an insight into the commonality between being 
and being depicted; between, if you will, identity and portraiture. 
The person in the portrait says, ‘I am here because I have been seen. 
I  exist because I have been painstakingly acknowledged to exist’. 
And this statement is no less true outside the portrait gallery. There, 
too, someone’s humanising gaze of others is needed to actuate your or 
my personhood. 
The idea that others give us our humanity doesn’t sit well with our 
culture’s individualistic ethos. We, the children of Descartes, Locke and 
Kant, tend to believe in spontaneously autonomous personal identity. 
Public and private, me and others: this distinction is integral to the 
modern psyche. The self is a private fiefdom. When the ‘I’ presents 
that fiefdom to the world it is always with the sense of putting up a 
public relations pageant. For the true self is what one deeply is, never 
what one shows. Hence our propensity to suspect the touch-up job, 
the slick lie, in portraiture. We cannot help assuming that whatever 
the intention, a portrait holds a mask over the face. The painter, 
we say, could only show what the sitter seemed, not who they are. 
There are several reasons why this is not true, at least not true of 
great portraiture such as Rembrandt’s. Let’s begin with the historical 
reason. The clear-cut duality of private self and public persona, or, 
if you will, face and portrait, doesn’t travel well across the ages. 
Admittedly the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did see a trend 
towards more individualised experience. Castiglione, Montaigne, 
Cervantes, Shakespeare and Descartes—their works are the milestones 
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of a growing sense of separation between the private self and public 
life. Until quite recently, however, these were more philosophical 
exercises than realities. Actual everyday life mostly went on as it had 
for centuries, woven into an intricately communal web. If Shakespeare 
did ‘invent’ the deep modern self, this invention took place on the 
rowdily public London stage—hardly a solitary affair. Even the proto-
individualist Hamlet needs an audience, and a performance of his 
individuality, to get at who he is privately. He doesn’t know himself 
until he acts out his various social selves. Of course he worries about 
being honest and true to himself. The problem is that there is no 
‘himself’ until he acts before a public. 
This was also Rembrandt’s world—a gregariously civic milieu in which 
very few people would have fretted about the division between their 
‘true’ selves and their social selves. It would scarcely have occurred to 
them to consider the gaze of others a Trojan horse. Little would they 
have understood Sartre’s Cartesian trepidations about the objectifying 
glance of others. Seventeenth-century man was an unquestioning 
public creature. To be and to be seen, to be and to be portrayed wasn’t 
the feuding pair it has become in the modern age of privacy. 
If anything, the golden age of Dutch society would have deepened the 
social embedding of selfhood. Released from feudal vassalage, men and 
women had to negotiate their lives and livelihoods, their good names 
and fortunes, in teeming urban environments. Not fixed ancestry but 
trade and burghers’ councils and influence-peddling defined who one 
was. A drawback of merchant society, aristocrats bemoaned, was that 
no one was ever relieved of having to prove their worth. No step up 
the social ladder was secure. The work of garnering social relevance 
was never finished.6 Identity was a fungible asset, always in need of 
recognition and reaffirmation. It was, we might say, permanently on 
the auction block.
This fragility is the context of Rembrandt’s portraiture. It explains 
the expectant attention of his faces, their susceptibility to slight, their 
pained need of confirmation. These were the faces of people who lived 
by the esteem of others. They are the faces of men and women taking 
part in the strange new experiment of having their portraits painted, 
6  See Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its rise, greatness, and fall, 1477–1806, London, 
Clarendon Press pp. 328–32, 344–53.
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a luxury formerly the perk of princes and prelates. Their parents 
had been commoners, invisible and unpaintable. Suddenly they were 
sitting in front of a painter’s easel, like gawky provincials in Sunday 
dress—though dress, when it comes to it, was not something you 
could hide inside because clothes were generally plain and uniform 
in Calvinist Amsterdam. Sumptuary laws frowned on the wearing of 
insignia, frippery and showy signs of distinction. One’s good name was 
one’s face, bare and uncovered, and this is what Rembrandt looked at, 
alive to his sitters’ expectant mood, which sometimes bespeaks utter 
vulnerability. The faces he painted look for a witness: for someone 
with whom they can put themselves in trust.
Very often Rembrandt’s portrait commissions were of merchants 
(the shipbuilder Jan Rijksen, the fur merchant Nicolaes Ruts, the cloth 
merchant Maerton Looten), men whose livelihoods depended on social 
exchange and thus on trust, negotiation and reputation (the part of 
our own self we do not own). Hence the implicit aim of these portraits: 
to present a face that says to investors, bankers, underwriters and 
society at large, ‘you can trust me’, ‘your investment is safe with me’, 
‘give me your guilders and I will repay you tenfold’.
Rembrandt discovers, or at any rate chronicles, what happens to the 
human face in the bourgeois age—the age that made human identity 
ever so much more fragile, more conditional and more contingent than 
it had been under the feudal caste system. Under feudalism, in an age 
of virtually non-existent social mobility, identity was mostly an innate 
non-negotiable asset, high or low, which fortune, better known as 
Divine Providence, allocated at birth to the individual. One was born 
a peasant or a great lord, a laborator or a bellator, and no amount of 
striving could turn the former into the latter (not, at any rate, within 
one lifetime). Enforcing this rigid, one-time allocation of identity 
was the work of theocratic ideology, which remitted the matter of 
personhood to divine ordinance, laying bare the contents of one’s 
psyche to God’s omniscient and omnipresent eye. Why discuss, debate, 
argue, doubt or explore the contents of one’s soul when all is decreed 
and defined by the ultimate Judge above? The question of personal 
identity was, as it were, out of one’s hands and, crucially, out of other 
people’s hands as well. Without straying too far into the sociology 
of the transformation from agrarian feudalism to the mercantile, city-
based economy of the nascent modern period, it is well-known that 
the economic and social experiment first started in the Italian city 
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states of the Renaissance and then more clearly emerged in Flanders, 
Holland and the cities of the Hanseatic League, together with ordered 
trade, manufacture and banking, and the political administration of 
industrial prosperity.7 With urban mercantilism came social mobility 
and therefore a more fluid, contingent and change-prone experience 
of personal identity. No longer was identity a fixed allocation. It was 
a movable and negotiable asset, a currency subject to the upward and 
downward re-evaluations of good and bad luck (for this reason the 
allegoric figure of Fortuna re-emerges during the Renaissance), and 
subject also to the contingencies of personal success or failure, and 
consequent civic standing. In sum, identity in the bourgeois economy 
of incipiently modern Europe had a much more fragile, vulnerable, 
fungible quality. As society moved from the Court to the Town, identity 
came to depend on ongoing exchange with equals, competitors, fellow 
guildsmen, associates, customers, fellow traders and neighbours. 
Acknowledgement was given, but like all things given could be taken 
back or refused. We see in the mercantile city just how much identity 
rested on the currency of one’s good name, one’s reputation: that is, 
through the recognition of others.
The contrast between the fixity of pre-bourgeois identity and a 
contingent bourgeois experience of identity is best seen when 
we consider the court portraiture of the Cinquecento of a painter 
like Bronzino against Rembrandt’s civic portraiture of mercantile 
Amsterdam. The high gloss and immaculate finish of a Bronzino 
portrait, such as the portrait of Eleonora of Toledo, Grand Duchess of 
Tuscany, conveys but one thing: that the creature before us is a kind 
of immaculata conceptio of identity. Bronzino doesn’t delve into the 
inner springs of personality; he maintains the mystique of aristocratic 
status, its aloofness, the idea that a great lord is not made but born. 
The Duchess’s subjectivity doesn’t wait on our testimony. Nor does it 
wear on contact or leak. It is decay-proof. Certainly it isn’t liable to 
downward reappraisal. For this reason no grand duchess of Tuscany 
ever asked a Rembrandt to do her portrait. She who thrives on ignoring 
the gaze of the awestruck many—this person wants not a Rembrandt 
but a court artist; the Bronzino of the Medici court or the David 
of Napoleonic glory, an artist who can rustle up the stainless gloss 
7  Fernand Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th century, Vol. 1: The structures of 
everyday life, New York, Harper & Row, 1981, esp. pp. 479–525.
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of  a bulletproof face. Sensitive portraits of tyrants are few because 
tyrants freeze the person-to-person encounter that begets intimate 
portraiture: Elizabeth I is a jewel-box, Louis XIV a minotaur, Stalin 
a poster idol. Court portraiture conveyed all this by holding forth a 
miracle of synthesis: not a visible brushstroke betrays its making, 
its workshop provenance. 
This contrasts sharply with Dutch portraiture. Unlike its Italianate 
cousin, a portrait by Rembrandt or Frans Hals doesn’t conceal its 
layered, analytic, obviously manufactured construction. It isn’t just 
that Dutch portraiture doesn’t airbrush the corrugations of time and 
the material genealogy of the individual’s flesh. It’s that the portraitist 
flaunts their brushstrokes (thick, streaky, laboured), which tell of 
industry. The strenuous hand admits that these burghers, far from 
being born into an identity, made themselves who they are. In life as 
in paint, they are made of contingency.
Social identity in the bourgeois age is work-in-progress. Unlike 
the Duchess, a Dutch burgher cannot take recognition for granted. 
Eleonora of Toledo’s identity is an awesome fait accompli. The Dutch 
merchant who sits for his portrait, by contrast, calls on our recognition; 
his likeness has an expectant, other-directed quality, conveyed by the 
deliberately tentative, cumulative brushwork. The latter tells us that 
identity is a mutually constructed thing. Both sitter and painter have 
to work at it. Identity is interaction, that is, artefact, and it is achingly 
alive to the confirming look of others. See me, the Rembrandt face 
says. See me and ponder me, because without you I am not sure. Here 
identity awaits confirmation. Thus the contrast between aristocratic 
and bourgeois portraiture, Italian and Dutch, Court and Town comes 
to this: while a Bronzino records a pre-existing face; Rembrandt 
recommends a face to our attention, knowing that this face exists only 
so far as this recommendation and this attention last. 
Where caste and religion prevail, the painter isn’t invited to puzzle 
out the sitter’s personality, the facial chiaroscuro of seeing and being 
seen. The painter doesn’t need to plumb the silence of a human face 
because there is no silence. God knows everything, down to the lees of 
one’s mortal soul. This certainty siphons off facial depth and mystery. 
The  faces of the theological-aristocratic age are those of people 
who know they cannot stop being who they are. If they do pose, 
their posing comes naturally. One might say that it hides nothing. 
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First, because nothing is ever hidden (from God); second, because no 
amount of inner idiosyncrasy, of internal twistedness, can dint the 
iron of caste identity (a mad king is king nonetheless); and third, 
because the divide between public and private, the outer and the 
inner, isn’t the antinomy that it would become post-Reformation. This 
homogeneity of identity helps to explain the mostly flat, hieratic style 
of portraiture that prevailed until the mercantile revolution of the late 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Until then a portrait tended to be 
a symbol, an icon, a cameo, generally cold to psychological probing. 
It is in the mercantile city-states of Italy, then of Northern Europe that, 
not coincidentally, portraiture evolves towards a less hieratic style. 
In the late 1400s, the portrait turns sideways: neither frontal, nor 
profile, but in-between; half in light, half in shade, a limbo between 
revelation and mystery. Henceforth, particularly in Rembrandt, when 
the subject does strike a grand pose it is with a self-undercutting hint 
of irony; sometimes of parody.
Rembrandt indeed learned from Italianate portraiture, and parodied 
its forms (Rembrandt sitting himself in the fur and velvet of a 
Raphael grandee). Art historians regard these portraits as parodic or 
aspirational—Rembrandt, the son of a country miller and a baker’s 
daughter, either clawing his way into the dream-life of a Florentine 
prince or mocking its pretensions.8 Whether aspiration or political 
lampoon, we cannot for this reason take his self-portraits, at any 
rate those of the middle period, as straightforward invitations to a 
one-to-one with the artist. A great deal of window-dressing has 
gone into them. Less so in the portraits of the late period, when 
Rembrandt’s bourgeois fortune began to turn, and creditors took away 
his furniture, and his standing among the Amsterdam bourgeoisie 
began to totter; when, indeed, he became an economic failure. Gone 
then is the parodic intent, the aesthetic commentary on his Italian 
predecessors, the insider’s joke or political theatre.9 From then on 
his self-portraits are more a plea for recognition, that most precious 
of bourgeois commodities, especially for the bourgeois loser, which, 
socially speaking, is what Rembrandt became in his last, sad decade. 
In these self-portraits Rembrandt takes in the full fact of his inner 
and outer contingency, depicting himself with the same earnestness, 
8  Mariet Westermann, Rembrandt, London, Phaidon, 2000, pp. 153–7.
9  Harry Berger Jr, Fictions of the pose: Rembrandt against the Italian Renaissance, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 427–514. 
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sensibility and earnest recognition he had given his sitters in the best 
portraits. Rembrandt is undeniably in dialogue with other painters, in 
particular with Rubens and the Italians. As such he is in dialogue with 
art’s history, forms and ideas. But his attention isn’t merely theoretical, 
and the subject of his paintings isn’t just other paintings. Standing at 
the easel, Rembrandt is also in dialogue with people—his sitters, his 
relations, his own person, to whom he owes the currency of bourgeois 
life: that is, acknowledgement, the gift of biography.
The personalism of Rembrandt’s portraiture is, first of all, a by-
product of a great social experiment: the sea change that was the 
relative equality of social conditions or, if not equality, at least the 
breachability of conditions—the fact that social status was now open 
to new entrants (and also produced outgoing losers). This levelling 
of human identity (no longer an immutable, God-appointed fixture 
but a permeable process, an economic variable) is essential to the 
experience of the portrait-as-encounter. It must be remembered that 
Dutch painters, whether Rubens, Jan de Bray, Frans Hals, Vermeer, 
Pieter de Hooch, Gerrit Dou, Jan Steen or Rembrandt, all hailed from 
the merchant middle class, sometimes from the stratum of artisans and 
small traders—the same middle class that by and large was the subject 
of their portraiture. This means that when Rembrandt stood at the 
easel he did not face princely creatures stratospherically above his 
own station. He saw fellow beings who competed in the marketplace 
of social acknowledgement like he did. And like him, the burgomaster 
sitter wasn’t a mythical projection of the grovelling crowd; he was 
above all a fellow citizen paying another to depict him—that is, to be 
seen, acknowledged, portrayed. This is no simple service, for if the 
customer’s power lies in his fee, the artist holds the spiritual power 
of recognition. And when it comes to portraying his fellow townsmen 
and women, Rembrandt doesn’t do satire or sentimentality, and he 
certainly doesn’t do adoration. He does civic acknowledgement, which 
he knows is the mysterious quantity by which he, good bourgeois 
that he is, lives. So he renders the russet frizz of the man’s beard, the 
sympathetic crow’s feet around the eye, the embossing of midlife on 
the cheek as though each detail were a talisman, the concentrate of 
an entire life. A person stands forth: not a curiosity, not a facet of 
everyday life, but a person, a person like oneself, one might say, except 
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that oneself, as Rembrandt acknowledged in his self-portraiture, is far 
from being an open-and-shut case. It requires abysmal attention: 
literally, a taste for the abyss. 
Civic equality (not to mention the Christian equality of souls) enabled 
the portrait-as-encounter. Which is why, at least to my eye, Rembrandt 
isn’t quite as adept at giving women their full subjectivity. Either lust 
or a gender barrier or prejudice (we cannot venture to say which) blurs 
the mirror. He certainly is a better observer of matrons; the younger 
or more desirable the female, the more he tends to confabulate. It is 
a creature of fancy Rembrandt paints in the portraits of his beloved 
Saskia, and for all their hint of intimacy, we feel ourselves being set up 
to ogle and daydream. Rembrandt is known to paint women in profile, 
but no man does he ever sit in profile. A profile tends to be much 
more of a stylised synthesis. In any case it isn’t something one has to 
face. One doesn’t have to stare into those eyes. For this reason a profile 
is easily abducted by abstraction. 
Fanciful avoidance also has the better of Rembrandt when he turns 
to group portraits. The fantastical masquerade that is The night watch 
suggests that he fell for the musketeer mystique. Here he stops looking; 
he confabulates. We admire the brilliance; address ourselves to the 
separate person, however, we cannot. Likewise, his pictures of the 
patriciate of aristocratic young bloods, whom he depicts as soft-focus 
apparitions, eyes and bodies sidling into some romantic unknown. It is 
cases like these that, from a position much lower down the social ladder, 
Rembrandt delivers social mystique as commissioned, with creatures 
delicately airbrushed out of everyday life. This is Rembrandt at his 
most Italianate.10 And for a moment, as with an aristocratic portrait 
by Titian, we feel the cold whiff of unshakable self-certainty, and of 
what it is like to exist beneath the notice of people to whom one does 
not, and could never, matter. The aristocrat of the Baroque courts had 
his portrait drawn not to solicit public attention but to confirm that 
all eyes were on him even before he cared to look down. The bourgeois 
who is Rembrandt’s subject secures social acknowledgement through 
the portrait. And social acknowledgement (negotiable, contingent, 
conditional) is what Rembrandt cannot help distil into his own, 
especially late, self-portraits. 
10  On the topic of Rembrandt and Italian art, see Kenneth Clark, Rembrandt and the Italian 
Renaissance, New York, New York University Press, 1966; and Berger, 2000.
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Compare Titian’s Portrait of a man and Rembrandt’s admiring tribute 
to the Venetian master, Self-portrait leaning on a stone sill. For all 
Rembrandt’s admiration of Titian, he seems not to grasp what makes 
the latter’s portrait so terrifyingly beautiful: its aristocratic disdain. 
Titian’s man doesn’t need us to carry on in his magnificent, lip-curled 
existence. He sees us before we see him, and doesn’t find the prospect 
rewarding. We are an off-glance in his day. Rembrandt’s face is another 
story: it quavers with alertness. Wrinkle-browed, the hint of a bite on 
his lips, his gaze seared into ours, he is nothing if not determined to 
catch our eye. He may look dashing under the cocked beret, but the 
flurried cross-hatching, the crackling frizz of hair, the static bristles 
of his sleeve all prickle with intent, the lines at dry point crisscrossing 
his figure in a fever of attention-getting, the strain of which finally 
tells in the fatigued dimming of his eyes. Or take Raphael’s Portrait of 
Castiglione and Rembrandt’s homage: Platonic poise and dreaminess on 
Raphael’s side; on Rembrandt’s a man who buttonholes our attention 
lest he cease to exist should we look away. Castiglione exists before 
and after the portrait; Rembrandt, precariously, through the portrait.
IV
The idea that the bourgeois self exists through the portrait allows us to 
revisit another commonplace of portrait criticism. Earlier I betrayed 
dissatisfaction with some blind spots of materialist criticism. But this 
isn’t to say at all that subjective-emotive art criticism has all the right 
answers. One of its core assumptions is that a portrait records a pre-
existing personality; that it serves as a personal mirror. ‘A private 
dialogue, a lonely old man communicating with himself while he 
painted’, is how one critic explains Rembrandt’s late self-portraits.11 
This idea is both obvious and untrue. 
First of all, a portrait is much more than a channel of communication; 
it is an act of creation. A mirror relays a pre-existing likeness, 
whereas a portrait creates one. Moreover as intimate and personal 
as a self-portrait may be, it is never a ‘private dialogue’. There is 
little about a portrait that is merely inward or private. Painting is 
a hands-on activity that generates a concrete artefact. In the work 
11  Manuel Gasser, Self-portraits from the fifteenth century to the present day, New York, 
Appleton Century, 1963, pp. 90–1.
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of art the subjective objectifies itself, and the inner becomes outer. 
Self-portraiture secretly wants an audience; it asks a public to ratify 
from the outside who one takes oneself to be on the inside. This way 
of cultivating external forms  throws into doubt the notion of some 
internally looped personal self. 
Figure 1.2: Self-portrait as the Apostle Paul, Rembrandt Harmensz. van 
Rijn, 1661, oil on canvas, 91 x 77 cm.
source: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, public domain images.
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Far from being inward, a self-portrait requires a painter to adopt an 
external viewpoint. The artist depicts himself not by looking inward 
but by looking at what other people see. Self-depiction here is filled 
with the acknowledgement of other people’s gaze. It is a confession 
about the ghostliness of the so-called inner self. Had Rembrandt 
possessed perfect self-transparency, it is unlikely he would have 
returned again and again to the mirror over his seventy-eight self-
portraits. Rembrandt wasn’t himself until he painted himself. And more 
than a means to construct an identity, self-portraiture was internal to 
his sense of self. It was just what it felt like to be Rembrandt.12
There is a hint of this in his working method. Not for Rembrandt 
the job of merely capturing his own likeness. The stakes were higher: 
it was a matter of finding himself. As a pupil described, Rembrandt 
never began a portrait by contouring or defining his general features 
but rather by ‘violent, flurried strokes ... Painting by means of 
these strokes, he worked so slowly, and completed his things with 
a tardiness and toil never equalled by anybody’.13 Rembrandt didn’t 
‘block’ the face and then fill it in. He didn’t have a theoretic overview 
of a likeness; human presence was something he needed to paint his 
way into, layering and moulding one brushstroke at a time, building 
towards a climax of recognition that came, or not, at the end of three 
months, often more, a delay not every Amsterdam patron was willing 
to endure, which is perhaps why Rembrandt so frequently turned 
to the long-suffering mirror. Rembrandt worked ad hoc, resisting 
the easy lure of summarily sizing up the sitter. Hence the iterative 
paint strokes, the clotted, glutinous, lumpy texture of his surfaces, 
particularly of the late period. They are of faces travelled through, 
explored, delved into. Above all, they are incorporate faces, heavy 
with mortal flesh, with ageing and physicality. We can see the welts 
of paint laid on, one after the other. We feel the toil, and the duration 
of making enters the portrait and time becomes one of its dimensions. 
These searching, overlapping strokes are like a process of approaching; 
they ask permission for ingress. They are the work of acquaintance. 
They acknowledge the perfectible, never perfected labour of adjusting 
12  See Alpers’ discussion of Rembrandt portraiture as theatre in Svetlana Alpers, Rembrandt’s 
enterprise: The studio and the market, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1998, pp. 34–6. This 
analysis supports my intuition that unless it is portrayed, a face remains abstract. But then the 
aesthetic mode isn’t theatre; it makes real people more real.
13  Joachim von Sandrart, Filippo Baldinucci and Arnold Houbraken, Lives of Rembrandt, 
London, Pallas Athene, 2008, p. 23.
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to a reality that is more commanding and elusive than painting itself, 
though it requires painting to come into its own. That reality is the 
face—civic bourgeois identity in the flesh.
This long, drawn-out painterly labour is a lesson to us whose idea 
of portraiture is irremediably tainted by photography. Today, in the 
vast majority of cases, portraiture means snapping a picture. And 
photography doesn’t go much for the soft-footed work of acquaintance. 
The camera is a hunter, not an interlocutor. It ‘catches’ or ‘captures’ a 
moment. It snaps and snags. Photography is an aesthetic of shoplifting, 
not of confession. It is also a rhetoric of extreme reduction for it crams 
the vast and fluid presence that is a human being into a split second 
snatched out of the air. It purports to trap the human form of life 
in a quantum. Think of the crushingly vacant eye of Hal 9000, the 
supercomputer villain in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A space odyssey. 
Here the aesthetic of soul snatching meets the aesthetic of murder. 
Hal records without seeing, and this is why murder comes so easily 
to it.
As for the human eye itself, it doesn’t see in 1/500th-of-a-second 
brackets. Cutting into life, a photograph shows what no one actually 
ever sees. Its nature is forensic, and its use archival. A portrait, for this 
very reason, it cannot yield since it cannot describe and doesn’t wait on 
a face. It doesn’t have the active patience to suffer a reality to emerge. 
And without the creative patience that is description, without the 
labour of seeing one’s way around the landscape of a face, the human 
face is but a wan abstraction, a graph, a marker—this independently 
of how true to life its record may be.
Perceiving the abstract nature of photography depends on whether 
we remain alive to the danger against which Rembrandt is warning—
the danger of distraction. Rembrandt’s romance of the face reminds 
us that our existence hangs on each other’s gaze. We are humans 
thanks to the moral work of mutual depiction. Nothing is so common 
as to dismiss a face as a thing or a type. Nothing is so tempting as 
casualness, especially in our photographic, televisual culture, where 
offhand attention is a style—the ‘cool’ cat, the slacker who ‘chills’, 
the Facebook selfie flashing the orthodontically standardised grin that 
makes one look like a photograph even before the picture is taken 
(there is such an undertow of conformity in our scramble for personal 
recognition). 
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Real portraiture is the opposite of casualness. To portray is an act of 
looking-at that is also a looking-after. It makes a face matter. It may 
be informal but it is never casual. And because it is not casual, its 
products are never generic. A photograph cannot care because a 
camera lens cannot see what it records. And no matter how great 
or intelligent or kind a photographer is, he or she cannot force the 
camera to care. This is why a good portrait photograph is good in spite 
of being a photograph; it is good by virtue of being lucky—because 
the button was pushed at the right moment. 
Take, for example, the world-famous 1984 photograph of the emerald-
eyed Afghan girl also known as the ‘Afghan Mona Lisa’. The moniker 
alone speaks volumes about how little we think of portraiture, 
or how little we expect of each other. As photography goes it is a 
striking picture of a strikingly beautiful face framed by a Holbein-
green backdrop and a cinnamon headscarf. If the picture is beautiful, 
however, it is because the girl is beautiful. Photojournalist Steve 
McCurry was a lucky man with the right equipment. But his skills 
were of a technical not moral nature. He may well be a big-hearted 
human being; but the point is big-heartedness is not required to 
produce a great photo of a face. A photographer doesn’t need to be 
especially attentive, patient, responsive or committed. In principle 
there is no reason why the ‘Afghan Mona Lisa’ couldn’t be the work 
of a sociopath. We wouldn’t know the difference.
By contrast, imagine a portraitist who is narrow-eyed, cruel, callous, 
shifty, incurious, absent-minded: their pictures are likely to be 
caricatures, mangled nightmares—the gropings of soul-blindness. 
A psychopath can presumably make a good mathematician, perhaps a 
piano virtuoso, a master of systems; to be a good portraitist it takes an 
artist who, when at the easel, is morally awake. 
Late twentieth-century portraiture is alive to the moral vacancy 
of photography. Andy Warhol turned out reams of photo-painted 
portraits that are really an elegy to portraiture: bleached and flattened 
facial logos that are more trademarks than persons. How quickly 
has mass-processed photography leached the lifeblood out of a face. 
Warhol makes portraits of persons who are never truly seen, only 
recognised—congealed in the formaldehyde of fame, crudely outlined 
and daubed in the neon glare of instantaneous mass recognition: 
cognition without encounter. Your face, my face: who has time to 
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notice? The camera lens does it for us. Truly the camera has cheapened 
the human face, taking the labour (of love) out of it. What took months 
for Rembrandt to reckon with, the lens shutter dispatches in a trice. 
And there is a price to pay for efficiency. The camera’s indifference 
wears hard on the face. There hangs over it the glassy reminder that 
in between the eye and the sitter there stood a recording device 
implacably devoid of concern, sociopathically casual. Warhol’s 
masochistic charm, we might say, consists in showing what happens 
to the human face when we allow ourselves to be recorded without 
being depicted. We revert to flesh, or its postmodern equivalent, 
plastic (think of Jeff Koon’s embalming treatment of Michael Jackson, 
or Pierre and Gilles’ cryogenically candied faces).
Genuinely depicted flesh, by contrast, is never just flesh. Rembrandt’s 
famous painting of the flayed ox shows a carcass, which though dead 
is anything but lifeless. In fact, you might say it isn’t dead enough. 
Whatever we depict as dead is understood to have lost its life. And 
whatever lacks life is not lifeless. For what lacks spirit by definition 
ails, is bereft, is soulful—is as throbbingly soulful as that carcass 
that still screams for the life wrenched out of it. Nothing that is truly 
depicted is ever lifeless. If meat could not be dead stuff to Rembrandt’s 
eye, then how much less a human face?
The novelist Jean Genet disagrees. He argues that Rembrandt’s late 
self-portraits proclaim a painter who ‘had to recognize himself as a 
man of flesh—of flesh?—rather of meat, of hash, of blood, of tears, 
of sweat, of shit, of intelligence, of other things too, ad infinitum’.14 
Actually this statement disproves itself (at least with respect to blood, 
tears and sweat). To recognise oneself as meat assumes the power of 
self-recognition. To be merely meat, to be meat all the way, would take 
away the ability to see, let alone represent one’s self as such. Thus the 
announcement that one is meat, plastic and shit should be construed 
as a roundabout refusal to be just that.
Nevertheless, Genet was right in that representation generally wields 
a leaden touch. The artist peels off a likeness from the living and 
transfers it to the inanimate canvas, a surface that is as lifeless as the 
14  Jean Genet, What remains of a Rembrandt torn into four equal pieces, and flushed down the 
toilet, Madras and New York, Hanuman Books, 1988, p. 43.
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corpse of an anatomy lesson. Perhaps a pause of queasy self-recognition 
crept upon Rembrandt as he painted surgeons around the dissecting 
table, in their midst a former person who is now meat, tendons, guts 
and, yes, paint streaks. Smears and daubs, after all, are what a portrait 
inescapably is. Could this be a clue to the oddest of Rembrandt’s self-
portraits, the one where he dangles a lifeless heron so that it blocks 
his face? When torn from the person and nailed on canvas, a likeness 
is a hunting trophy of sorts. Where, at any rate, is the ontological 
difference between a painting and a dead bird? 
So a portraitist casts the evil eye, and the death-dealing glare is inherent 
in representation, whether it be the kindergartener’s doodle or Ingres’ 
exquisite sketches. Yet in the measure that the artist knows this, so he 
can also control it. An artist’s job is to challenge the confines of his 
medium, not to plead captivity to its moral shortcomings. The odds 
are that an image will objectify; this is why there is grace and beauty 
in the portrait that succeeds in beating the odds. 
Rembrandt returned often to the motif of corpses, perhaps because it 
was an opportunity to reflect on the danger of image-making. Perhaps 
he understood that portrait painting requires a touch as careful as the 
surgeon’s own, a touch that remedies what even the surgeon cannot. 
For anatomists bow to the deadening process that runs from subject to 
object. Surgeons, after all, deal with nuts and bolts, whether they be 
dead or alive. The painter, by contrast, strives in the opposite direction, 
from object to subject. And when Rembrandt paints a corpse, it is 
to affirm its humanity. Such is the case of the stunning Anatomy of 
Dr Joan Deijman (1657), where Rembrandt puts before us an empty 
chest cavity from which the human heart is intolerably absent. It is the 
absence we are meant to endure. Call it a reverse portrait, a portrait of 
the aching absence of subjective life. Here, too, humanity proclaims 
its own demise, and thereby affirms itself.
This is why, in parting, we return to the portrait that first hypnotised 
us by its simple plea for solidarity. It is the unguarded confession, the 
poignant vulnerability of a Rembrandt portrait that moves us. It is the 
confession that the face in front of us is in need of us; that without 
us it is not a face but an anatomy. The humanity he or she has is the 
humanity we give them. The human face truly is tender clay: when 
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we withdraw the feelers of recognition, it goes flat; it dulls, and dies. 
The portrait lives not by internal combustion but in the same way that 
the human face comes alive: in the degree to which it is encountered. 
Rembrandt took on the work of building the human conversation and 
this is the work he passes on to us. How we pick it up from here—how 
long we remain alive to the call of these impossibly soulful eyes—




Pictures for our time and place: 
Reflections on painting in 
a digital age
Melinda Hinkson
Social theorist Zygmunt Bauman puts forward the proposition that 
‘life is a work of art’. The statement appears glib without Bauman’s 
further qualification: ‘Being an individual’, he suggests, ‘(that is, being 
responsible for your choice of life, your choice among choices, and the 
consequences of the choices you chose) is not a matter of choice, but 
a decree of fate’. Identity, Bauman tells us, needs to be created, just 
as works of art are created.1 In the present we are, he suggests, all 
artists of life. Bauman’s reflections on the art of identity-making—
which point to certain generalised processes at work in our society 
more than art creation per se—are confirmed in the observations of 
other social theorists. Arjun Appadurai argues that with the rise of 
technological mediation imagination is transformed—it ‘has broken 
out of the special expressive space of art, myth, and ritual and has now 
become a part of the quotidian mental work of ordinary people’; it ‘has 
become a collective social fact’.2 Sociologist John Thompson writes of 
the defining ontological challenge that confronts us in the present: 
to coherently integrate two registers in which we experience others 
1  Zygmunt Bauman, The art of life, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008, pp. 53–4.
2  Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at large, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 5.
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and the world around us—experience we might simply characterise 
in terms of presence, and the experience of distance that is enabled by 
technological mediation, in the first instance by the advent of print 
and generalised print literacy and then progressively by networked 
computerisation.3
Each of these writers is concerned with the way technological 
mediation brings about a new social landscape in which the onus is on 
the individual to draw relations of presence and distance into coherent 
alignment. This ‘new’ province of subject formation is the ‘old’ work 
of artists. As Hans Belting reminds us, the most basic and complex 
definition of an image is that it makes an absence present.4 Crucially 
an image cannot execute its own coming into being. Images are made 
present by the media that make them tangible and animate them and 
the bodies that produce and respond to them. Belting’s model of image–
media–body transcends the presence/absence binary presupposed 
by the social theorists while continuing to foreground questions of 
qualitative distinction between differently mediated forms of image. 
It is a potent model for thinking about relations between persons and 
images in the present.
In this essay, I briefly consider these issues from the perspective of two 
quite different locations. The first is the mediated public sphere. The 
second is the intimate space of painting production. The link between 
these locations is painting itself, and, more particularly, attitudes to 
painting, acts of looking at paintings and making paintings in an era of 
accelerated technological mediation. Pursuing a nuanced understanding 
of what might be described as a contemporary cultural attitude to 
painting, I briefly consider the work of three Canberra-based painters: 
Micky Allan, Vanessa Barbay and Jude Rae. Significantly, none of 
these painters is directly engaged with the problem of mediation I have 
established. All three are committed to painting as a distinctive medium 
of artistic practice. In looking at their approaches, we nevertheless 
gain important insights into how technological mediation figures in the 
cultural practice of painting in the present. We also encounter distinctive 
3  John Thompson, The media and modernity: A social theory of the media, California, Stanford 
University Press, 1995. A large and complex literature tracks the social consequences of 
technological mediation from print literacy through to the digital period. Among others see 
Anthony Giddens, Modernity and self-identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991; Walter Ong, 
Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the world, London, Methuen, 1982.
4  Hans Belting, An anthropology of images: Picture, medium, body, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2011.
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perspectives on the contemporary problematic of imaging identity in 
general and portraiture in particular. Before turning to consider this 
work, I want to explore a minor art scandal that erupted in Australia in 
2010 to establish a context for thinking about a contemporary cultural 
attitude to images. Far from being peripheral to the concerns of a book 
on portraiture in the digital age, I will argue that in tacking between 
these spaces of looking at and making artworks, we gain insight 
into the complex interplay between the life history of persons, place 
and technological mediation that bear upon contemporary creative 
approaches to imaging identity.
In April 2010, Melbourne artist Sam Leach took out two of Australia’s 
most prestigious art awards—the Archibald Prize for portraiture 
and the Wynne Prize for Australian Landscape painting. Public 
outcry followed the revelation that his entry in the Wynne Prize, the 
painting Proposal for a Landscaped Cosmos, was ‘a copy’ of a work 
by seventeenth-century Dutch painter Adam Pynacker, held in the 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. On 14 April 2010, the headline on the front 
page of The Australian screamed ‘Double Dutch: Scandal rocks Wynne 
prize’. Under this headline, the newspaper paired low-resolution 
images of the two works side-by-side, inviting readers to make their 
own comparison.
Figure 2.1: Left: Boatmen moored on a lakeshore, Adam Pynacker, 1668; 
Right: Proposal for landscaped cosmos, Sam Leach, 2010. 
Low resolution scans of these two images were reproduced side by side under the headline, 
‘Double Dutch: scandal rocks Wynne painting prize’, in The Australian and online outlets, 
14 April 2010.
source: Left: Wikimedia commons; Right: courtesy of the artist.
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In the days that followed, Australian talkback radio and the 
blogosphere  were alive with commentary on the ‘embarrassing’ 
situation. The Art Gallery of NSW was said to be ‘a joke’. The judges’ 
insistence that they would have awarded the prize even if they had 
known the painting was a ‘copy’ was said to set off the ‘old bullshit 
meter’. The painting was ridiculed not only as a copy but also a ‘poor 
imitation’ that one might ‘expect to commission in Asia from the 
… workshops that create these sorts of fakes’. And in perhaps the 
harshest blow to the artist, his ‘mediocrity’ should have come as no 
surprise because, as one commentator revealed, Leach was ‘merely 
a graphic designer’.5
Beyond this online chatter, which might be identified as revealing 
one dimension of a familiar Australian attitude to art, commentary on 
the Wynne Prize was interesting for what it seemed to reveal about 
an attitude to painting, and more specifically landscape painting. 
Running through the commentary was a desire to see painting 
conform to particular expectations. Landscape painting should be 
unmediated: it should deal with what can be seen; it should be about 
the ‘real’ environment. Considerable hostility was directed towards 
Leach for having depicted a Dutch landscape rather than one that was 
‘authentically’ Australian. While the whole episode might easily be 
dismissed as a predictable clash between a misguided artist who should 
have properly attributed his painting and persistent modernist desires 
among ‘the public’ for a coherent and knowable subject, I want to 
suggest that the scandal around Sam Leach’s painting can be usefully 
explored in terms of the interests I have established—particularly 
for what it reveals about a generalised desire in the present for an 
authentic art (read: painting) that is independent of the effects of 
technological mediation and its logic of simulation. 
Yves-Alain Bois reminds us that such attitudes to painting and the 
desire for the integrity of specific media are by no means new and 
by no means restricted to ‘the public’. 6 They emerged in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century as part of a general ‘attempt to 
free art from its contamination by the forms of exchange produced 
5  All quotes are taken from comments posted on Crikey.com, 14 April 2010.
6  See Diarmuid Costello, ‘On the very idea of a “specific” medium: Michael Fried and Stanley 
Cavell on painting and photography as arts’, Critical Inquiry, no. 34, 2008, pp. 274–312.
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by capitalism’.7 As we approach the present, the urge remains to free 
art not only from the contaminating effects of the market but from 
information. Yves-Alain Bois considers the naivety of such longing 
at a time where ‘reproducibility and fetishization have permeated all 
aspects of life’, and indeed have become our ‘“natural” world’.8 Given 
these circumstances, we must shift orientation if we are to identify the 
substantive work that painting can continue to do. Here Bois invokes 
Mondrian, for whom painting was, 
a theoretical model that provided concepts and invented procedures 
that dealt with reality: it is not merely an interpretation of the world, 
but the plastic manifestation of a certain logic that he found at the root 
of all the phenomena of life.9
It is in this deployment of painting as a distinctive method of working 
through questions, rather than as a means to an end, that we find 
a compelling response to glib claims of painting’s death in the face 
of photography and the market.
Two weeks after being awarded the Wynne, Sam Leach made his 
first public comment, appearing on the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s Radio National, in a 30-minute conversation with senior 
journalist Monica Attard. For the first time the artist made public his 
intentions in relation to the painting entered into the Wynne prize, 
telling Attard, ‘I wanted to make a painting that was very optimistic, 
actually, about humanity’. Leach continued: 
I wanted to make a painting that was going to be about projecting an 
idealised landscape into the deep future. That was really the point of 
it; to say … maybe humans will actually survive, and maybe if we do 
… technology could be used to do something that’s quite beautiful. 
Here Leach revealed that his painting dealt with a technological theme: 
SL: [W]hat I really wanted to do was take that … idealised, archaic 
landscape and just flip the meaning from it … I wanted to take out 
those things [the figures, the pastoral idyll] the … golden, idealised 
past and turn the meaning of the painting into something that’s about 
… projecting the idea into the future.
7  Yves-Alain Bois, Painting at model, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1993, p. 235.
8  Bois, 1993, p. 242.
9  Bois, 1993, p. 240.
IMAGInG IDenTITy
42
MA: So then why didn’t you just cite the original work?
SL: You know, having said all of that … the original painting itself is 
not actually what my work is about. My work is about an idealised 
future … when you put a painting into a gallery basically you’ve only 
… got a small amount of information that you can give the viewer and 
that is the painting itself and the title … I wanted to make sure my 
title … gave viewers a guide to the painting.
MA: With all due respect, I mean, the title is not what you look at. 
What takes the eye is the image, and the image is strikingly similar to 
the Pynacker.
SL: [I]t’s clear that the painting is based on that original painting. But 
actually the content and meaning of the painting is quite different 
from the original painting. And … if you … had the original painting 
and my painting side by side you’d see that there are a number of 
distinct differences really.
MA: I’ve seen them reproduced in the media, and to me, what strikes my 
eye is the jutting landscape … it almost overrules everything else. So 
again, I’m surprised to hear you say that, in your mind, that you were 
creating something distinctly new.
SL: [Y]es, the composition is the same. And I did actually work quite 
hard to maintain the feel of that original Italianate landscape. If 
you look at the painting and … you think that landscape is like the 
original 17th century, well, that’s really part of the intention of the 
work. But really, when people look at a painting, I think many people 
at least will look at the detail of the painting and think about how that 
detail informs the entire work.10
This dialogue is revealing for the profound disconnect it registers 
between painter and journalist, particularly around concepts of 
representation and authenticity. What I want to highlight is the 
way each assumes a contrary position regarding the circumstances 
under which viewers might engage with the paintings in question. 
The painter makes it clear he assumes a viewer who sympathises with 
his intentions and, importantly, who will encounter his picture in all 
its detail in material form, scale, technique and texture. He assumes 
a viewer with an appreciation for paint, not simply as image, but 
as material dealt with in particular ways. The journalist expresses 
10  Sunday profile, ABC Radio National, Friday 30 April 2010, www.abc.net.au/sundayprofile/
stories/2886663.htm, accessed 1 March 2016, emphasis added.
43
2 . PICTuRes foR ouR TIMe AnD PLACe
a collective desire for an unmediated painting, but simultaneously 
assumes the viewer’s access to these paintings via rescaled digitised 
images on television or the internet to be unproblematic.11 The painter 
assumes people will be physically in the company of his pictures. 
The  journalist assumes the integrity of mediated engagement. 
Crucially, while the mediated environment is an essential element of 
this interchange, it goes unremarked upon by both. 
Why do I dwell upon this relatively mundane controversy? It raises 
questions about how we interact with images in a digital age; questions 
about what kind of work we wish particular kinds of pictures to do for 
us in the present; as well as WJT Mitchell’s question about what pictures 
may want from us,12 questions about what is at stake in maintaining 
qualitative distinctions between different kinds of images. In looking 
to apply an anthropologist’s lens to these questions, I move from the 
abstract space of public debate to some more intimate positions from 
which to gauge the interactions between persons and images, shifting 
register to consider how technological mediation figures in the work 
of three Canberra-based artists, who describe themselves as painters. 
I discovered early on in my conversations with painters that the desire 
for painting to retain some kind of autonomy from the mediated visual 
cultural environment is by no means restricted to the abstract world of 
public opinion. Canberra-based painter Micky Allan recalls the Head 
of the National Gallery of Victoria Art School, John Brack, telling her 
years after her 1968 graduation that she should have won the final-
year travelling scholarship but that she was ruled out of contention by 
the judges because she had used a photograph to constitute a subject 
in her submitted work, rather than painting it direct from life.13
As this episode implies, Micky has never harboured a desire to keep 
painting autonomous from photography. Throughout her career she 
has moved between and combined several media in her practice. 
Trained as a painter, painting on canvas is her preferred medium of 
11  See interview podcast, Sunday profile, ABC Radio National, 2 May 2010, www.abc.net.
au/radionational/programs/sundayprofile/sam-leach-wynne-prize-winning-artist/3104550, 
accessed 4 February 2014.
12  WJT Mitchell, What do pictures want: The lives and loves of images, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 2005.
13  All biographical material and quotations from here on are from interviews with the author, 
1 April and 30 April 2010. 
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expression, but she has also developed a reputation over the past 
30  years for work on etched glass and hand-painted photographs. 
Micky’s biography reflects a common, complex interrelationship 
between personal experience and creative expression. An early and 
difficult marriage to another art student saw her painting marginalised 
in favour of his. By the time the marriage broke down, Micky had 
stopped painting altogether. Over the next 10 years she lived a highly 
mobile life, moving between Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide. While 
each location gave rise to new artistic projects, canvas painting lay 
stubbornly dormant. 
A move to Sydney in 1978 was precipitated by a personal breakdown. 
There followed what Micky describes as a ‘fabulous period of 
complete certainty, simplicity, calm’. In Sydney she had her first solo 
show, which combined drawings, a book of poems and hand-painted 
photographs, but no paintings. 14 ‘I did photographs’, recalled Micky, 
‘because, why, I wanted to paint, but I couldn’t do it. It sort of wouldn’t 
flow.’ Micky’s hand-painted photographs drew considerable interest, 
but also hostility, in the heady days of photography’s attempts to gain 
recognition as a distinctive form of fine art. Renowned Australian 
photographer Max Dupain was observed at one of her shows with 
tears pouring down his cheeks and was heard to declare, ‘it should be 
stamped out!’
But this painter was neither courting controversy nor attempting 
to make a critical statement regarding the medium of photography. 
She was drawn to photography by an altogether more personal set of 
motivations. For Micky, picking up the camera provided an avenue 
for venturing out into the world, leaving behind the isolation of the 
studio. Photography, somewhat paradoxically, brought her face to face 
with other people. ‘I wanted that connection and that engagement’, 
she told me, ‘even if it was only there in the second of taking the 
photo.’ There were, of course, also qualities of the photographic image 
that were particularly appealing—‘the tonal range you can’t get in 
painting; all that fine grain’. ‘And there was something about [this] 
… this happened, this place exists.’ Photography, it seems, as both 
practice and medium, provided a kind of anchorage, a certainty that 
Micky needed both socially and artistically. But Micky was repelled 
14  Micky Allan, The Live in Show, exhibition at Ewing and George Paton Gallery, Sydney, 1978.
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by the dark room, and especially its chemicals, and was impatient 
for the photographs ‘to be there’, ready for her to paint. Photographs 
were ultimately a form of technical support. Photographs were there 
in a time when ‘painting seemed too hard’.
Figure 2.2: Untitled #2, from the series Yooralla at twenty past three, 
Micky Allan, 1978, watercolour and coloured pencil on silver gelatin print, 
27.7 x 35.2 cm.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
Then followed a conscious decision to ‘give up the photography’, 
a challenge as difficult, one might surmise from her way of speaking 
about it, as giving up booze or cigarettes. Going cold turkey, Micky 
took herself, along with some travelling companions, to the red centre 
and camped out for an extended period near Uluru, the iconic heart of 
Australia. Without a tent and living on meagre rations of potatoes for 
days on end, Micky and her friends wandered around exploring the 
landscape during the day and then basking in the ‘velvet, embracing, 
expanse of the night sky’. Like a well-disciplined patient withdrawing 
from her addiction, Micky did not photograph, paint or draw during 
this time, although she did make some sketches from the window of the 
moving car. On her return to Adelaide, the creative urge was back and 
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Micky produced large charcoal drawings of what she remembered of 
the desert landforms and ‘these imagined strange insects’. She refers to 
these drawings as some of her favourite pieces. ‘They really surprised 
me, what came out … They were going into that totally imaginative 
area that is responding to the place.’ 
Through the 1990s to the present, Micky has produced series upon 
series of painted work, wrestling with how to figure in paint the 
complex interaction of the infinite in the everyday, the interplay 
between material and immaterial experience, the rhythms of nature, 
crisis and renewal, and echoes between deep sea, night sky and outer 
realms of the universe. Mesmerising sweeps of paint are in some works 
interrupted by a raised fractal, a scatter of glitter, cut coloured-glass 
marbles, highly textured painted strips. These motifs—often depicting 
entities beyond tangible reach, such as deep-sea creatures and space 
matter—are regularly constituted with the help of photography 
and scanning equipment. The photographic images feed Micky’s 
imagination in ways that are critical to her practice. 
The energy and conflicting pulls of Micky’s imagination are as evident 
on the walls of her studio as they are in her manner of speaking. When 
I visit her one day in April 2010 I am taken aback. In place of the 
usual riotous scene of colour, materials and works competing for her 
attention, is an austere calm of empty bench tops and blank white 
walls. Canvases are stacked away, turned so that their backs face into 
the room. Materials are filed in draws. The studio has been transformed 
into a blank canvas awaiting its tenant’s next move. As I take a seat a 
flash of blue catches my eye—a pile of underwater photographs from 
a recent trip to Cape Leveque in Western Australia lies on a table next 
to Micky’s laptop, tickling her interest.
Jude Rae, who painted Micky’s portrait (Figure 2.3), speaks about 
the studio as lab.15 But in her case it might also be characterised as a 
critical theory workshop. Her paintings are consciously constructed 
meditations on the nature of contemporary perception. Yet they 
are emptied of any obvious content that might draw the viewer’s 
attention to such perceptual processes. Jude’s still-lifes are of bottles, 
cheap vases, plastic containers. Her main aim, as she describes it 
to me, is ‘to neutralise the force of association that those sort[s] of 
15  Henceforth all quotations are from interviews with the author, 12 April and 23 April 2010.
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objects [still-life objects] carry with them’. She wants to reinvigorate 
a supposedly exhausted genre via a new set of questions. This process 
gained further dramatic force with Jude’s second series of still-lifes: 
of fire extinguishers and gas bottles, produced in the wake of 9/11 
and the second Gulf War. Her subsequent series of portraits of people 
with their eyes closed, and then of people engaged in looking at things 
beyond the reach of the viewer, are similarly a form of genre critique. 
A particularly striking painting, Self-portrait (the year my husband left), 
which won the 2008 Portia Geach Memorial Award for portraiture, 
poses further questions regarding mediation and concealment and the 
complex encounter of painter and viewer in the work itself.
Jude works with a deep awareness of painting’s lack of autonomy; 
particularly how the forms of vision brought to bear on and through 
paint today are deeply entwined with the wider visual cultural 
environment. She wants to produce pictures that get us thinking 
about how we look at things under these conditions. In order to do 
so, she needs to withdraw from the ‘visual chaos’ and into her studio, 
which she characterises as ‘like an extension of my psyche’. Here Jude 
closes the curtains and immerses herself under fluorescent light in the 
work of painting, with or without the semi-controlled intrusion of the 
outside world via Radio National playing in the background. 
Some months before our conversations in her studio, Jude was asked to 
produce a nude for an exhibition being mounted by her New Zealand 
dealer.16 She was eager to be involved but when she came to confront 
the task encountered a number of hurdles. The first was the genre 
itself and its historical baggage. As she put it to me: ‘How do you make 
a painting of a nude without a mythological framework?’ The second 
was confronted in the doing. Jude found that she fell back onto the 
method of the life class, where, to quote her, ‘you just plonk a person 
in front of you and you paint them’. In this case, the person had to 
be plonked naked in Jude’s studio, which was a very challenging 
experience. The model turned out to be ‘too present’ to enable the 
imaginative process to kick in.
16  Naked, on show at Andrew Jensen Gallery, Auckland, 29 April–16 July 2010.
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Figure 2.3: Large interior 173 (Micky), Jude Rae, 2005, oil on linen, 
180 x 120 cm, winner of the 2005 Portia Geach Memorial Award for 
portraiture. 
source: Courtesy of the artist.
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One day, out of frustration, Jude brought her old Canon camera into 
the studio and set it up to take some video footage of herself while she 
danced around naked, striking poses to get a sense of the light, trying 
to work out how she might use a model in that particular space. From 
this footage she produced a series of blurred, highly pixilated still 
images. Looking through them Jude saw not pictures of herself but 
signs that were graspable in terms of art-historical precedent—one 
particular image stood out, its qualities seemed to reference paintings 
by Degas, as well as an ancient sculpture of a boy taking a thorn from 
his foot. 
So what had happened in this process? For Jude the camera became 
a necessary and highly productive distancing mechanism, an 
objectifying mechanism. As Belting would have it, this doubly 
digitised process produced a medium for an image, and in so doing 
enabled the production of a subject—herself—to which she would 
not otherwise have had access. The photographic process allowed 
Jude to distance herself from her own body and the problems of the 
genre, as well as getting ‘around the issue of the model in the studio’. 
In this seemingly simple, stripped-back charcoal drawing on paper 
is a paradox enabled by the camera. 
Jude’s drawing (Figure 2.4) is made by a painter who is consciously 
aware of the effects of the camera on painting—its ‘lack of distortion’, 
‘lack of the problems of drawing’, its ‘hardness and harshness’. While 
artists like Gerhardt Richter make paintings that comment directly 
on the visual possibilities and constraints of photography,17 Jude’s 
engagement with the medium is more ambivalent. She told me she 
had a problem with photography intervening in painting ‘for a very 
long time’. ‘The guilt that somehow if you use photographs you’re 
somehow cheating the world is still very powerful.’ What liberated 
her was recognising that ‘vision is governed by expectation ... When 
you experience that, it’s like, what is the difference between working 
from a photograph and working from a set of expectations?’18 
17  See Peter Osborne, ‘Painting negation: Gerhardt Richter’s negatives’, October, no. 62, 1992, 
pp. 102–13; also Paul Rabinow, Marking time: On the anthropology of the contemporary, Princeton 
and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 116.
18  Rabinow, 2008, p. 116.
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Figure 2.4: Drawing 101 (naked), Jude Rae, 2010, willow charcoal 
on Fabriano paper, 220 x 140 cm.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
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In the case of the nude project, the pixilated photograph worked as 
a trigger for the imagination precisely because it was unlike other 
photographs, which tend to give ‘too much information’. Because a 
photograph presents an absent subject, Jude reflected, it is ‘much 
less overwhelming in all sorts of ways than having the model in front 
of you ... It … creates a space of imagination. It doesn’t close it all 
down …’ ‘Working from a photograph’, Jude tells me, ‘… my mind 
will … often … allow me to reflect in a more dreamlike way on my 
experience of that person. Which is not possible when they are here in 
front of me. It can take me quite a long way.’ So here we are presented 
with one kind of instance of the beauty of distance. In slightly 
different ways both Micky and Jude’s use of photography seems to 
share with Gerhardt Richter a desire to counter (or at least temper) 
the subjectivist tendencies of painting.19 Their use of technological 
mediation is undertaken in support of a thoroughly contemporary 
culture of painting, not to suggest its end. 
A third painter, Vanessa Barbay, confronts the abstract mediation of our 
time with a poetics of a different register.20 Vanessa describes herself 
as trying to ‘discover ways of painting animals that express, or at least 
incorporate in part, a “regime of involvement” as differentiated from 
that of scientific detachment’. The regime of involvement invoked is 
starkly devoid of sentimentality. Indeed, Vanessa seeks to transcend 
the abstract modes of engagement and representation through which 
such emotions might be carried. She collapses any clear distinction 
between representation and the real by incorporating into the pictures 
themselves pigment and material drawn directly from her subjects—
dead animals, road kill—and their environments. From a distance, 
a painting appears as a mottled swirl of dark and lighter shades of 
brown, an apparent experiment with colour and materiality. Up close, 
the surprising essence of the work is revealed: echidna spikes jut out 
from the canvas at 90 degrees, matted hair and sedimented flesh hold 
the composition in place. ‘Echidna and rabbit-skin glue on canvas’, 
as the materials list for Vanessa’s Sorcery painting (autumn echidna) 
(Figure 2.5) makes clear: the animal is the painting. In this sense, the 
pictures Vanessa makes are not representations in any conventionally 
understood sense of the term. These transformational pictures re-enact 
19  As observed by Rabinow, 2008, p. 116.
20  This section of the essay draws from Melinda Hinkson, ‘Vanessa Barbay: Painting our 
animal selves’, Art Monthly Australia, no. 259, 2013, p. 88. 
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and meditate upon something of the human–animal relations that have 
led to the loss of life of the particular subject with which each work is 
concerned. Specificity is crucial: place and the materials of particular 
places loom large in the choices Vanessa makes in the production of 
each work.
Figure 2.5: Sorcery painting (autumn echidna), Vanessa Barbay, 2011, 
echidna and rabbit-skin glue on canvas, 84 x 80 cm.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
Vanessa describes her method as a kind of mortuary practice, one 
that enables her to collaborate with the deceased animals, to make 
works that are redemptive acts, transcending the objectification that 
lies at the heart of classical painting. Her practice involves a carefully 
managed decomposition process. Dead creatures are placed on canvas, 
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laid out on a sprung bed base and left to the elements beneath a 
eucalyptus tree on a Monaro property. After a period of months, the 
canvases acquire shroud-like impressions of bodies, bits of putrefied 
flesh, as well as eucalyptus sap, dust, rain, marks left by other animals 
and faint grid-like impressions of the wire mesh protecting the corpses 
from predators. Most (but not all) shrouds are then domesticated/
deodorised, being steeped in vinegar and infusions of eucalyptus 
leaves to leach the odour of decomposing flesh. 
As Vanessa considers what further creative involvement each 
shroud asks of her, she gives attention to the particular and local 
circumstances of each creature’s demise. Her choices are also shaped by 
a wider critical interest in cross-cultural attitudes to the non-human 
universe, and by an eye attuned to the sacred offerings of nature. 
Gift (autumn rosella), an ethereal silhouette of a rosella in flight, is the 
ultimate mystical outcome of the decomposition process, untouched 
by Vanessa’s painting hand except for a coat of rabbit-skin glue. 
This magical picture has the aura of an ancient religious painting.
Other works are outcomes of the delicate balance between Vanessa’s 
painterly imperative—as the daughter of a taxidermist/collector 
and two generations of Hungarian artists she has inherited a deeply 
felt obligation, ‘the need to replicate what I see around me’—and 
her aspiration to transcend that imperative. Where she takes up 
the paintbrush she does so with a light touch. Wider influences 
of a childhood closely lived among animals dead and alive, and in 
association with the Koori community at Vincentia on the NSW South 
Coast, are evident. Vanessa’s more recent research with Kunwinjku 
painters in Arnhem Land also leaves traces—in the repeated use of 
delek, spiritually charged white pigment; in restrained experiments 
with cross-hatching; and in her pervasive attention to the possible 
sacred outcomes of collaborative engagements between humans, other 
species and the environment. If Vanessa’s artworks are portraits, they 
demand a reinterpretation of that genre for these works foreground an 
inextricable set of relationships between the deceased subjects of her 
paintings, the environment in which those subjects lived and died, 
and the human attitudes implicated in their demise.
While Vanessa’s approach to painting enacts a critique of the 
abstraction that characterises the dominant contemporary attitude to 
nature, this does not amount to a rejection of technologised methods. 
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Many of Vanessa’s works have been created with the intervention of a 
computer, scanner or projector. The projected outline of a bird’s nest 
and dead bird are traced with gesso onto canvas prepared with nothing 
but rabbit-skin glue. The completed work enfolds the projected image 
as a component of its making, but, like Jude’s nude, does not reveal its 
crucial involvement to the viewer. 
To some extent these technical supports are drawn into the process 
of  making paintings under the pressure of the institutional 
environment  in which they are made—the university-based art 
school.21 Vanessa’s strong moral preference to paint directly from life 
(or death) is qualified by her concern to meet the requirements of her 
PhD program, to reveal the processes of making to her examiners, 
and to meet the ‘milestones’ and projected outcomes of annual plans. 
In this respect, her carefully crafted regime of involvement with 
her subjects and her practice are challenged by the institutional 
requirement to make paintings more quickly than might otherwise be 
the case. Projecting images of dark and light onto the canvas so that 
they might be traced out with efficiency is one kind of compromise 
made by painters in the art school setting, alongside other constraints 
related to the cost, and therefore choice of materials, size of canvases 
and number of paintings made.
* * *
To link the consideration of these painters’ work back to the issues 
with which I began, in describing our vision of the world as ‘bifocal’, 
anthropologist John Durham Peters suggests that one of the great 
ironies of contemporary experience is that the distant, or the global, 
which we grasp through media images, 
becomes clear through representation, whereas the immediate is 
subject to the fragmenting effects of our limited experience. Our sense 
organs, having evolved over the ages to capture immediate experience 
of the local, find themselves cheated of their prey.22 
21  See the contributions to Brad Buckley and John Conomos, Rethinking the contemporary art 
school, Nova Scotia, The Press of Nova Scotia College of Arts and Design, 2009, for an examination 
of the range of issues and pressures brought to bear on university-based art schools in the present. 
22  John Durham Peters, ‘Seeing bifocally: Media, place, culture’, in Akhil Gupta and James 
Ferguson (eds), Culture, power, place: Explorations in critical anthropology, Durham and London, 
Duke, 1997, p. 79.
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John Durham Peters seems here to capture something of Jude Rae’s 
experience of being overwhelmed by the presence of the naked 
model in her studio. We may well observe that studio-based nude 
life-painting was a common mode of painterly practice of an earlier 
period. In the digital era, the physically present model may no longer 
be a familiar or regular element in painterly practice, as painters take 
inspiration from all manner of objects and phenomena, mediated in all 
manner of ways. In what Mitchell describes as the latest biocybernetic 
turn in our relationship with images, the image-worlds created in our 
time enact the increasingly central and intimate place of technologies 
in a distinctive way of being human.23 The subjectivity of persons 
who identify as painters is as much caught up in these transformations 
as is the case for the rest of us. 
Yet, as a number of writers have observed, paintings continue to 
demand a different register and temporality of engagement from the 
fleeting, screen-based images that currently dominate daily experience. 
TJ Clark and Didier Maleuvre argue that, increasingly, we take the 
attitude that characterises our interactions with fleeting commodified 
images into our engagements with other kinds of images, including 
paintings.24 This is the logical consequence of late capitalism, which 
has called out not only a distinctive form of image but, along with it, 
a distinctive cultural attitude through which persons interact with 
those images. 
It is unsurprising that under these circumstances there may be a 
strong social demand for painting to stand for what is thought to be 
natural, or unmediated. While the painting practices considered here 
demonstrate that painting in the present is technologically mediated 
activity, these artists continue to privilege what they understand as a 
logic of painting; that is, a method of working-through, a method that 
only at its conclusion gives rise to ‘production’. What is strikingly 
the case across the work of these three painters is that none wish 
painting to be free of the possible effects of technological mediation. 
Their enterprise presupposes a flow across art forms and ways of 
seeing: the possibility of troubling, and indeed undermining, binary 
23  Mitchell, 2005.
24  TJ Clark, The sight of death, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2006; Didier 
Maleuvre, ‘A plea for silence: Putting art back into the art museum’, in Hugh Genoways (ed.), 
Museum philosophy for the twenty-first century, Lanham, MD, Alta Mira Press, 2006.
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distinctions such as those between presence and distance, immediacy 
and abstraction, materiality and intangibility. Given this, there is a 
kind of double movement in their works—on the one hand, a drawing 
of attention to thoroughly contemporary phenomena, on the other, 
a casting of their concerns in more transcendental, universal terms. 
In this way, painting practice might be grasped as a form of myth-
making. During my discussions with painters I have been regularly 
reminded of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss’ work on myth, which 
he describes in terms of a universal human need to enact in narrative 
form the contradictions with which we live.25 Within the structures 
of myth, Levi-Strauss identifies elements directed at overcoming 
those contradictions. Art, he suggests, lies midway between science 
and myth. Artists construct objects from a limited set of materials 
and tools, but the objects produced are simultaneously objects of 
knowledge. Artworks have a special ambiguity in that they are both 
closed and open forms.26 This kind of interpretation is particularly 
helpful for thinking about the distinctive place of painting in our 
digitally dominated contemporary world; painting is both of the 
times and contrary to it. Painting may be observed to stand outside of 
and be opposed to the digital yet, as we have seen, its practice often 
unfolds in intimate engagement with digital technologies, in much 
the same ways that painters work within and against the temporal 
structures and ways of seeing associated with the digital visual culture 
environment they inhabit.27 Contemporary painting carries its charge 
in how it holds this apparent paradox in productive tension. As a 
medium of the present, painting cannot simply be described in terms 
of the materials that render its finished form.
The works of these three painters indicate a dilemma that returns us 
to the Sam Leach case. Viewers of Jude Rae’s nude or Vanessa Barbay’s 
animal shrouds or Micky Allan’s underwater worlds have no access 
to the stories and techniques of how these pictures were created. 
And unlike Leach’s painting, their titles give nothing away. Thus 
I conclude by posing several questions. Does it matter that a charcoal 
25  Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural anthropology, volume 1, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
1977.
26  Claude Levi-Strauss, ‘The science of the concrete’, The savage mind, Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, 1966.
27  See Melinda Hinkson, ‘Australia’s Bill Henson scandal: Notes on the new cultural attitude 
to images’, Visual Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 202–13.
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drawing would not exist but for a technologically mediated process 
of creation? What difference does it make that a painting is composed 
of the very materiality of its subject? The answer returns the weight of 
responsibility to the viewer. Just like the journalist interviewing Sam 
Leach, the viewer of these paintings may not hear or see the message 
the artist is attempting to convey. It is only when we slow down to 
look28 and allow pictures to work on us that they establish themselves 
as images that speak to us and to our contemporary visual culture 
environment. In Jude Rae’s work, we have a nude that refuses to give 
up its face and front the gaze of the viewer, a nude that refuses to 
present itself in the visual language that most commonly addresses 
the late-capitalist consumer. The work of each of the three painters 
considered here refuses to conform to conventional expectations of 
what painting is for. Or are these simply beautiful pictures? You be 
the judge.
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Diasporic looking: Portraiture, 
diaspora and subjectivity
Gali Weiss
How does an understanding of diaspora contribute to the way we 
think about and respond to the world around us? For a number of 
scholars, diaspora is one of the most relevant social formations for 
framing the way we understand our times. Some even propose that 
diaspora is the only social formation that enables cultural identity to 
survive in a globalised world, describing ‘diasporised’ identity as one 
that can hold together seemingly contradictory positions.1 Diaspora 
discourse and theorisation offer a critical space for thinking about 
the mass movements of people that defined the twentieth century 
and continue to shape the twenty-first.2 More significantly for this 
essay, that space is also one in which we can explore how diasporic 
experience influences the way we view, articulate and aestheticise 
ourselves and the contemporary world.
1 In relation to contradictory positions of identity, Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin write 
of ‘an Egyptian Arab who happens to be Jewish, and a Jew who happens to be an Egyptian 
Arab’. Relating to gender, they argue that ‘rather than the dualism of gendered bodies and 
universal souls … — the dualism that the Western tradition offers—we can substitute … bodies 
that are sometimes gendered and sometimes not. It is this idea that we are calling diasporized 
identity’. See Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin, ‘Diaspora: Generation and the ground of 
Jewish diaspora’, in Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur (eds), Theorizing diaspora, London, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p. 109.
2  Braziel and Mannur, 2003, p. 3.
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Representations of ‘face’, fluidity of gesture and form, notions of 
presence and absence, self and other, the real and the imagined; 
such themes, which relate to conceptual, philosophical and material 
expressions of ‘being’, have always been part of my art-making. 
It was only as I embarked on practice-based academic research that 
I identified this practice in terms of portraiture. Simultaneously, 
I came to understand the significance of diasporic experience for my 
artistic vision, a vision emerging from a family history of migration, 
closely held cultural and spiritual values, and identification as Israeli-
Australian. While the idea of diaspora has evolved and changed 
considerably in recent decades,3 what continues to be recognised 
as common to all diasporic communities is an emotional allegiance 
to the ‘old homeland’. Most critical attempts at characterising 
diaspora refer, whether explicitly or by implication, to a centre or 
home of origin—historic, current or imaginary.4 The connection to 
a home other than where one is situated, and thereby the promise or 
possibility of a return or quest for a return of sorts, lies at the heart 
of diasporic consciousness. Diasporic identity at once belongs and 
does not belong to both the home of origin and the adopted home. 
Diasporic consciousness involves a sense of difference and multiplicity 
of belonging, a sense of ‘otherness’, and hence of displacement. The 
identity of the displaced is not ‘complete’ as a distinct, fixed identity 
but, in the words of Zygmunt Bauman, is ‘wholly or in part “out of 
place” everywhere, not … completely anywhere … nowhere will one 
be fully “at home”’.5 Diaspora can in itself, however, be viewed as a 
particular space of belonging, in which, as Stuart Hall claims, ‘diaspora 
identities are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, 
through transformations and difference’.6 For Hall, the future existence 
of diaspora identity is in its continual re-creativity, re-being; that is, 
3  According to Braziel and Mannur, theories of diaspora ‘have emerged in area studies, 
ethnic studies, and cultural studies as a major site of contestation. Since the journal Diaspora: 
A Journal of Transnational Studies was inaugurated in 1991, debates over the theoretical, 
cultural, and historical resonances of the term have proliferated in academic journals devoted 
to ethnic, national, and (trans)national concerns’. See Braziel and Mannur, ‘Nation, migration, 
globalization: Points of contention in diaspora studies’, in Braziel and Mannur, 2003, p. 2.
4  Robin Cohen, Global diasporas: An introduction, London, University College London Press, 
1997, p. 2.
5  Zygmunt Bauman, Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2004, pp. 13–14.
6  Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, in Braziel and Mannur, 2003, p. 244.
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in its’ ‘becoming’. It is with these ideas, this particular conjunction of 
absence and presence, of belonging and not belonging, that I wrestle 
in making portraits, and which I explore in this essay. 
Diaspora as a way of viewing the world
Diaspora—the diaspora as I knew it—was a familiar term that referred 
specifically to the extensive history of the Jewish people. Until only a 
few decades ago, diaspora was likely to refer to the dispersion of Jews 
from their original homeland over 2,000 years ago; although sometimes 
also to the centuries-old dispersion of Armenians from their original 
and then fragmented homeland. Since the late 1960s, dispersed 
communities once described as exile groups, overseas communities, 
ethnic and racial minorities and so on have been re-identified in the 
terms of diaspora.7 The complexity of diaspora is evident not only 
in the range of definitions that are currently in circulation but in 
the variety of diaspora now identified and the variables within each 
of these. 
My family history demonstrates this: my parents were part of the 
Jewish diaspora in Eastern Europe in their respective countries of 
birth before ‘returning’ to their biblical homeland in Israel, at that 
time Palestine. When I was a child my parents migrated again, this 
time with family, to Australia, where we were active in the Jewish 
community and identified as Israelis living in Australia. As a young 
adult I returned to live in Israel, then returned after 14 years to live 
again in Australia. This history of attachment to Israel is so embedded 
in my family identification that I once heard my Australian-born 
daughter, when asked by a new acquaintance where she ‘came from’, 
answer, ‘Israel’. My family has continuously moved backwards 
and forwards between places, real and imaginary, experiencing the 
paradox ‘of and between location and dislocation’ that is a common 
dimension of diasporic positioning.8
7  Khachig Tölölyan, ‘Rethinking diaspora(s): Stateless power in the transnational moment’, 
Diaspora, vol. 5, no. 1, 1996, p. 3.
8  Avtar Brah, Cartographies of diaspora: Contesting identities, London and New York, 
Routledge, 1996, p. 204.
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Avtar Brah proposes a viewing of diaspora through a ‘politics of 
identification’ as opposed to a ‘politics of identity’, accommodating 
the different identities people inhabit that interweave relations of 
race, gender, class and sexuality.9 If we accept an idea of diaspora that 
goes beyond definitions of particular minorities, then how are notions 
of diaspora placed and enacted within creative production? How do 
we use the ‘language’ of diaspora and its inherent ambiguities to both 
‘read’ and depict notions of identity? 
Diaspora, and particularly the profusion of diaspora and diasporic 
identity in the past few decades, has affected both metaphorically 
and materially the way in which we understand notions of identity, 
individualism, boundaries and so forth. With this in mind, we can 
speak of the role of artistic practice not so much in terms of reflecting 
who we are but as a performative mode of agency that engages us in a 
positioning or negotiating of a form of subjectivity. 
Ernst van Alphen claims that art can act as agency for cultural 
discourse; it has the power to transform the ways in which cultural 
issues are conceptualised, as well as represented.10 Art practice not 
only reflects culture and philosophy, it provides us with a way of 
understanding, such that art can be viewed as ‘a mode of thinking’.11 
We can see, then, that both diaspora and art can be viewed as frames 
for undertaking cultural studies and philosophy, not only as historical 
products.
As already noted, what is constant within diasporic consciousness is the 
existence of a relationship with a homeland and thereby a continuity 
of belonging or reference. It is this relationship, this inescapable 
link to a history, that is at work in my approach to portraiture. More 
precisely, my practice is driven by an urge to maintain some form 
of connection, imaginary or actual, with a past (of the genre—that 
is, its history—and of the portrait’s reference) while exploring new 
meanings and possible futures.
9  Brah, 1996, p. 93.
10  Ernst van Alphen, Art in mind: How contemporary images shape thought, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 2005, p. xiii.
11  van Alphen, 2005, p. xv.
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As I explore below, crafting notions of identity and representation 
through diasporic consciousness opens a distinctive way of viewing 
and experiencing art. In the case of the contemporary portrait, such 
a view is attentive to the ambiguities inherent in both diaspora and 
portraiture: the tensions between stillness and fluidity, stability and 
movement, belonging and displacement, difference and sameness, 
presence and absence, being one and multiple.
Diasporic visual culture
Through the final decades of the twentieth century, the visual arts 
were being ‘disentangled’ from their traditional forms such as painting 
and sculpture and repositioned not only within fine arts but within 
a broader visual culture, thus foregrounding a new discourse on the 
nature of contemporary visuality itself.12 Diasporic visual culture is an 
area emerging within visual culture studies, giving special focus to the 
visual representation of diasporic experience and identity. Nicholas 
Mirzoeff recognises the paradoxes involved in attempting to represent 
diaspora, since by its nature contemporary diaspora cannot be fully 
known, seen or quantified: ‘A diaspora … cannot be represented from 
the viewpoint of one-point perspective.’13 The space of diaspora exists 
in multiple times and places, encompassing those who leave as well as 
those who stay and those who return. It is multiple, fluid, and at times 
paradoxical. It is about the future as well as the past. While diasporic 
identity can be understood in terms of ‘double consciousness’ as 
a tension in belonging, or as Mirzoeff claims, as a dialectic between 
past and present, it may also be rethought in terms of an indeterminate 
future to come.14
Just as concepts and terms of identity are continuously evolving, so too 
are the terms of portraiture. Portraiture in western art is a genre whose 
credibility in art-historical terms traditionally depended on notions of 
authenticity. The conventions of portraiture claim referentiality as the 
element that differentiates the portrait from all other artistic genres.15 
12  Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett and Jonathan Karp (eds), The art of being Jewish in modern 
times, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, p. 1.
13  Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), Diaspora and visual culture: Representing Africans and Jews, London 
and New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 2.
14  Mirzoeff, 2000, p. 4.
15  Richard Brilliant, Portraiture, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 7–8. 
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Informing the traditional portrait is its indexical relationship to a 
particular individual outside the picture. Contemporary discussions 
of the terms of portraiture, however, range from echoing these older 
ways of thinking to new conceptualisations that challenge the genre’s 
conventions of presence and authenticity. 
Visualising the copy as a tool for new thinking
Susan Buck-Morss has argued that what is powerful in a photograph 
or digital image is not its ability to re-present but its ability to generate 
meaning. As previously suggested, the authenticity of the image 
as art-object may matter in terms of art history (as the product or 
reflection of a historical period or person), but within visual studies 
the reproduction takes on meaning in new ways beyond the idea of 
origin: ‘The image disconnects from the idea of being a reproduction of 
an authentic original, and becomes something else.’16 Buck-Morss calls 
reproduced images, specifically as produced by digital technology, 
‘tools of thought’ that mediate between things and thinking.17
Perhaps this is the approach taken by Hélène Cixous when she writes 
of Roni Horn’s photographic portraits: ‘These are not photographs, 
these are portraits of looks that don’t allow themselves to be taken, 
snapshots of instants, series of winks of an eye.’18 Horn’s photographic 
portraits, despite the repeated imagery of the individual photographed, 
do not represent that individual, claims Cixous. In her Portrait of an 
image 2005: Isabelle Huppert impersonating herself in her film,19 the 
viewing position is a face-to-face engagement with the image of a face. 
As the title implies, the artist’s intention does not seem to be to depict 
the ‘real’ Isabelle Huppert. Cixous explains how this series challenges 
the referential purpose of the portrait:
16  Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Visual studies and global imagination’, Papers of Surrealism, Issue 2, 
Summer, 1991, p. 23.
17  Buck-Morss, 1991, p. 20.
18  Hélène Cixous, ‘A kind of you: 6 portraits by Roni Horn’, catalogue, ACCA, Melbourne, 
2007, p. 8 (from her ‘Portraits of portraits: The very day/light of Roni Horn’, in Cixous, Poetry 
in painting: Writings on contemporary arts and aesthetics, ed. Marta Segarra and Joana Masó, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press). 
19  Cixous, 2007, p. 64. For an image of this portrait in part, see www.hauserwirth.com/artists/
images-clips-view//?artist_id=14&a=roni-horn&p=66, accessed 2 January 2014.
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[it] deconstructs the entire traditional unthinking approach to the 
thing called Portrait, the use made of the word Portrait, when it is 
referred to people. For this to happen the Portrait must personify the 
image. The difference between an image and a face: the face sees you. 
The image does not see you. Is seen. The gaze of the Portraitist gives 
a figure to the image.20
The image alone is not the portrait, and the person the image relates 
to provides only a fragment of the subject. As Didier Maleuvre argues 
in this volume, it is the artist’s gaze that creates the possibility of the 
image becoming a face, which as a consequence engages the viewer so 
that they might discover the ‘pearl’ that is the portrait. The portrait 
is a matter of relationality.
The image, the copy
Can a photograph, or reproduction, in itself provide evidence of the 
‘realness’ of an original? The digital age has shown us that the filmed 
or photographic image can be manipulated, that virtual images can be 
created, referring not to a real existence outside the image but to the 
idea of a reality.
How can authenticity remain a value in a medium that centres on 
reproduction, especially when reproduced images are copied, repeated 
and layered? It would appear that continued reproducibility distances 
the viewer from an origin and thereby creates a sense of loss of truth, 
truth being a notion often aligned with origin.
The use of repetition has been central in the work of Chinese-
Australian artist Lindy Lee—from her 1980s works using photocopied 
Renaissance portraits, to her current work in which she draws directly 
on personal history and family ancestry. Many of Lee’s works from the 
1990s incorporate repeated images of photocopies of European Old 
Master portraits into grid or linear formations, playing with differing 
degrees of visibility and variations in colour tone. This work was 
informed by Lee’s consciousness of her diasporic identity, using the 
copy as a metaphor for ‘unbelonging’ or cultural displacement. Lee was 
20  I have reproduced this and subsequent quotes from Cixous as they appeared in the ACCA 
catalogue ‘A kind of you: 6 portraits by Roni Horn’, with the understanding that the visual 
representation of the text, including grammatical omissions, are congruent with Cixous’ 
meaning. Cixous, 2007, pp. 12–13.
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born in Australia of Chinese heritage. She has stated, ‘I had always felt 
a fraud—a copy, and a flawed one at that … I was counterfeit white 
and a counterfeit Chinese’.21
In An ocean of bright clouds, an ocean of solemn clouds (1995) (Figure 3.1), 
Lee uses 25 photocopies of a single image in varying degrees of 
exposure so that the face in the work appears and disappears in tone 
and form but is decipherable through repetition. Significantly, the 
repetition of the face does not enhance its visibility or particularity, 
but rather reduces it to anonymity. Rather than a portrait of a fully 
present individual, Lee creates a heightened sense of the tension 
between presence and absence. 
Melissa Chiu points out that in adopting the copy as a methodology, 
Lee is attempting to locate herself within the western art-historical 
canon, at the same time as disrupting that tradition by transforming 
the notion of the original into the anonymous and reproducible. Lee’s 
use of repetition in the different versions of the original on each panel 
is not structured as a progression or narrative but as an entity. Here 
repetition is used to suggest how identity differs according to time and 
context in ‘a state characterised by moments of flux and uncertainty’.22
Edward Colless suggests that viewing Lee’s 1990s portraits from the 
position of cultural tradition has the effect of casting Australian 
culture as a version or ‘copy’ of European culture. Colless views 
these portraits, which simultaneously obscure and delineate the face, 
as metaphors for displaced cultural memory:
These plaintive ghosts from an Old World hang forever at both 
a temporal and geographical distance from us. Looking at Lee’s 
appropriated portraits we lose and partially recover images from the 
past, but images of a cultural tradition that was never really our own. 
Perhaps we are condemned to see them this way—those original 
works of art—as remote and speechless icons, because we are their 
false descendants. Just as the artist considers herself a false descendant 
of European art, producing false copies of that art as her own.23
21  Melissa Chiu, ‘Struggling in the ocean of Yes and No’, in Benjamin Genocchio and Melissa 
Chiu, Lindy Lee, Sydney, Craftsman House, 2001, p. 16.
22  Chiu, 2001, p. 16.
23  Edward Colless, ‘Lindy Lee: The many faces of Lindy Lee’, Artcollector, Issue 26, October, 
2003, www.artcollector.net.au/LindyLeeTheManyFacesofLindyLee, accessed 2 January 2014.
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Figure 3.1: An ocean of bright clouds, an ocean of solemn clouds, 
Lindy Lee, 1995, photocopy and acrylic on board, 205 x 143 cm.
source: Courtesy of the artist and Roslyn oxley9 Gallery, sydney.
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Figure 3.2: Birth & death, Lindy Lee, 2003, Installation Artspace, 
Sydney, inkjet print and acrylic on Chinese accordion books, installation 
dimensions variable.
source: Courtesy of the artist and Roslyn oxley9 Gallery, sydney.
A copy, however, as Colless notes, can only be regarded as ‘false’ or 
‘bad’ when it is compared to the original. Lee’s art produces a new sense 
of original by deviating from what it has copied while nevertheless 
relating to that original as the basis of its being. While these works 
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could be claimed to be self-portraits of sorts, relating to cultural 
memory and artistic ancestry, Lee has in recent years turned to more 
direct forms of personal history and family ancestry.24
Her 2003 installation Birth & death25 (Figure 3.2) comprises one 
hundred concertina books of eighteen panels of family-album 
images of enlarged faces that journey across the floor of the gallery 
space. The  gallery becomes inhabited with Lee’s Chinese family, 
past and present, alive and deceased, in stillness and in movement. 
The  installation is at once a collective portrait and a self-portrait, 
a family genealogy and a moment in time. 
Familial looks and postmemory
Family photographs are likewise central to Marianne Hirsch’s study 
of postmemory. Postmemory, explains Hirsch, is a particular way of 
relating to the past through imaginative investment and creation. 
It ‘characterises the experiences of those who grow up dominated 
by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories 
are evacuated by the stories of the previous generation shaped by 
traumatic events that can be neither understood nor recreated’.26 
The photograph, in particular the family-album photograph, whose 
images and narratives extend well into subsequent generations, 
facilitates this transference. Such a photograph can be read as trace; 
the trace of the photographed person or place; an ‘outline’ trace of 
their materiality; and as the trace of a time that no longer exists. This 
photograph signifies both life and death, for it shows evidence of the 
object that was photographed and at the same time we recognise the 
sense of the ‘having-been-there’ that creates a sense of loss in the 
viewing.27 This photograph both blocks memory, because it is not 
reviving experience, and attests to its past reality.28 The function of 
the photograph as postmemory is as a site that mediates between past 
and present.
24  Colless, 2003.
25  Roslyn Oxley9 Gallery, Lindy Lee—Birth & death—Roslyn Oxley9 Gallery, 2013, www.
roslynoxley9.com.au/artists/20/Lindy_Lee/471/38857/, accessed 2 January 2014.
26  Marianne Hirsch, Family frames: Photography, narrative and postmemory, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 22.
27  Hirsch, 1997, p. 20.
28  Hirsch, 1997, p. 82.
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Hirsch has developed the notion of postmemory in relation to Holocaust 
survivors, but considers it useful in describing the process at work in 
the continuity of collective memory in diasporic situations. The idea 
that memory has both public and private dimensions is integral to the 
diasporic vision, for this dual status shapes and marks it. This shared 
memory forms the basis of the traditions and practices of diasporic 
communities, and the basis of their existence. Without the shared 
memory of the home of origin and of a collective if diverse past, even 
if mythologised or abstract, diaspora would not exist. According to 
Hirsch, the inheritance of history as postmemory distinguishes it 
from memory as recollection, ‘by generational distance, and from 
history by deep personal connection’. Photographs can connect first- 
and second-generation remembrance, memory and postmemory, for 
they represent what has been and what no longer is, but also what 
continues to be from the position of those who do the viewing.29 
What is particularly meaningful in family photographs is the 
performative function of the ‘affiliative’ gaze, a term that Hirsch uses 
to argue that there is a particular kind of viewing identification in 
relation to the familial image: 
Recognizing an image as familial elicits … a specific kind of readerly 
or spectatorial look, an affiliative look through which we are sutured 
into the image and through which we adopt the image into our own 
familial narrative. Akin to Barthes’s move from the studium to the 
punctum, it is idiosyncratic, untheorizable: it is what moves us 
because of our memories and our histories, and because of the ways in 
which we structure our own sense of particularity.30
The affiliative look is not a gaze that is restricted to ‘knowledge’ of or 
about the subject but one in which identification follows the particular 
intimacy of a familial look or exchange of looks. The affiliative look is 
characterised by its collective sense of intimacy and familiarity. It is the 
search for this kind of intimate acknowledgement of experience rather 
than recognition of identity that guides the artistic choices I make in 
producing portraits.
29  Hirsch, 1997, pp. 22–3.
30  Hirsch, 1997, p. 93. 
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The practice of portrayal
Figure 3.3: Aaron, Gali Weiss, 2000, solvent transfer, charcoal, graphite, 
76 x 56.5 cm.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
I had been questioning the function of the portrait in my art practice 
for a number of years, though it is hard to pinpoint the precise time 
the problematic nature of portraiture first arose for me. Was it with the 
depictions of my father in the series Aaron (2000) (Figure 3.3)? One of 
my main concerns then was how to depict the expanse of my father’s 
lifetime in a single image. The more I drew his face at each sitting, 
and the more details I placed on the paper, the more insignificant the 
details became. My layered charcoal applications were in effect erasing 
underlying details, yet I could not stop revisiting those details for 
they seemed to me in constant change. I decided to ‘ground’ the image 
by using a photograph to convey his image stilled, in play with the 
action of drawing. When I reviewed these images it made sense to me 
that the viewer’s first impression of Aaron was not to be a clear one; 
though reference to the particular man remained recognisable, details 
of his features were presented ambiguously. The  portrait series of 
Aaron became one of multiple and fluid images, for there was no one 
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total reality or placement that satisfied me—each drawing of Aaron 
reflected a different subjectivity, whether as a result of my differing 
interpretations and gestures, or my perception of his different moods.
Perhaps, alternatively, my questioning began with the works of Claire 
as Naomi (2003), in which I depicted the sitter/subject with reference to 
the biblical character Naomi. I did not ‘dress up’ my sitter as the biblical 
character. My interest was in approaching her as if she were someone 
else’s story. At the same time it was inescapable that I was working 
with the image of Claire—there was nothing in the image to indicate 
that this subject was Naomi. The only indication was in the title of the 
work. I was experimenting with notions of identity in representation, 
questioning what actually constitutes identity in the image.
My explorations seemed to clearly indicate that I was not satisfied 
with depicting a fixed image of a person. All my depictions displayed 
shifts of movement in form and gesture, continuous material layering, 
at times to the point of erasure. The look of my subject was either 
uncannily familiar or particular yet anonymous. 
By the time I was developing the 2008 body of work presented below, 
I was recognising these characteristics as purposeful elements of what 
I termed as diasporic consciousness: elements that arise from common 
experiences of diaspora. The materials I use in my portraits and in 
methods of application enact a mobile and ambivalent state of being 
that is a feature of diasporic consciousness. These transient states of 
imagery can be viewed as progressions or fragments of a whole. As in 
the Aaron portraits, my processes and material practice create layered 
images that are at once marked with gestures and stains, and erased 
by those marks and stains. Erasure is a significant metaphor for the 
diasporic experience of loss, with its own traces of marks and stains, 
where place and time are continuously recreated and relocated in 
memory and identification.
The subjects of these portraits are interrelated in image and through 
biological connection. Each image is made up of two referents. 
One I term the sitter, who has come to my studio to sit for the portrait. 
The other is drawn from a photograph of a parent or child of the 
sitter, taken from a time outside the parameters of this project. In self-
critique, I ask how I can use the photograph as a portrayal equal 
in human presence to the sitter whose presence I have experienced 
beyond the image. In answer, I remind myself that it is not the essence 
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of the human behind the photograph that I am portraying but rather 
the image of an absent person I know has a significant presence in 
a relationship they have with the person visiting my studio.
My use of the familial relationships of my subjects in works that 
incorporate photography, photocopy and drawing proposes a 
construction not only of a familial subjectivity but of a relational 
portrait that is simultaneously self and other. The portrait includes my 
relationship to the sitter and the image of the absent other, while giving 
heightened attention to the relationship between the two subjects. 
My drawing attempts to portray particularity, not so much within the 
facial features or expression of the person depicted as in what the 
relationship between sitter and imaged absent other instigates within 
my own artistic practice.
In MotherDaughter (as self-portrait) (2008) (Figure 3.4) each image is 
made up of my mother’s photographed face as an enlarged photocopy 
transfer together with the observational drawing of parts of my 
face layered over parts of her face. The areas of watercolour wash 
surrounding the face have been sandpapered in some places in an 
attempt to excavate an underlying physical presence.
Figure 3.4: MotherDaughter (as self-portrait), Gali Weiss, 2008, watercolour, 
solvent transfer, charcoal, graphite, 75 x 75 cm each of 6 panels.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
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At first glance, this portrait may be understood as a hybrid or 
composite of two people. As my portraiture work evolved I began 
to recognise the complexities of my subjects both as representations 
and in their referentiality. I had complicated the notion of the 
portrait’s indexical quality by using a doubling of reference, whereby 
one reference was to the sitter present in my studio and the other 
to a person related to the sitter, referenced through their depiction 
in a photograph. The  photographic image was photocopied and 
subsequently transferred onto paper so that reference was made not to 
the origin of ‘person’ but to the origin of ‘photograph’. Additionally, 
new subjectivities and relationships were being constructed through 
the multiple images of the doubling of the subject.
My work draws two subjects into the completion of one portrait 
that is composed of a number of parts. These parts have in turn been 
assembled out of variations of repeated images of the two subjects. 
However, the intent of doubling in my work (the portrait of two people 
as one) is neither to ‘return’ to a single referent nor to substitute one 
being for another. Rather, the oscillation and shifting emphasis of the 
imagery calls into question the hierarchy of one subject overlaying or 
displacing the other; the image as well as the subject is at the same 
time unified and separate, lost and found, present and absent, coming 
in and out of focus.
Thus while my portraits can be viewed as composites or hybrids, my 
own experience as maker and viewer simultaneously is of the portrait 
as a meeting point: of two individual subjects connected by a shared 
history, heritage and family, and myself as artist/viewer. As both 
artist and viewer, mark-maker and mark-observer, I am engaging in 
turn with a relationship that is re-established imaginatively on paper 
by enacting possibilities for ‘meeting’ within representation. This 
‘meeting’, in the representation of the subject’s facial features, will 
never bring about a unified whole, but the making and identifying 
within the process of production—the mark-making and trace—can 
present the possibility of ‘oneness’ or completeness. Identifying with 
the process of production does not mean interpreting the signs of 
the mark-making but rather re-enacting the processes of materiality 
that are open to being engaged with imaginatively. In this way, the 
viewer is invited to enter into that process of possibilities through 
identification, rather than by recognising an identity.
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Figure 3.5: FatherDaughter, Gali Weiss, 2008, ink and watercolour wash, 
solvent transfer, charcoal, graphite, 52.5 x 37 cm each of 14 panels.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
 
Figure 3.5a: FatherDaughter (detail), Gali Weiss, 2008, ink and watercolour 
wash, solvent transfer, charcoal, graphite, 52.5 x 37 cm each of 14 panels.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
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As with MotherDaughter, FatherDaughter (2008) and MotherSon 
(2008) (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) present a relational portrait of parent and 
child, only this time ambivalence extends to displacement in gender. 
FatherDaughter is a wall installation of 14 panels. The source image 
of the ‘father’, the absent subject, is a small photograph in which he 
poses at a distance from the photographer. The eyes of the subject are 
in shadow. The marks of drawing are of observational drawing in my 
studio of the ‘daughter’, at much the same age as that of the father 
at the moment of being photographed. While much of the focus is 
drawn to the eyes, my focus is not limited to the eyes but extends to 
the whole installation and viewing experience. My focus is multiple, 
for I am dealing with looking and the look returned, with the spaces 
between the forms of the individual faces and across as well as within 
the viewing trajectories of the installation as a whole.
Figure 3.6: MotherSon, Gali Weiss, 2008, solvent transfer, graphite, 
37 x 30 cm each of 15 panels.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
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The images in MotherSon (2008) comprise two photographs that have 
been photocopied and transferred to paper. The original photograph 
of the ‘son’ was a small digital print given to me by the ‘mother’, 
whom I photographed myself. As in all these portraits, an image of 
one subject is overlaid with an image of another in various layers, 
sizes and emphases. Rather than the mark-making of observational 
drawing, artistic choices regarding material application and chance 
actions were the crucial interventions in this series. Mine is not only 
a visual and interpretive relationship with the photograph but also a 
material relationship via my transferring of the photograph to paper. 
In undertaking this manipulation of the image and carrying it across 
in a newly mediated form to establish a relationship with the sitter’s 
image, I attempt to create a space that involves another relationship to 
the image—that of the viewer. 
Materially, the photograph presents me with the stillness of past time 
captured. The photocopied photograph becomes a tool for thought. 
It presents me with possibilities for present and future imaging and 
imagining. The photocopy is transferred onto paper, at times in 
several layers, with differing manipulations. What is left is the trace 
of the photograph, which had the trace of the subject, captured at a 
particular time in a particular place. By using the (photo)copy I am 
not trying to represent the absent referent, nor the photograph. 
My intent, rather, is to free up the referent from the context of the 
photograph into a new imagery in order to interact with him/her as 
animated presence. One could say that I am setting up a challenge: to 
diffuse the ‘deadness’31 of the posed subject and to diffuse the distant 
‘other’, through my material interactions and through the relational 
positioning of the subject-images. Continual interaction activates this 
relational presence, not by interacting with the ‘pose’, which is the 
face’s expression or place, but through the evocation of a dialogue 
with a human face as subject. The copy mediates between the ‘real’, 
stilled subject and myself as artist because the image comes alive as 
subject in the artistic process of production. 
31  Here I use ‘dead’ in the sense that Roland Barthes gives to the subject position of the 
photograph, as the person poses for the camera, thereby creating him/herself as other, and 
thus transforming him/herself into an image: as ‘a subject who feels he is becoming an object, 
I experience a kind of death’. ‘I have become Death in person.’ Roland Barthes, Camera lucida: 




Figure 3.7: MotherSon II, Gali Weiss, 2008, black & white and colour 
solvent transfer, 60 x 40.5 cm each of four panels.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
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In MotherSon II (2008) (Figure 3.7), facial expression occurs not 
through features but through the action and placement of material 
elements. The border of a stain, for example, affects the expression 
of a feature of the face. In this way, the portrait shifts from being an 
iconic object that has a life-presence of its own, or that represents the 
uniqueness or essence of the person outside it, to function as a site 
of mediation and negotiation, a site of relationality. In the words of 
Buck-Morss, my task is ‘not to get behind the image surface but to 
stretch it, enrich it, give it definition, give it time’.32 These portraits 
thus become sites of collective presence and production—in subject, 
material production and viewing.
Portraiture as culture
This way of construing the subjectivity of the portrait is at odds 
with those concerned with the portrayal of the specificity, ‘truth’ or 
‘knowledge’ of the person portrayed. My primary intention is not to 
replace such notions of referentiality and ‘authenticity’ as inform the 
conventions of portraiture, even though my approach may challenge 
them. Rather, I have strived to investigate further the productive 
possibilities of portraiture, ‘rethinking’ the portrait alongside other 
current ‘rethinkings’ of culture, identity and representation.
Avtar Brah suggests that cultures are processes rather than ‘reified 
artefacts’.33 Her argument suggests a parallel viewing of portraiture 
as itself a culture, where the genre can be seen to have a history, 
a genealogy, an authority and conventions of language and practice. 
Thus representations that do not comply with the historical, essentialist 
criteria of portraiture—portraits that, for example, are anonymous yet 
nevertheless images of persons—need not be viewed as marginal or 
challenging to the genre, but rather help constitute the genre itself. 
The site of portraiture can accommodate works that subscribe 
to the ideals of unity, homogeneity and pure presence, as well as 
those that declare the subjective impossibility of such qualities. In 
this way the space of portraiture can parallel the space of diaspora, 
or culture at large, where works (and people) that enact a desire for 
32  Buck-Morss, 1991, p. 25.
33  Brah, 1996, p. 92.
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unity can co-exist with works (and people) that refute the possibility 
of fixed and unified positions, but stop short of rejecting tradition.34 
Hence, portraiture can be understood not so much as a genre within 
the boundaries of a territory that includes or excludes but rather 
as a cultural site that contextualises the desire for, in Brah’s words, 
a ‘politics of identification’.35 
By conjoining portraiture and diaspora, I ‘think through’ notions of 
identity, subjectivity and representation. My work plays with layered 
possibilities of subjectivity—with notions of multiplicity, erasure, 
location and dislocation, of mobility and ambivalence, of self and 
other, working from a premise of inheritance. Beyond the qualities 
of transience in the portraits is the figuring of a space in which past 
and present meet in new formations. The sense of inheritance, of 
the past that is integral to diasporic consciousness and that includes 
imaginings of home in place and time, and of futurity, is highlighted 
in my work through the doubling of subjects and creation of a space 
of relationality between them.
The completed portraits suggest imprints of memory and postmemory 
through the duality of subjects but also through the selection of 
materials and media. The selection and application of materials and 
processes of production are integral to both the thinking and becoming 
of diasporic personhood: the photocopy as the copy of a photograph, 
itself a reproduction, a trace of body, time and place; the adaptive 
transferring by hand of the photocopy, which at times results in a 
reductive linear mark, at others a stain alluding to corporeal qualities; 
the charcoal and graphite gestures of observational drawing that 
trace the artist’s visual trajectory as marks of repetitive exploration, 
discovery, formation; the paper itself, which lacks demarcation when 
used as overlapping panels (Figure 3.5) or as a layer and disintegration 
of a layer between images (Figure 3.8).36 The materials are employed 
not simply as a means of constructing a representation but also as an 
enactment of that representation, in all its relational aspects. 
34  Andrew Benjamin, Art, mimesis and the avant-garde, London and New York, Routledge, 
1991, pp. 63–4.
35  Brah, 1996, p. 93.
36  One feature of MotherSon III is the result of the photocopy solvent transfer being applied 
to the other side of the paper, absorbing into the paper and revealing itself on the viewed side. 
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Figure 3.8: MotherSon III, Gali Weiss, 2008, black & white and colour 
solvent transfer, 60 x 40.5 cm each panel.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
My works attempt to create imaginative possibilities for a dynamic 
portrayal in a ‘still’ representation through a relational approach 
to the portrait as representation and as presence. These portrayals 
offer simultaneously a collective and an individual representation of 
personhood and a viewing experience that is participatory—based on 
identification rather than identity. They contain qualities and address 
themes that are prevalent within diasporic consciousness and that are 
commonly experienced as paradoxes of diasporic life: the simultaneity 
of difference and sameness, location and dislocation, belonging and 
otherness, particularity and anonymity. Like diasporic space, which 
encompasses those who leave as well as those who stay and those who 
return, portraiture can provide a potent space for enacting multiple 







The self-portrait and the film 
and video essay
John Conomos
The world is but a perennial movement. All things in it are in constant 
motion … I cannot keep my subject still … I do not portray being, 
I portray passing … 1
Born under a Claude Neon milk-bar sign
This essay seeks to illuminate the intertwined forms of the essay 
and the self-portrait and does so in light of recent currents in 
contemporary art, film, and literary and media theory. Today we 
can speak not only of the essay film but also of the video essay and, 
more generally, of the essayistic in postmodern digital creativity. 
As  a  media artist, I  have always been attracted to the essay form 
because of its pliable, intertextual capacity to act, as Serge Daney 
would have it, as a ‘go-between’, linking cinema, video, new media, 
literature and critical theory.2 I have been fascinated with the idea of 
1  Michel de Montaigne, ‘Of repentance’, in The complete essays, trans. MA Screech, London, 
Penguin, 1993.
2  For a more elaborate discussion of Serge Daney’s idea of a filmmaker, artist and writer 
as a  ‘go-between’, and the broader implications for contemporary art, cinema and literature, 
see  John Conomos, Mutant media, Sydney, Artspace/Power Publications, 2008. And for the 
actual concept of ‘go-between’ as defined by Daney see his Postcards from the cinema, trans. 
Paul Grant, London and New York, Berg, 2007.
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cinema, video and installation as writing. The phantasmatic notion of 
film and video as a form of sound–image–performance–writing has 
haunted me since the 1960s (think of the work of Chantal Akerman, 
Jean Cocteau, Jean-Luc Godard, Chris Marker, Agnes Varda, Yvonne 
Rainer and Orson Welles).3 Over many years I have made videos, films, 
installations and radio as a diasporic Greek-Australian subject in 
postwar Australia. I have sought to create audio-visual self-portraits 
in the French New Wave tradition of Alexandre Astruc’s key concept 
of caméra-stylo cinema.4
Autobiography, landscape, memory, time and the self-portrait have 
been interrelated concerns of my art and writing practice since the 
1970s. And over the years the self-portrait has been particularly central 
to my videotapes, media installations, radiophonic essays and photo-
performance. This (post)modern genre par excellence of image-making 
is emblematic of the underlying conceptual, formal and technological 
ideas, contexts and forms that have emerged since the historical avant-
garde. As artist and writer, I have been substantially engaged with 
creating ‘in-between’ contexts, ideas and genres that emanate from 
art, cinema, literature, philosophy and critical theory. Indeed, it is 
because I have been excavating precisely these very art forms, figures 
and contexts that I have been able to engage in an autobiographical/
critical project over the last four decades.
But it is not that simple, for I am also critically interested in questions 
of seeing and hearing that may hover beyond our present horizons 
of creative, cultural and existential possibility. The essay form has 
allowed me to fashion videos, films, installations and radio texts in 
the hope of sustaining an informed, speculative and poetic ‘border-
crossing’ between established art forms and more recent forms that 
are particularly salient to contemporary art. In other words, I have 
pursued the production of trans-media work that critiques the binary 
essentialism of (post)modernism and western thought. At the outset, 
it should be observed that the increasingly compelling terrain of 
essayistic cinema (including the diary film, the notebook film and 
3  For a discussion of the general concept of cinema, video and new media as a kind of image–
sound–performance–writing as it may apply to the works of Jean-Luc Godard, Orson Welles, 
Chris Marker, Jean Cocteau and Agnes Varda, see Conomos, 2008.
4  For a clear and concise introduction to Alexandre Astruc’s caméra-stylo idea of a personal form 
of cinema in the context of the French New Wave cinema, see Richard Neupert, A history of the 
French New Wave cinema, 2nd edn, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 2002, pp. 45–56.
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the essay film in general), video and new media is critically indebted 
to Michel Montaigne’s concept of the literary essay, as well as to 
autobiography and the self-portrait in painting. Image-making in this 
evolving field of creativity is personal—intimate cinema/video/new 
media trembling with experimental risk-taking and crossing generic 
boundaries without need of a passport.5
I became interested in creating art that questions itself as a continuing 
autobiographical project and articulates an overall attempt to be self-
reflexive and open-ended, a project always striving to remind us that 
art is power and needs always to be ‘untimely’, to put it in Nietzsche’s 
terms.6 Art, for me, is anti-art. The essay form permits the artist-writer 
to be a self-interrogator, and the past to be recognised, crucially, as a 
part of the present. And yet art and writing for me share a perennially 
nagging, half-glimpsed striving towards an undecided elsewhere.7
It is in this critical context that the essay form in contemporary audio-
visual production has given me hope. In the 1970s, while squatting 
in London, I encountered a ‘popular front’ ethos—à la Jean Renoir’s 
Crime of Monsieur Lange—of ‘in-between’ creativity and living. And 
video was always at the centre of this. In that era of punk, people 
used video as art, social critique, performance and parody. Returning 
to Sydney in 1977, I attended several short courses on video editing 
and production techniques. The liquid collage and intertextual poetry 
of the electronic medium bewitched me. It was so calligraphically 
flexible—just like seeing sign-writers applying their ornate art to 
my parents’ milk-bar window in the 1950s, advertising our coming 
weekly bargains. To me this was to make images as if putting pen to 
paper, celluloid, video and neon. Enchantment. 
Our milk bar at Tempe became a Bachelardian theatre of bicultural 
being, dislocation, surreal reverie, silence, memory and otherness. 
It indelibly coloured my understanding of a poetics of ‘in-between’ 
creativity, foreignness and discordances of time and space. The milk 
bar as home, as an uncanny place of estrangement and wonderment, 
5  This notion of ‘travelling without a passport’ is drawn from the work of Steve Fagin. 
See Peter Wollen, ‘An interview with Steve Fagin’, October, no. 41, Summer, 1987, p. 99.
6  Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997.
7  In this I am inspired by the work of Maurice Blanchot, Hugh Kenner and Ezra Pound.
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defined my life, as in Michel de Certeau’s words, ‘being in between’.8 
I  was always aware of being a hybrid alien. In grappling with and 
indeed surviving the cultural and ideological contradictions and 
fictions of my life, Stanley Cavell’s idea of ‘the strangeness of oneself’ 
has resonated strongly.9 Through cunning, language, mimicry and 
play, I learnt to value cinephilia, difference, exilic marginality, 
self-reflexivity and experimentation in order to survive—to make 
sense of my ongoing life as a hyphenated being: Greek-Australian, 
artist-writer. I would cling to essays, fragments, aphorisms, quotes, 
digressions, autobiographies and mémoires like a marooned sailor does 
floating wreckage. All of my works, whether Autumn song, Album 
leaves, Shipwreck or The spiral of time, in their respective aesthetic, 
cultural and formal ways enact my interest in subjective cinema—
the self-portrait and the essay film and video form.
As a reluctant, introspective child acting as a scribe for our many 
ethnic customers in their Kafkaesque dealings with bureaucracies—the 
local council, the law, education, immigration and so on—I intuitively 
realised that life as an immigrant, as the other, meant absurdity, 
solitude and vulnerability (hence also my deep interest in American 
film noir). Waiting for the next customer to enter through the door of 
the milk bar—always waiting—I would watch that doorway magically 
transform into a movie screen, framing a world of enchantment beyond. 
Busy images of passing cars, customers, shopping, screaming kids and 
teenagers doing their Jukebox Cindy Sherman thing—I would dearly 
caress every image framed by the door with my roving, fugitive eyes.
Ever since those days, I have been engaged in the risk-taking enterprise 
of creating ‘in-between’ media art and writing anchored in Rainer 
Maria Rilke’s belief that the artist or writer is the bearer of cultural 
memory.10 Making memory matter: this is paramount in my praxis 
as an artist-scholar-writer. I create art as works against forgetting. 
But as we are all too aware, as individuals we often misremember 
art, cinema, literature and life. How much do we misremember? This 
question haunts all of us and is lyrically posed by one of England’s 
8  Michel de Certeau, The practice of everyday life, trans. Steven Rendell, Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 2007.
9  Stanley Cavell, A pitch of philosophy, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1994, p. xv.
10  Raymond Bellour, Between-the-images, trans. Allyn Hardyck, Zurich, JRP/Ringier, 2011.
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great film and video essayists, Chris Petit, in his 1999 ‘road-movie’ 
video essay Negative space, a homage to late, great film critic and 
painter Manny Farber.
Writing and making art for me is utterly compelling, ontological. 
I have no choice; I do not know what else to do. Kafka once described 
his nocturnal feverish writing as an act of ‘interior emigration’. 
Caught between two worlds I would always read between languages, 
between cultures, between art forms. I have been doing this all my 
life; rummaging among the dustbins of various art forms, genres 
and cultural contexts. By existential necessity I am—in the classic 
European sense of the term—a ‘ragpicker’.11 Or if you will, I became 
an ‘aesthetic vagabond’,12 interested in the multiplying ‘creative 
encounters’13 that have been or are taking place between art, cinema, 
video and the new media technologies. I am concerned with the 
conversations that exist between these different art forms, contexts 
and genres, locating, as it were, the ancients next to the moderns in 
the same room and seeing what might ensue (think of Octavio Paz 
or Michel Serres).14 For me, analogue and digital media coexist as part 
of a continuous dialogue of art-making.
The essay film and video essay
Writing of the audio-visual essay in film, video art and new media 
arts, we can trace its historical legacy to the literary, the philosophical 
and the photographic—from Michel Montaigne through Theodor 
Adorno and Walter Benjamin to James Agee and Walker Evans’ 
11  Walter Benjamin, The arcades project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002; Georg Simmel, ‘The metropolis and mental life’, 
in The sociology of Georg Simmel, New York, Free Press, 1976.
12  Jean-Louis Schefer, The engimatic body, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 4.
13  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi, London, Athlone, 1987. 
14  Here I am influenced especially by Octavio Paz and Michel Serres. See, for example, 
Octavio Paz, On poets and others, New York, Seaver Books, 1986; Michel Serres, The troubadour 
of knowledge, Ann Arbour, University of Michigan Press, 1997. 
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classic collaboration Let us now praise famous men.15 For Montaigne, 
the essay was an ideal vehicle for speculating aloud and testing ideas 
on paramount questions of life, culture, politics, human fragility and 
society. It also asked questions of his own subjectivity and, by focusing 
on the dialectical tensions between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’, was able to 
contribute significantly to a highly elastic personal genre of creative 
thought and speculation.16 The genre has the ability to compress 
together, in a non-systematic fashion, such devices as collage, irony, 
pastiche, satire, humour and paradox.
It was, however, the German critics and philosophers of the early 
twentieth century who further articulated what an essay might be.17 
Although it was the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs who described 
the written essay as ‘criticism as a form of art’ and as a ‘philosophical 
poem’, and who thought of it as a flexible form of the ‘accidental’ 
and the ‘necessary’,18 it was Adorno who took up Lukacs’ ideas and 
characterised the genre as having the key characteristics of ‘luck’, 
‘play’ and ‘irrationality’. Thus for Lukacs and Adorno the essay 
did not put forward truth claims, as did documentary film, but was 
characterised by its fragmentary, wandering concerns and stylistics.
The film essay was first introduced as a concept by the German 
experimental filmmaker Hans Richter in April 1940.19 Richter argued 
in his seminal text, ‘The essay film: A new form of documentary film’, 
that this new genre would allow the filmmaker to make the ‘invisible’ 
world of ideas and thoughts visible on the screen.20 The film essay 
would transgress the traditional concepts and forms of documentary 
cinema, enabling the artist/filmmaker to be irrational, contradictory, 
speculative and fantastic—in short, to question the binary logic 
of western representation in art, culture, language and society.
15  The literature on the essay film and video has started to expand in the last few years. 
Previously it was lean pickings for anyone interested in the subject. The following are 
recommended: Noral Alter, ‘Translating the essay into film and installation’, Visual Culture, 
vol. 6, no. 1, 2007, pp. 44–57; Raymond Bellour, Eye for I: Video self-portraits, New York, 
Independent Curators Inc., 1989; Conomos, 2008; Timothy Corrigan, The essay film, Oxford and 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2011; and Laura Rascaroli, The personal camera, London and 
New York, Wallflower Press, 2009.
16  See Alter, 2007, pp. 49–50 and Corrigan, 2011.
17  Corrigan, 2011, pp. 21–3.
18  Georg Luckacs, Soul And Form, trans. Anna Bostock, Massachusetts, Cambridge University 
Press, 1974.
19  Corrigan, 2011, p. 63.
20  Corrigan, 2011, p. 61.
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In the late 1940s, there were several significant turning points in 
the unfolding sociocultural and aesthetic formations and contexts 
that substantially helped to usher in the film essay, and around two 
decades later, the video essay. In his famous 1948 essay ‘The birth of 
the new avant-garde: The caméra-stylo’, critic, filmmaker and novelist 
Alexandre Astruc argued that it was quite possible for a filmmaker 
or an artist ‘to express his thoughts, however abstract they may be, 
or translate his obsessions exactly as he does in the contemporary 
essay or novel’.21 For Astruc, the filmmaker’s camera could become 
the equivalent of the author’s pen, introducing the influential concept 
of the caméra-stylo, which animated the auteur theory of the French 
New Wave—exemplified by Jean-Luc Godard—and its authorial 
assumptions about cinematic subjectivity.
There has been no filmmaker more intertwined with the fate of the 
image than Godard; no one so compelled to create a new poetics 
of image-making anchored in the dialectic between literature and 
writing and the cinema (and, more recently, video). From the 
beginning, Godard’s involvement with cinema was with its other, 
which for him, from the late 1950s and early 1960s on, was television. 
For Godard, television represented new ways of seeing and hearing, 
new modalities of composition and decomposition (accelerating and 
slowing down the image), new strategies of mise-en-scène. In a word, 
television’s other—‘video’ or ‘the electronic image’—for him signified 
an unexplored potential for locating new sites in the image.
Since Ici et ailleurs (1974), Godard has expanded his experimentation 
with the new electronic image and sound systems in order to ‘redefine 
representation in reference to bodies, time, space and speech’.22 
Godard’s ‘border-crossing’ activity over the last three decades has 
taken us into a new territory of imaginative possibilities between 
film and video predicated on attempting to see ‘not this or that, but 
only to see if there is something to see’.23 The ‘writerly attributes’ of 
the highly elastic video medium are ideal for Godard, and for other 
artists, including Robert Cahen, Thierry Kuntzel, Chris Marker, Steve 
21  Corrigan, 2011, p. 65.
22  Philippe Dubois, ‘Video thinks what cinema creates’, in Raymond Bellour and Mary Lea 
Bandy (eds), Jean-Luc Godard son + image 1974–1991, New York, Museum of Modern Art, 1992, 
pp. 169–85.




Fagin and Irit Batsry, who seek to construct a poetic style of electronic 
image-making, influenced by Stéphane Mallarmé, among others. 
These artists share a sustained interest in exploring the idea of video-
stylo writing (following Astruc’s caméra-stylo in cinema) in today’s 
media arts.
Chris Marker, like Godard, uses video technology as a ‘camera-pen’ 
to create and think, and to interrogate the image (often archival) 
of history, politics, time and memory. Marker’s enigmatic work—
films, travel books, imaginary film scripts, photo-novels, videos, 
installations, photographs and travel essays—constitutes a highly 
subjective voyage across the world and its labyrinthine features of 
faces, landscapes, objects and animals in memory, time and space. 
He wanders the world recording his impressions as a furtive lyrical 
flâneur, reporting meditative image–sound letters that chronicle life 
as a vertigo of space and time linked by the insane impossibility and 
unreliability of memory. Marker’s early film essays, such as Dimanche 
à Pékin (1955) and Lettre de Siberie (1957), his science-fiction short 
La jetée (1962), as well as his more personal, epistolary works such as 
Sans soleil (1983), AK (1985) and Le tombeau d’Alexandre (1992), are 
some of the more elaborate and haunting examples of film- and video-
stylo creativity as ‘autobiographical documentary’ in contemporary 
audio-visual media.24 
In the context of the rise of the essay film or film essay, the works of 
the artists I have briefly surveyed here are salient, as is the expanding 
significance of the essay form (both print and audio-visual) that is 
rapidly becoming a crucial aspect of DVDs and their supplements.25 
The legacy of the essay form is highly visible and arguably it is 
playing an essential role in shaping today’s DVD cinephilia and its 
attendant global media culture. As a genre, the film and video essay 
problematises the cultural politics of representation and knowledge 
production. The  essayistic in our ‘post-human’ moving image 
24  Marker’s essayistic work includes influential new media contributions such as the CD-ROM 
Immemory, 1997. See Catherine Lupton, Chris Marker: Memories of the future, London, Reaktion 
Books, 2008, p. 205; Conomos, ‘The spiral of time: Chris Marker and new media’, in Mutant 
media, 2008, pp. 183–95. 
25  It is interesting to note the development of the scholarly video essay phenomenon of the 
last two years or so. No doubt the reasons for this new pedagogic essay form are complicated, 
but one may be able to trace a vital link to its origins in terms of the supplements (documentaries 
on filmmakers and written essays, etc.) of a given DVD. This new essay form in film and media 
scholarship warrants further critical scrutiny.
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culture is self-reflexive in that, by its very inter-disciplinary nature, 
it offers its own film and video criticism. Like its distant cousin the 
philosophical literary essay, the film and video essay embodies cross-
disciplinary concepts, forms and norms. Essentially, it does not adhere 
to a linear narrative trajectory, but rather is hybrid, open-ended and 
non-hierarchical in its pluralistic image–sound–spatial figurations. 
This spiralling, hesitant and introspective form of image-making 
connects to what Chris Marker once described as ‘the imaginary 
country which spreads out inside us’.26
As someone who has been working in the essay form and the self-
portrait (across literature, cinema and video), crossing so many 
different kinds of cultural, generic, linguistic and psychic borders 
in my life’s journey has been dear to me. As Salman Rushdie once 
said, ‘To see things plainly, you have to cross a frontier’.27 Easier said 
than done. I have always regarded art-making (irrespective of the 
medium) a fugitive, elliptical enterprise that questions one’s own 
aesthetic, cultural and epistemological baggage. The artist-writer as 
self-interrogator, as trickster, crosses the thresholds of multiple forms, 
always attempting to dig deep, to mingle things, perennially engaged 
in boundary-creation and boundary-crossing.28   
Thus it is wise to note that the critique of amnesia as a mass-
mediated malady of late-capitalist culture is not new in itself, 
as Andreas Huyssen points out. For example, witness Adorno’s, 
Walter Benjamin’s and Martin Heidegger’s interwar writings on the 
obsession with memory and the fetish quality of mass cultural forms.29 
Yet, my work as an artist and as a critic/theorist strives to underscore 
how today’s cybernetic virus of amnesia is threatening to consume 
memory. This contemporary amnesia constantly blights our cultural 
and epistemological endeavours to speak of video art’s mutating 
complexities in a digital age. Lamentably, this amnesia is systematically 
embedded in our academic, funding and museological institutions 
and their theoretical frameworks of interpretation. Cultural amnesia 
travels by way of computer-networked media in our age of hyper-
consumption, information networks and global capital.
26  Marker, cited in Conomos, 2008, p. 191.
27  Salman Rushdie, Imaginary homelands, London, Granta Books, 1991, p. 125.
28  Lewis Hyde, Trickster makes the world, Edingburgh, Canongate, 2008, p. 7.




When speaking of video art and new media, it is vital to deal with 
their complexities, temporalities and cultural logics. For as Hubert 
Damisch reminded Denis Hollier, Yves-Alain Bois and Rosalind 
Krauss, ‘ We live in a moment of suspension. Is it the end of something 
or the beginning of something else?’30 Damisch’s remarks have been 
profoundly salient to my critical understanding of our emergent 
moving-image culture. In relation to the paradoxical art form we call 
video, for instance, we still lack the hermeneutic ability to speak of it 
in a language that is as inventive as it is practised today in its mutable 
forms of representation-production, exhibition and critical reception. 
I agree with Sean Cubitt, Chris Darke, Siegfried Zielinski and Nicholas 
Zurbrugg, among others, that we simply do not know how to talk 
about video art’s histories, contexts, genres and effects. 
Nicholas Zurbrugg’s concluding words to his incisive 1991 critique 
of Fredric Jameson’s distorted exegesis of postmodern video and 
multimedia performance—that we (all of us) need to learn how to 
observe, analyse, interpret and evaluate the new arts of the 1980s and 
1990s, and now in these first decades of the new century— lamentably 
have still not been heeded.31 For me, video art is not dead. Along with 
Zielinski and others, I maintain that we are ignorant of the art form—
aesthetically, archivally, curatorially and pedagogically—particularly 
of our own video creations since the 1970s, as they are tragically 
(and tiresomely) eclipsed by the Euro-American canon of the art 
form.  
To speak of one’s own art and writing practice in the context of 
Australian video art and new media is quite a tricky thing to do, 
given what Gilles Deleuze demonstrated when he persuasively 
spelled out the many intricate biographical, cultural, social and 
philosophical complexities central to the act of explaining one’s self 
to any given audience.32 This was perfectly illustrated for me when 
one day in the early 1980s I watched on my television set Jean Genet 
being interviewed by a BBC television crew. Within minutes Genet, 
in his withering scatalogical way, upturned the proverbial applecart 
30  See Yves-Alain Bois, Denis Hollier and Rosalind Krauss, ‘A conversation with Hubert 
Damisch’, October, Summer, 1998, p. 16.
31  Nicholas Zurbrugg, ‘Jameson’s complaint: Video art and the inter-textual “time-wall”’, 
Screen, vol. 32, no. 1, Spring, 1991, pp. 16–34.
32  Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Hammerjam, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1987. 
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and interrogated the interviewer about the ideological fictions and 
limitations of what conducting an interview signifies. What was it to 
explain oneself to someone else via the customary ‘ingrained’ generic 
banalities of television?
I became, in Abul R JanMohamed’s sense, a ‘border’ video-maker 
and theorist/writer, someone who has (regardless of their class, 
gender, political or historical determinations) occupied over the years 
a heterotopic, specular site in society.33 I found myself located in a 
nomadic, paradoxical space between culture and system, thereby 
representing a subject-as-space in the hope of delineating, critiquing 
and inverting the real sites of the dominant culture, someone who 
believes in the Nietzschean self-enabling intertextual freedoms and 
perspectives of ‘in-between’ media creativity, opening up a kind of 
‘creative stuttering’ within language.34 I have treated image-making 
and writing as forms of ‘travelling without a passport’, as Steve 
Fagin would say, or as the French put it, as ‘paperless’—homeless, 
‘without (identity) papers’. I regard both creative activities as critical-
speculative enterprises, located at the edge, always in the midst of 
things, suspicious of monocultural homogeneity.35 
1968 and 1984
In 1968, as a student at the University of New South Wales, 
I experienced two events that would shape the kind of artist, writer 
and educator engaged in media arts that I was to become. Thanks to 
Michael Glasheen (whose pioneering importance to Australian video 
art is yet to be given adequate critical and museological due), I walked 
into the Science Theatre—where I would take a subject in the history 
and philosophy of science (gratefully, I may add, in hindsight) because 
of the university’s critical legacy to CP Snow’s two-culture debate of 
the 1960s—and heard Buckminster Fuller speak.36 
33  Abdul R JanMohamed, ‘Wordliness-without-world, homelessness-as home: Toward a 
definition of the specular border intellectual’, in Michael Sprinker (ed.), Edward Said: A critical 
reader, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 103.
34  Deleuze and Parnet, 1987.
35  See Wollen, 1987, p. 99.
36  CP Snow, The Two Cultures, London, Cambridge University Press, 1959.
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There he was, like Robert Crumb’s Mr Natural—snowy-haired, 
wearing thick black glasses and a threadbare black suit, with a clutch 
of biros and pencils in his front jacket pocket. He spoke for close to 
three hours non-stop, in his swirling, vertiginous, collage-style of 
verbal delivery, a labyrinthine vortex of cross-disciplinary subjects: 
Black Mountain College poetics, architecture, modernism, atonal 
music, American transcendental philosophy, Zen Buddhism, John 
Cage, mathematics ... I was cauterised into my seat. ‘What in the name 
of Jesus H Christ was that?’, I asked myself as I left the auditorium. 
Today I still think about it; its reverberations are still with me.
I had a similar experience in 1984—having by this time developed 
some critical, self-reflexive hermeneutic tools to deal with the 
encounter—when I attended Gayatri Spivak’s restless, panther-
like talk at the University of Sydney’s Footlight Theatre during the 
momentous Future Fall Conference on postmodernism. Another 
encounter that influenced my turn to collage aesthetics had occurred, 
again in the Science Theatre, in 1968, when I heard French novelist 
and critic Michel Butor speak on Charles Baudelaire as a collagist-
flâneur. Michel Butor’s address, like Fuller’s talk, but a much quieter, 
modulated style of verbal presentation, opened up exciting new vistas 
of creative and theoretical possibility.
In more recent times, I have come to believe that one is obliged to 
treat the past, the present and the future as a continuing dialogue of 
possibilities; that we must be alive to our one shared, turning world, 
treating the past as integral with the present. In other words, I put the 
ancients next to the moderns, producing in Paz’s fitting expression, 
‘an antiquity without dates’, and see what intertextual conversations 
ensue.37 I simply do not believe in use-by-date orthodoxies relating 
to creativity and scholarship. ‘Give me a pencil, a box of matches and 
some paper and I will create cinema for you’, Godard once said.
37  Paz, 1986, p. 57.
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Consequently, I have learned to value the intertextual potential 
that comes from an engagement of old and new media on the same 
shared plane of multimedia creativity. I appreciate Serres’ important 
characterisation of the legacy of Cartesian rationalism as a violent, 
totalising force in our approach to the question of the relationship 
between Snow’s two cultures and the fate of analogue media in a post-
computer epoch.38 For Serres there are complex passages that we can 
traverse from one domain to another, like the difficult (but rewarding) 
routes that he himself as a sailor-philosopher would take between 
isolated islands of order in a sea of chaos—as in the Northwest 
Passage—from one medium to another. We must be prepared to 
problematise global paradigms and universal ahistorical modes of 
thinking; to shift our ways of knowing by negotiating complexity, 
disorder, uncertainty and multiplicity in everyday life.
Autumn song and beyond
Finally, in concluding this essay, I wish to say a few words about my 
own autobiographical videographic practice and its grounding in 
the aesthetic and critical historical avant-garde, contemporary art, 
literature and philosophy. I shall focus primarily on Autumn song, as 
it is emblematic of my approach to video art, and briefly refer to my 
more recent work, The spiral of time (2013).39 
38  Michel Serres, ‘Northwest Passage’, in Timothy Simone, Peter Caravetta, Frank Mecklenbeerg, 
Brigitte Ouvry-Vial, Gregory Whitehead (eds), Oasis, New York, Semiotext(e), 1984, p. 104.
39  On Autumn song see John Conomos, Autumn song, the Kythera narratives, Sydney, 
Australian Regional Media, 1999. On The spiral of time and other works see Brad Buckley and 




Figure 4.1: Autumn song (still), John Conomos, 1998, SP Beta, 23 mins 
duration.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
The underlying narrative premise of Autumn song, as a multilayered, 
pun-encrusted, self-portrait video, centres on the powerful influence 
an uncle, Uncle Manoli, had on me as a child. He, unlike his siblings 
who migrated to Australia, never left the Greek island Kythera. 
My  parents and relatives would often jokingly warn me about 
him—that if I wasn’t careful, I’d turn out like him: a legendary, lazy, 
misanthropic writer with an encyclopaedic mind who spent his life 
in taverns playing cards. Although I didn’t meet him until the 1970s 
(he looked like a carbon copy of my biological father, who passed away 
in 1957), as a child the spectre of Uncle Manoli profoundly shaped my 
imagination.
Autumn song’s landscapes, and numerous images and quotes drawn 
from Man Ray, Maya Deren, Georges Franju, Buster Keaton and 
Chris Marker, together with its open-air performances, suggest the 
situation of the postcolonial alien caught between places in postwar 
Australia. As an autobiographical work, Autumn song engages various 
elaborate ideas of postcolonial dislocation, cultural mistranslation 
and transmigratory spaces. Its overall caméro-stylo aesthetics is 
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predicated on video collage as defined in the context of cinematic 
and visual modernity and new media. Simply put, Autumn song, as a 
baroque, essayistic self-portrait, questions the surreal logic of my own 
(childhood) life in that it strives to problematise the conflicts, tensions 
and transgressive silences of my poly-cultural experience, at the same 
time endeavouring to define new expressive possibilities in the video 
medium.
One of the dominant formalistic tropes of my video weaves together 
references (especially in its use of film inter-titles, quotes and certain 
props in my improvisatory performances) to past artists, authors, 
filmmakers, video-makers and thinkers as a kind of antidote to the 
institutionalised amnesia that seems to be impacting on contemporary 
media’s history. The voiceover (narrated by Lex Marinos) accompanying 
the film’s improvised, playful, self-reflexive images of my childhood 
memories at Tempe; the numerous in situ images of me performing 
in the tranquil wintry landscape of Kythera (an island immortalised 
by Theo Angelopoulos, Baudelaire, Ernest Bloch and Claude Debussy, 
together with its smaller adjacent island of Anti-Kythera, which the 
Surrealists included in their world map); and images of me as Uncle 
Manoli approaches the camera with a rock, are images of the foreigner, 
the exiled, caught in claustrophobic spaces.
My more recent video, The spiral of time (2013), similarly focuses 
on my postcolonial subjectivity shaped by exile, longing and 
restlessness. But this work also amplifies how an existence that does 
not feel at home in society resonates deeply in the way one dwells 
within one’s own body. In contrast to Autumn song’s elaborate themes, 
sequences and meta-generic concerns, this new video is much more 
compressed in its allusive, speculative, collage style and concerns. 
It pays tribute to art, experimental/avant-garde and classical narrative 
cinema, contemporary and modernist literature, cultural theory and 
philosophy. More specifically, The spiral of time pays homage to the 
‘trance film’ of the past, and its stark black-and-white photography 
evokes a netherworld of existential sleepwalking and lyrical poetry.40 
40  The trance film, as a genre of European art cinema and the American avant-garde/
experimental cinema, has an elaborate aesthetic, cultural and historical genesis. Stan Brakhage, 
Jean Cocteau and Maya Deren are three of its key exemplars. Kenneth Anger’s highly influential 
‘mytho-poetic’ cinema is also relevant.
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Characteristically, quotations abound, drawn from the various 
disciplines that have shaped the basic template of my aesthetic, 
creative and theoretical imagination and concerns.
Figure 4.2: The spiral of time (still), John Conomos, 2013, HD video, 
5 minutes duration.
source: Courtesy of the artist.
To conclude, the self-portrait and essay film and video have been 
significant in my work as an artist, critic and educator. Ever since 
becoming a cinephile in the 1960s and 1970s, when the medium 
first surfaced in this country, I have been attracted to the untold 
experimental pliability of video. It was a huge leap of faith at that time, 
a gamble of sorts, to imagine the liminal horizons of this emerging art 
form. Despite the occasional ‘moral panic’-charged critiques of this 
‘new’ medium back then, its overall magnetic undertow of essayistic 
experimentation and critical thinking drew me into the aesthetic and 
literary/philosophical avant-garde of modernism, and cinema and 
the visual and performing arts allowed me as an image-maker, critic 
and writer to produce zig-zag connections between these disparate 
arts and disciplines. The essay form and the self-portrait gave me 
(and continue to do so, after 30 years) a compelling way to find new 





Michele Barker and Anna Munster
In this chapter we focus on the ways in which the neurosciences 
intersect with psychology and how, together with imaging 
technologies and techniques of identification, these come to constitute 
a complex, contemporary field of ‘faciality’. We refer to our own 
work, which examines how the face and scientific imaging combine to 
create this shifting field. Here we explore the historical links between 
the early natural and medical sciences of the nineteenth century 
and contemporary obsessions with facial symmetry and ‘genuine’ 
facial expression found in neuropsychology and neural marketing. 
We draw upon the history of facial expression as it works its way 
through the early medical photographic images of hysterics’ faces in 
Charles Darwin’s The expression of the emotions in man and animals. 
Ideas about the face as a site for the expression of genuine and staged 
emotion that germinated in early neuroscience have now become part 
of contemporary analysis of cultural and social phenomena, such as 
Barak Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. In the video installation 
Duchenne’s smile1 we make these historical and contemporary links, 
examining emerging paradigms for how we imagine identity today at 
the intersection of expression, technologies and securitisation.
* * *
1  Michele Barker and Anna Munster, Duchenne’s smile, two-channel video installation, 2009.
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Figure 5.1: Photographic montage depicting different facial expressions 
induced by electrical currents. 
source: Photographs by Guillaume Duchenne de Boulogne, from Mécanisme de la 
physionomie humaine, ou, analyse électro-physiologique de l’expression des passions, 
1862, copyrighted work available under Creative Commons Attribution only licence CC 
By 4.0.
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Duchenne’s ultimate legacy may be that he set the stage, as it were, 
for Charcot’s visual theater of the passions and defined the essential 
dramaturgy of all the visual theaters, both scientific and artistic, that 
have since been conceived in the attempt to picture our psyches … 
In the end, Duchenne’s Mecanisme de la physionomie humaine and 
the photographic stills from its experimental theater of electroshock 
excitations established the modern field on which the struggle to 
depict and thus discern the ever-elusive meanings of our coded faces 
continues even now to be waged.2 
The human face is often seen, culturally and analytically, as the 
primary site of the expression of emotion and character, becoming 
the place for imaging and fixing identity. Yet identity is a complex 
and fickle phenomenon to capture, relying not simply upon historical 
norms but also technical developments, the rise of particular scientific 
paradigms and the relation of these to modes of visual perception. 
During periods of accelerated technical and scientific change, what 
the face ‘expresses’—and hence what kind of identity resides on or 
behind it—is open to a number of coexisting conceptions. The face, 
then, is a surface, but not one that simply reveals or hides the depth of 
emotion or meaning. Instead, this surface is itself a complex meshing 
of technical and expressive histories of the measuring and organisation 
of emotion. The imaging of the face by specific media—such as 
photography, and now facial-recognition software and databases—is 
caught up with these histories of the face’s surface, participating in 
and contributing to a specific regime of measurement. This regime 
finds its apotheosis today in technologies for imaging the face as a 
surface that is recognisable, expressible within tightly circumscribed 
patterns and, ultimately, the object and manifestation of a socio-
technical formation of bioinformatic control. 
This chapter examines how the imaging of the face as a site of 
emotion and expression drew initially on the role photography 
played in the development of a taxonomy of emotions in the work 
of Charles Darwin. It particularly traces the ways in which Darwin 
drew on the photographs of neurologist Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand 
Duchenne de Boulogne, who worked at the Salpêtrière hospital in 
Paris during the second half of the nineteenth century. Duchenne 
used electro-physiological devices wired to the faces of his subjects 
2  RA Sobieszek, Ghost in the shell: Photography and the human soul, 1850–2000, Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press, 2003, p. 79.
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to send electrical currents that would hold facial expressions in place 
to match the long shutter speeds his camera required. The chapter 
casts light on this entanglement of expression, technics and imaging 
as it also discusses the authors’ audiovisual artwork, Duchenne’s smile. 
In this video installation, we explore the heritage and legacy of what 
is now known as the Duchenne smile—the staging and construction 
of ‘genuine’ expression in the genesis of neurological science and 
psychology via the work of Darwin, Duchenne and others—through 
to the contemporary capture of facial expression in face recognition 
software. We also discuss the shift from the imaging of the face in 
the earlier attempt to ‘freeze’ expression to a fascination with fleeting 
and barely seen micro-expressions that are today seen to characterise 
the ‘truth’ of the face. We argue that it is important to identify the 
ways in which the face continues to be redrawn as a control surface by 
combining with new techniques and media and in conjunction with 
social and political currents and movements.  
In 1872, almost two decades after the publication of On the origin of 
species, Darwin’s The expression of the emotions in man and animals 
was published. This work meshed Darwin’s theories of evolution with 
what he identified as the instinctive—and universal—behaviours of 
human beings. In arguing for a shared human and animal ancestry 
via evolution, he directly questioned Charles Bell’s Anatomy and 
philosophy of expression,3 which claimed human expression to be the 
result of a divine musculature.
With physiognomy still widely revered, and camera-based 
photography in its infancy, Expression offered a mix of the familiar 
along with the novel, made possible by new imaging technologies.4 
Much has been written about Darwin’s observations and his use of 
3  Charles Bell, Essays on the anatomy and philosophy of expression, London, John Murray, 1824.
4  Darwin himself makes reference to the physiognomical drawings of the seventeenth-
century painter Charles Le Brun. Le Brun was interested in contributing to a fledgling and 
pseudoscience of physiognomy in which the face could be ‘read’ for a range of true expressions 
of the passions—wonder, reverence, admiration and so on. Darwin, however, explains that he 
is not interested in physiognomy per se because it concentrates on expression as recognition of 
(underlying) character. Darwin is more interested in the relations between the movement of the 
facial musculature and the movement of emotions via expression across the face. He therefore 
sets up the possibility for a new regime of faciality, as we will begin to outline in this chapter, 
one that is not concerned with depth and personhood but rather with surface and a moving 
field of visuality discerned across the face. See Darwin, The expression of the emotions in man and 
animals, London, John Murray, 1872, pp. 1–5.
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heliotype plates to create photographic reproductions to illustrate his 
text, for this was one of the first instances of a scientific publication 
being illustrated with photographs. Until the nineteenth century, 
scientific illustration—linocuts, woodblock, watercolours—adhered 
to a set of unwritten standards: the expectation was that the illustration 
resembled the subject matter being discussed and this confirmed 
the authority of both the author and the artist. According to Phillip 
Prodger, the introduction of photographic illustration rendered this 
system useless:
Once the vision threshold was breached, new thinking was required. 
Photographs assumed a dual role. They illustrated something but they 
were also experiments in their own right. They became more than 
mere pictures—they became data. At that point, scientists became 
concerned about exactly how their photographs were made. They 
developed self-contained protocols to enable like-minded scholars to 
reproduce their results.5
Darwin was to find images from a variety of sources, including the 
Swedish photographer Oscar Rejlander, who was better known 
for altering and manipulating photographs than his ability to 
photographically illustrate a scientific treatise. A fine-art painter, 
Rejlander has come to be regarded as one of the first wave of art 
photographers, known for introducing the composite image into 
the photographic mainstream. Not surprisingly, Darwin’s choice of 
Rejlander and the subsequent highly stylised images Darwin created 
for Expression would be questioned by future generations. But for 
Darwin, ultimately, image production was not a matter of process but 
rather an end result.
Nevertheless process did matter, and perhaps of greater significance 
here was the inclusion of images resulting from the work of neurologist 
Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne de Boulogne. Duchenne was 
based at the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, where he researched muscular 
electrophysiology—the perceived electrical dysfunction underlying 
neurological conditions, ranging from strokes and epilepsy through 
to the more questionable areas of hysteria and insanity. It was his 
work using electrical currents to isolate certain facial muscle groups—
published in his treatise The mechanism of human facial expression, 
5  Phillip Prodger, Darwin’s camera: Art and photography in the theory of evolution, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. xxiii.
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or an electro-physiological analysis of the expression of the passions 
applicable to the practice of the fine arts6—that came to the attention 
of Darwin (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3: The facial expression of fear being induced 
by electrical currents. 
source: Photographs by Guillaume Duchenne de Boulogne, from Mécanisme de la 
physionomie humaine, ou, analyse électro-physiologique de l’expression des passions, 
1862, copyrighted work available under Creative Commons Attribution only licence CC 
By 4.0.
Darwin was deeply interested in Duchenne’s work but ultimately 
had reservations that the extreme facial expressions produced by 
the neurologist’s research would be misread or would require more 
information than was possible to provide in Expression. Of the few 
Duchenne images he did use, he requested some be redrawn—with 
the electrical apparatus removed from the picture. But it is precisely 
the relationship between Duchenne’s electro-physiological devices 
and the resulting images that resonate the most in the contemporary 
context. The images appear, literally, shocking, and offer a disturbing 
insight into some of the experimental medical and scientific practices 
of the mid-nineteenth century.
6  Guillame-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne de Boulogne, The mechanism of human facial 
expression, trans. RA Cuthbertson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990 [1862].
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Figure 5.4: Left: Horror and agony; Figure 5.5: Right: Terror.
source: Both figures copied from photographs by Guillaume Duchenne de Boulogne, in 
Charles Darwin, The expression of the emotions in man and animals, Chapter Xll, ‘surprise, 
Astonishment, fear, Honour’, 1872, copyrighted work available under Creative Commons 
Attribution only licence CC By 4.0.
The afflictions of the inmates of the Salpêtrière made them perfect 
candidates for Duchenne’s research and documentation: muscular 
paralysis and facial anaesthetics made them extremely malleable. 
The  flow of sustained electrical currents allowed Duchenne to 
overcome the limits of photography’s then long shutter speeds to have 
his sitters ‘hold’ a pose for an extended period. As Prodger notes:
Instead of accelerating the photographic process to produce 
instantaneous images, as others had tried to do, Duchenne devised 
a system for freezing the activity of his subjects long enough to 
accommodate the lengthy exposure times.7 
In calibrating the speeds of his subjects to the speed of the technology, 
Duchenne reveals a moment that moves beyond Darwin’s fleeting 
emotions; while the expressions are undeniably involuntary, they 
are difficult, as Darwin discovered, to classify with any certainty. 
His electrical probes enabled him to isolate and control the appearance 
of various fluxes of emotional states yet always out of context of any 
real event. Although using photographs as well as illustrations gave 
Expression an air of scientific authenticity, the technical challenges of 
speed were yet to be overcome. Around the same time that Darwin and 
7  Prodger, 2009, pp. 81–2.
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Duchenne were considering facial expressions and how to capture them, 
French surgeon and physiologist Etienne-Jules Marey was attempting 
to record movement. In 1874, he developed the photographic gun that 
enabled him to take 12 frames per second. By 1882 he had successfully 
created what would be termed a chronophotographic fixed-plate 
camera, equipped with a timed shutter. Thanks to this technique he 
was able to combine successive images of a single movement on a single 
plate. By 1890 he had successfully developed a system of sequential 
images on transparent celluloid and an electromagnetically operated 
camera to display them.8 
In the two-channel video installation Duchenne’s smile, we explore 
the heritage and legacy of the Duchenne smile, from the staging and 
construction of ‘genuine’ expression in the development of nineteenth-
century neurological science through to attempts to capture facial 
expression in contemporary face-recognition software. The installation 
questions whether images and the capture of ‘real’ facial expressions 
are part of a social and technical system constructing ‘true’ emotions. 
Further, it asks what affective and institutional politics arise from this 
typology of ‘real emotions’. The work explores how this typology 
supports such diverse organisations and forms as police forces, public 
relations and marketing firms, securitisation and the media’s imaging 
of contemporary politics. 
The left channel contains tightly cropped images of Duchenne’s 
portraits from his studies at the Salpêtrière. Beneath the images run 
fragments of horizontally scrolling text—specifically the elaborate 
chapter titles that Darwin used in Expression. The text format is 
reminiscent of the captions used in contemporary news bulletins: 
an unrelenting streaming of events. 
8  For further information about this and other techniques and apparatuses constructed by 
Marey see Francois Dagognet, Etienne-Jules Marey: A passion for the trace, trans. Robert Galeta 
and Jeanine Herman, New York, Zone Books, 1992, pp. 106–7.
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Figure 5.6: Duchenne’s smile (still), two-channel video installation, 
Michele Barker and Anna Munster, 2009.
source: Courtesy of the artists.
The right channel of the work, unhindered by the technicalities of 
real-time change, actively engages with the process of speed, here 
undermining the speed of real-time media delivery by allowing change 
to happen gradually over the duration of the piece. A head is framed 
by an almost cartoon-like vector representation of a face with ellipses 
for the eyes and a rectangle for the mouth. Not exactly a cartoon, it is 
rather the bounding boxes used in contemporary facial expression 
research (psychological and algorithmic) to isolate and record segments 
of the face. The bounding box is itself part of the contemporary 
regime of faciality, as it reduces the corporeality of the face to a 
schematic sign, which functions to include and exclude facial material 
for capture and further analysis. The notion of a regime of faciality 
rather than just a genre of portraiture is drawn from the philosophy of 
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Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.9 An entire regime of faciality is put 
in place by the connection and overlap of social, technical, aesthetic, 
economic, semiotic and cultural ‘machines’ across a specific historical 
or contemporary period. For Deleuze and Guattari, such machines do 
not have to be specifically technical; instead they operate according 
to a clear function that acts in conjunction with matter: ‘When the 
faciality machine translates formed contents of whatever kind into 
a single substance of expression, it already subjugates them to the 
exclusive form of signifying and subjective expression.’10 
Here faciality has coalesced into a machine that organises expression 
itself. Examples of such organisations of expression via faciality 
include the way in which the face of Christ organises an entire 
expressive religious machine of suffering, guilt and subjugation. 
A more contemporary example of facialisation can be found in 
human–computer interaction, which tends to organise computational 
expression around the concept of the interface and, frequently, 
icons of smiling faces (emoticons, the start-up diagram of a face 
on computers and so on). Just such a facialisation machine can be 
seen to be operating in the diagrammatic element of the bounding 
box in facial-recognition software (depicted as in the right channel 
of Duchenne’s smile), which attempts to organise all expressions 
according to its constraints. The  regime to which this box belongs 
is a contemporary one, in which identity is mapped, controlled and 
expressed bioinformatically. Digital information in this way functions 
to express a biopolitics that is played out across the surface of the 
face, and through which the face becomes the dominant surface for 
tracking, tracing and controlling the subject.
Does continuity or rupture best describe the relations between 
contemporary regimes of faciality and those of the nineteenth 
century? What do we inherit from Duchenne and Darwin, and what 
has changed in our new facial regimes? For it is not as if one vast regime 
of faciality spans all history. Rather, what is important is the way in 
which the diagram of the face is always combining differently with new 
techniques and technologies and in conjunction with a socio-technical 
9  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A thousand plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005, pp. 176–85.
10  Deleuze and Guattari, 2005,pp. 179–80. For an extended discussion and critique of faciality 
in interface design, see Anna Munster, Materializing new media: Embodiment in information 
aesthetics, Hanover, NH, Dartmouth College Press, 2006, pp. 117–49.
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machine. In the wake of 9/11, securitisation measures, taken by the US 
government especially, have exploded around biometric research and 
development. These have been deployed in facial-recognition software 
and retina scanning at airports and in voice analysis of recordings 
of actual and potential terrorist suspects.11 One can easily see how 
such technologies share a lineage with the profiling of human types 
that began with the criminological sciences of the nineteenth century 
and their deployment of anthropometrical and physiognomical 
techniques to produce fixed facial and corporeal identities. As Michel 
Foucault had already suggested in 1978 for a range of biopolitical 
forms of control, first emerging in the eighteenth century, these were 
techniques for the management and governance of the entire life of the 
human.12 Darwin’s systematisation of human emotions via a taxonomy 
that relied upon fixed facial expression recorded photographically 
seems commensurate with this biopolitical project. 
The installation Duchenne’s smile is a visual response to these issues of 
continuity and rupture, indicated especially in the right video channel 
as the subject’s face is gradually pixellated and overlaid with bounding 
box elements, which are similar to those used in facial-recognition 
software. Pixellation of the subject’s face in the right channel over 
time makes the viewer aware of a digital aesthetic at work, which has 
become so ubiquitous as to be almost naturalised in contemporary 
forms of portraiture. By foregrounding the encoding that is taking 
place, the installation raises questions about not just the authentic 
smile but also the authentic face. Any semblance of the indexical 
that may have occurred in Duchenne’s portraits has ceased to exist 
in the contemporary example of portraiture that is the installation 
Duchenne’s smile.
It is also the case that certain branches of contemporary psychology 
that use techniques for capturing and interpreting facial expression 
also construct certain continuities with Darwin. The evolutionary 
psychologist Paul Ekman has styled himself as the successor to 
Darwin’s project of expressing emotions in ‘man and the animal’. 
Paul Ekman and Warren Friesen’s late 1960s research examined ‘micro-
11  For example, see Adam Peneberg, ‘The surveillance society’, Wired Magazine online, 2001, 
www.wired.com/2001/12/surveillance/.
12  Foucault’s lecture series of 1978 given at the Collège de France signal these preoccupations. 
The English translation of these has only been recently published. See Michel Foucault, Security, 
Territory, Population, London, Palgrave, 2007, p. 16.
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expressions’, which built on psychotherapeutic work undertaken in 
that decade. Facial and bodily movements ordinarily imperceptible 
to the human eye were observed through frame-by-frame scanning 
of video recordings of therapeutic sessions: ‘Micro displays may be 
fragments of a squelched, neutralized or masked display.’13 According 
to Ekman and Friesen, if you were able to see or train yourself to see at 
the rate of video recording—1/25th of a second—you could observe 
a micro-expression. Importantly, they argued that these betrayed both 
‘real emotion’—the truth of what someone was feeling—and attempts 
to mask or deceive the observing eye. One would expect the keen 
observer, on the other hand, to receive contradictory information 
from facial cues: simulated messages, micro-leakage of information 
contradicting simulations, and such deception clues as squelched 
displays and improperly performed simulations.14
In the 1970s, Ekman and Friesen developed the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS).15 This is an instructional set of techniques for 
categorising facial expression based on the groups of facial muscles that 
produce the expressions, and which they called ‘Action Units’. Then 
they developed FACS AID, a database that facilitates the relational 
linking of facial expressions to their psychological interpretations. 
Ekman further consolidated the connection between micro-expressions 
and the FACs system, relating the involuntary micro-movements of 
facial muscles such as we see in the Duchenne smile with the display 
of ‘trustworthy’ emotional displays, on the one hand, and voluntary 
micro- and macro-movements across the face with a person’s potential 
to mask emotion and deceive an observer, on the other.
When emotional expressions lack a muscular movement that is 
difficult to make voluntarily, that expression should be less reliable; 
and those expressions that contain the reliable muscle should be more 
likely to be trustworthy.16 
13  Paul Ekman and Wallace V Friesen, ‘Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception’, Psychiatry, 
vol. 32, no. 1, 1969, p. 89.
14  Ekman and Friesen, 1969, pp. 98–9.
15  For further information on FACS see the website Dataface, maintained by Ekman and 
Friesen, face-and-emotion.com/dataface/facs/description.jsp. 
16  Paul Ekman, ‘Darwin, deception, and facial expression’, Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences, 1000, 2003, pp. 205–21.
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There are two important points to draw from Ekman and the late 
twentieth-century contribution to contemporary regimes of imaging, 
interpreting and organising the face as a surface of expression. 
First,  in  order to observe human emotion on the face at its most 
expressive and most genuine, the observer must calibrate their vision to 
the temporality of media technologies. We have, then, replaced human 
vision with what Paul Virilio calls machine vision.17 Second, although 
the machine vision of video recording reveals micro-expressions, 
the micro-expression itself both reveals and masks; it is capable of 
supplying truth and deception simultaneously. Only by ongoing 
training and the calibration of human vision to the speeds of machine 
vision is the expert observer able to make the call between one and the 
other. Hence a new regime of faciality emerges in which the moving 
image and the face come to organise a relation to truth, to the subject 
being observed and to the observer. It is these relations that organise 
contemporary surveillance, and so much more insidiously than simple 
surveillance, even if the latter is now ubiquitous.
The constant fluctuations between truth and deception in this new 
regime of facialisation provide the drama and indeed atmosphere of the 
television series Lie to me.18 The character of Cal Lightman, who heads 
up The Lightman Group corporation in the series, is loosely modeled 
on Ekman and his Ekman Group. Just like Ekman’s corporation, 
The  Lightman Group’s employees are deployed by law enforcement 
agencies to solve crimes from homicide to terrorism. Using techniques 
based on FACS and technologies such as voice analysis to ‘catch’ 
and read micro-expression, Cal and his employees calibrate their 
observations to the real time of media and computational biometric 
technologies. But this calibration means that they are constantly 
subjecting everything—including each other’s facial expressions—to 
these techniques. In a regime in which micro-expressivity assumes 
primacy, both truth and deception become intra- and intersubjectively 
interchangeable. What Lie to me both captures and engenders in its 
constant search for both truth and deception across the face is the 
broad atmosphere of suspicion that permeates contemporary societies 
17  Paul Virilio, War and cinema, London, Verso Books, 1988.




governed by these new methods of control and securitisation: societies 
in which, potentially, ‘Anyone can be presumed to be a candidate for 
insider threat’, as put by US Department of Homeland Security.19 
Crucially, what has changed for the contemporary facial regime that 
both images and interprets the human subject is that we are not simply 
dealing with a ramping up of techniques of governance derived from 
the nineteenth century. The human is now not simply to be subjected 
to techniques of management but itself becomes a technique via its 
enmeshing with technologies of the moving image. This human is a 
category that functions as a technique for managing a broader scoping 
out of the contemporary technosocial scape:
Human eyes are capable of high-resolution, stereo-optical vision with 
immense range, and, integrated with a highly plastic brain, make 
humans uniquely capable of discovery, integration, and complex 
pattern recognition. Human hands constitute a dexterous, sensitive 
biomechanical system that, integrated with the brains and eyes, 
are unmatched by current and near-future robotic technologies. 
Humans operate in groups synergistically and dynamically, adjusting 
perceptions, relationships and connections as needed on a real-time 
and virtually instantaneous basis. Human language capabilities exist 
and operate within a dimensional space that is far more complex and 
fluid than any known artificial architectures.20 
We see such a scoping-out emerging in the 2004 National Plan for 
Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure 
Protection. This plan amounts to techniques and strategies for 
producing what are called the ‘Common Operating Picture for Critical 
Infrastructure’. This picture is produced by ‘sensing out’ deceptive 
behaviours at the micro or molecular level in persons who are equally 
deemed trustworthy and threatening.
The picture or image produced in the contemporary moment is not, 
then, the profile of an individual or even a type of human being 
with circumscribed characters and behaviours, as it was especially 
at the height of nineteenth-century anthropology, criminology and 
psychology. That is, when Darwin was writing and Duchenne taking 
19  Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, The national plan 
for research and development in support of critical infrastructure protection, 2004, p. 43, www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/ST_2004_NCIP_RD_PlanFINALApr05.pdf.
20  Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 63.
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photographs. Instead, we are now dealing with a completely abstracted 
yet highly technical image—an abstract machine of faciality—that 
must be constantly subjected to attenuation and calibration so as to 
maintain operability. Humans are only part of this picture and, now 
lacking determined character and specific intention, the profiler 
and profiled become interchangeable. Distinctions made at the level 
of intention, character and action are ultimately of little importance 
for such a bioinformatic regime. This is why catching the ‘wrong 
suspect’ is not something that requires explanation but can be passed 
off as a mere ‘system’ error. This is increasingly played out through 
systems of recognition in high-risk arenas such as airports. In 2009, 
for example, a Californian student, Nicholas George, was randomly 
singled out at Pomona airport for questioning by Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) officers:
George had been singled out by behavior-detection officers: TSA 
screeners trained to pick out suspicious or anomalous behavior in 
passengers. There are about 3,000 of these officers working at some 161 
airports across the United States, all part of a four-year-old program 
called Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT), which 
is designed to identify people who could pose a threat to airline 
passengers.
It remains unclear what the officers found anomalous about George’s 
behavior, and why he was detained … But the incident has brought 
renewed attention to a burgeoning controversy: is it possible to know 
whether people are being deceptive, or planning hostile acts, just by 
observing them?21 
Let us return, then, to the question of whether the face today is a surface 
whose identity can be traced back to the taxonomy of expression 
and emotion that Darwin initiated in 1872. We have suggested that 
contemporary bioinformatic regimes for drawing out the face as a 
fluctuating surface of micro-expressions, especially via the codification 
system designed by Ekman and Friesan, extends the Darwinian 
trajectory for locating truth and identity in the face. Importantly, 
the enmeshing of media technologies—initially photography but 
now facial-recognition software—with a science of facial expression 
shows how we are not dealing simply with the human face but rather 




a machine of facialisation. We have also suggested, however, that such 
a machine only makes sense, indeed is itself expressive, through its 
relations with social and political machines. Today we are in the grip 
of a face whose identity has been entirely abstracted from and by the 
technical speeds and the biopolitics in which it participates. What 
matters in this new regime are issues of signal, distortion and clarity 
and what measures, techniques and technologies are to be devised 
and deployed to produce this common operating picture. The common 
operating picture to be discovered in the face today is precisely the 
operation of the (moving) picture.
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BarkTV: Portrait of an innovator
Jennifer Deger
I
In his book Multiple arts, Jean-Luc Nancy describes the portrait as 
‘first and foremost an encounter’, though in fact, as Nancy clearly 
appreciates, the art of portraiture puts multiple encounters into play.1 
The most obvious is that between the viewer and the subject of the 
artwork, an experience often charged with an unnerving immediacy. 
Yet all portraits await viewers already imprinted with the echo of 
encounter. More than most, this is an art form that calls attention to 
the relationship between artist and subject: two people united in a 
shared project of portrayal. It is into this prefigured relationship that 
the viewer enters, assuming the vantage point of an artist who never 
completely vacates their place. Nancy describes this effect as the 
artist occupying the foreground of the canvas. From here, the viewer 
faces the figure before them: another being presenting themselves for 
encounter.
1  Jen-Luc Nancy, Multiple arts, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006.
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As these dynamic relations structure portraiture (even, I would 
suggest, when the face does not look directly out, or when there is no 
face at all), it becomes an art without objects, only subjects. Herein 
lies a strangely unsettling source of their allure: portraits seem to offer 
some kind of direct experiential encounter with an other even though 
there can be no mistaking the work of mediation involved.
For Nancy, though, portraiture’s most compelling, and defining, 
encounter occurs elsewhere: namely, between the depicted figure and 
themselves. Portraits, after all, concern something more, something 
deeper, than merely a figure posed for public view. The portrait 
artist’s true purpose is neither mutuality, nor resemblance. It is 
character: that complex inner tangle of qualities that mark individuals 
as at once unique and yet deeply, and recognisably, human.2 And so 
Nancy identifies the portrait as an art concerned with the ‘extraction’ 
of character, as artists work the tremulous surface of the subject in 
pursuit of an inner but somehow indelible relationship between a self 
and itself. Character in this reckoning exceeds what someone might 
be comfortable with—or capable of—publicly portraying to others. 
For Nancy what is at stake in portraiture is the depiction of a ‘singular 
trait of an intimate disunion’.3 From this perspective, the work of 
portraiture involves a breaking past the veneer of self-presentation 
in order to reveal the fundamental disunity of the self. This becomes 
portraiture’s defining point of tension. This is where the life lies. 
Nancy puts it this way: ‘“Art” is the name of this fragile other 
encounter.’4
2  As Marcia Pointon points out, it is only since the Renaissance that portraiture has been 
expected to reveal character along with status and identity: ‘[F]rom the Renaissance to our own 
day, portraiture carries a huge burden of expectation: a process of comparing and matching takes 
place as viewers (guided by curators and media commentators) construct an empathetic narrative 
based on fragments of data from a life set alongside the portrait image, the one illuminating the 
other.’ Marcia Pointon, Portrayal and the search for identity, London, Reaktion, 2012, p. 15. 
3  Nancy, 2006, p. 246, emphasis added. 
4  Nancy, 2006. Of course ethnography has likewise been defined in terms of encounter. See 
for instance Michael Jackson, Minima ethnographica: Intersubjectivity and the anthropological 
project, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998; and Franca Tamisari, ‘Body, vision and 
movement: In the footprints of the ancestors’, Oceania, vol. 68, no. 4, 1998, pp. 249–70.
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Figure 6.1: Left: Portrait of Ugolino Martelli, Angelo Bronzino, 1536 or 
1537, oil on wood, oil on poplar wood. 
source: Wikimedia Commons.
Figure 6.2: Right: Djalkiri #1, David Bukulatjpi, Jennifer Deger 
and Marrawakamirr Marrawungu, 2009, video and acrylic on bark.
source: Courtesy of the artists.
II
This essay is an attempt to flesh out the possibilities of encounter 
engendered by a mixed-media artwork that my collaborators and I 
labelled Djalkiri #1, but is nicknamed the BarkTV.5 I present it here, 
5  This is by no means an unprecedented argument. See Melinda Hinkson, ‘Seeing more than 
black and white: Picturing Aboriginality at Australia’s National Portrait Gallery’, Australian 
Humanities Review, vol. 49, 2010, pp. 5–28, who claims certain Aboriginal painting styles as 
portraiture as a means of disrupting the normative vision of cultural institutions such as the 
National Portrait Gallery. John von Sturmer, on the other hand, has dismissed the suggestion 
that bark paintings are portraits. See John von Sturmer, ‘A limping world: Works in the Arnott’s 
collection—some conceptual underpinnings’, in They are meditating: Bark paintings from the 
MCA’s Arnott’s Collection, Sydney, Museum of Contemporary Art, 2008, pp. 35–53. In exploring 
this argument here I am concerned with activating the relationship between images and other 
images as much as the relationship between image and stories that are more usually offered in the 
exegesis of Aboriginal art.
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in the context of a collection of responses to digital portraiture, with 
conflicting impulses. Claiming Djalkiri #1 as portrait feels immediately 
constraining, if not downright colonising. If, as art historian Marcia 
Pointon argues, portraiture is one of the ‘great defining metaphors of 
Western culture’,6 then why impose the category at all? What might 
be gained? What will be obscured, obliterated even, in the process? 
Figure 6.3: Djalkiri #1, Macquarie University Art Gallery, December 2009.
source: Courtesy of the artists.
Certainly from a purely formal perspective, there is no obvious 
resemblance between our BarkTV and, for example, Bronzino’s delicate 
masterpiece Portrait of Ugolino Martelli, a work I first came to know 
through my reading of Nancy.7 Yet the more I think about this kind of 
6  Pointon, 2012, p. 26.
7  I choose to use it here, though, because I especially like the way it sits beside our bark 
work. I am surprised how they seem, somehow, strangely akin.
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art, the more I realise that portrait artists and the Aboriginal people 
of Arnhem Land do share common concerns, most particularly with 
the art of discerning—and creatively bringing to light—the inner 
qualities of a person. Cultivating particular ways of seeing, both bring 
creative energy to the work of rendering visible distinctive marks 
of character; driven by revelatory purpose, both seek to manifest 
visible forms of likeness that tap into a power exceeding that of literal 
resemblance.
And so I begin with a tentative conclusion that there is something to 
be gained—maybe even something to be seen anew?—by approaching 
Djalkiri #1 as if it is a portrait. 
III
On first encountering Djalkiri #1 the sound might be the first thing 
that hits you, an energetic urgency of men’s ritual song punctuated 
by the striking of steel on steel. Or maybe, as it was for me when we 
flipped the ‘on’ switch for the first time, it will be the glow of the 
striated surface that catches your eye, the way the images seem to 
emanate from within the bark itself. Or maybe, you will be drawn 
closer for a second look by the force of sheer novelty. 
Far less likely is that you, my imaginary art gallery visitor, will approach 
this multimedia installation because of its appeal as a portrait, for this 
is simply not the way the work appears to present itself. Where is the 
face? The figure? The person? 
Instead, what you will encounter is a long, vertical, three-panelled 
bark painting, its middle section filled with a looped video projection. 
The sound comes from speakers built into the projector. It shouldn’t 
take long to work out that this is an Aboriginal headstone-laying 
ceremony. The nine-and-a-half minute single-take video shows a 
forklift being used to slowly lift and position the stone while men 
sing to the beat of clap sticks. The man in an orange T-shirt leading 
the ritual uses the bottom end of a shifting spanner to strike the steel 
blade of a tomahawk held above his head. This use of tools as practical 
instruments—in every sense of the word—is one of the aspects of the 
work much remarked upon by gallery visitors.
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The top and bottom panels feature octopuses and stingrays darting 
beside long-bladed knives rakishly crossed over a heavy-chained 
anchor, the in-between spaces backfilled with ochre-coloured cross-
hatching. It’s a dance of intertwinement that confounds conventional 
expectations regarding the traditional stuff of Indigenous material 
culture. In fact, if you look closely you might notice that the paint on 
the top and bottom panels is acrylic rather than ochre, ochre remaining 
de rigueur for barks produced for sale in the fine art market.
The video itself is observational in style—traditionally ethnographic, 
one might say. The camera quietly moves across the scene following 
the unfolding events. I shot it myself and use it here with permissions 
from both the relevant Dhalwangu clan leaders and the orange-shirted 
djungaya (ritual manager).
It would be a mistake to see these elements as either evidence of a 
playful cultural hybridity or an example of the degeneration of 
traditional forms. As each one of the men and women in this video 
would tell you, this is Yolngu rom (law, culture, ancestral precedent). 
The anchor and the knives and the sea creatures belong together, as 
do the grader and the shifting spanner, and by extension the bark and 
the video. Any explanation as to why this is the case, however, would 
likely be brief and guarded. Some say these images are the result of the 
history of exchange between Yolngu and Macassan fishermen. Others 
insist that it is really about relations between Yolngu and Balanda 
(non-Aboriginal, white people). But all agree that the incorporation 
of ostensibly foreign material culture has deep ancestral significance.8 
The objects depicted relate to the activities of Birrinydji, the ancestral 
sea captain, blacksmith and swordsman who sailed across Arnhem 
Land, dropping anchor at several places, including the Dhalwangu 
homeland of Gurrumurru.9 Stories associated with Birrinydji and the 
origins of Yolngu ownership and mastery of ‘foreign technologies’ 
are dhuyu (sacred, restricted and dangerous) among my friends and 
8  For an analysis and elaboration of what he calls the ‘Birrinydji legacy’ given to him by 
Warramirri clan leaders on neighbouring Elcho Island, see Ian McIntosh, ‘The iron furnace 
of Birrinydji’, in Alan Rumsey and James Weiner (eds), Mining and Indigenous lifeworlds in 
Australia and Papua New Guinea, Oxon, Sean Kingston Publishing, 2004, pp. 12–30. 
9  Some Yolngu and some anthropologists have suggested that because of their associations 
with Birrinydji, Yirritja clans—or perhaps certain Yirritja clans—are directly associated with 
innovation and technological incorporation, while those from the opposite moiety, Dhuwa, 




colleagues. But at any Dhalwangu funeral you will encounter people 
singing and dancing foundational events involving such items as 
knives, steel axes, telescopes, cloth and tobacco.
IV
‘The ancestral’ is hardly an adequate term to describe the sources 
of the ongoing and often highly reflexive dynamics of becoming in 
Yolngu life—and death—including, increasingly, digital practices. 
But it offers a place to begin. For now, perhaps the most important 
thing to say is that just as ancestral form and power inhere in country, 
sacred objects and painted designs, they also materially manifest in 
people themselves, through physical characteristics and even ways 
of thinking: ancestral identities emerge and become visible in the 
breadth of a nose, the tenor of a voice or the brilliance of an idea. 
V
Figure 6.4: Djalkiri #1 (detail).
source: Courtesy of the artists.
In the final 20 seconds of the video, the headstone ceremony reaches 
its conclusion as a photograph of a smiling man is carefully glued into 
position. From the dates in gold lettering, we can calculate that he 
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died aged 37. But we don’t know his name. In keeping with current 
Yolngu conventions it is withheld, indicated only by the initial B.10 For 
me, this is the crucial moment, the point at which the multiple media 
coalesce. For although his face is only glimpsed briefly at the end of 
the video—and then only in a photograph—there is indeed a central 
human figure around which it is structured and organised, a figure 
who is animated, called forth and made visible.
Created, at my instigation—with his wife, daughter and nephew—
to be exhibited in a Sydney art gallery among other artworks by 
anthropologists whose lives have also become densely interwoven with 
their research subjects, the work acts as a performative homage to the 
man who became the central and defining figure in my anthropological 
research in Arnhem Land; a man who, by adopting me, instructing me 
and working alongside me as a video-maker, profoundly determined 
the way that Yolngu continue to see me, as much as the way I see them.11
10  I have written elsewhere at some length about the shift in Yolngu relations to images of the dead. 
See Jennifer Deger, Shimmering screens: Making media in an Aboriginal community, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2006; and Jennifer Deger, ‘Imprinting on the heart: Photography 
and contemporary Yolngu mournings, Visual Anthropology, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 292–309.
11  As I wrote for the catalogue at the time:
interventions explores what might happen when researchers, instead of writing 
about their subjects, take up visual and other media as a way of relating with others. 
The exhibition claims the possibility of Aboriginal people working creatively with 
ethnographers to generate new forms and styles of cultural production. Compelled 
by the idea that making—and viewing—art is a critical and productive form of 
social engagement, interventions offers new ways of taking up, and taking seriously, 
Aboriginal ways of seeing the world.
 … this exhibition is not aiming at the fine art market … There are other kinds 
of economies, other kinds of exchanges at play here. By breaching conventional 
separations between art practice and scholarship—not to mention between the 
Indigenous subject and the non-Indigenous researcher—interventions locates artists 
and ethnographers in shared fields of experimentation.
Jennifer Deger, ‘Making interventions’, Interventions: Experiments between art and ethnography, 




Figure 6.5: Jennifer Deger and Bangana Wununungmurra in the BRACS 
radio studio, Gapuwiyak 1999.
source: Jennifer Deger.
I first met Bangana in 1994. He walked into the local community radio 
station where I was volunteering and announced that he wanted 
to work there with me. We could, he said, use the technology to 
strengthen Yolngu culture. Over the next few years, Bangana became 
my closest Yolngu friend and colleague. He oversaw the insertion 
of locally recorded manikay (clan songs) and raypirri (instructional 
messages) into a radio playlist that had previously been filled only 
with local favourites like ABBA, Smokey, Yothu Yindi, Kenny Rogers 
and Boney M. We made videos together in SuperVHS, working across 
northeast Arnhem Land with clan leaders and visiting film crews. 
He directed. I produced. We translated together.12 
Looking back over the years since he died, I’m surprised to realise 
just how many of my films and artworks feature Bangana’s image, 
often incorporating the same photograph. There are many reasons for 
this: his image summons up his family’s identity, our relationships, 
and by extension my relationship with his family and community; 
12  This essay forms a couplet with another piece about the making of this work. See Jennifer 
Deger, ‘Constellations of us: Backstories to a bark TV’, Journal of Australian Studies, vol. 35, 
no. 2, 2011, pp. 219–34. 
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it allows us to harness his authority and creative force as a powerful 
Dhalwangu man; it gestures to an enduring sense of shared loss, a 
specific set of stories and feelings that have become associated with 
him over the years. It also locates him as somehow seminal to the 
unfolding potentialities brought by new generations of digital media; 
and, of course, as foundational to the self that I have become. 
Figure 6.6: Family portrait #3, Christmas Birrimbirr (Christmas spirit), 
installation, Miyarrka Media, 2011.
source: Courtesy of Miyarrka Media.
Figure 6.7: Christmas with Wawa (still), Jennifer Deger with 





Figure 6.8: The entrance to Bangana Wunungmurra’s funeral shade, 2001. 
A painted cloth hung at the entrance to the shelter where we held Bangana for two weeks 
of ritual in the area known as Djalkiri. Amid the field of multicoloured dots on the body of the 




In the months and years after Bangana’s death we would sometimes get 
spooked when we heard an unexpected clank of steel or saw shadows 
in the trees that looked like wriggling octopus tentacles. In hushed 
voices, people would tell me how at night the octopus changes colour, 
depending on its mood. 
VIII
Figure 6.9: Portrait of father and daughter, 2005. 
During the months after his death, Bangana’s youngest daughter, Lay’pu, made a series 
of photographs with me, using my digital camera, showing her holding her father’s image. 
We kept going until we got it right. she wanted to capture the likeness, to show their 
unmistakable connection. I’ve lost the one where she smiles, the one we both loved, 
the one shuddering with uncanny likeness. 
source: Jennifer Deger.
IX
Djalkiri is a Yolngu word for foot or footstep, but in a deeper sense it 
is used to refer to the underlying foundations of Yolngu life. It is the 
name given to the house where Bangana Wunungmurra once lived 
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and where he is now buried, next to the shady area under the mango 
tree where his father held ceremonies in the early mission days of the 
1970s. For those of us involved in this project, djalkiri means home and 
belonging, family and foundation, a shared history and a particular 
point of attachment. 
Susan Marrawakamirr Marrawungu, widow of Bangana, her nephew 
David Bukulatjpi, and I called our work Djalkiri #1 for all these 
reasons. 
X
Figure 6.10: Studio portrait of Susan Marrawakamirr Marrawungu and 
Bangana Wunungmurra, 1997. 
Bangana has arranged himself for the camera as loving family man and successful 
intercultural figure (complete with accidental coffee stain). He’s just spoken at his first 
international conference, a symposium on Indigenous people in an interconnected world. 
source: Jennifer Deger.
In the above image, against the elongated diamonds and colours of his 
tie hangs a miniature sword, its placement foregrounding not only 
a Dhalwangu identity but a foundational source of power, force and 
ferocity. At the Dhalwangu homeland of Gurrumurru, the ancestral 
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swordsman called Birrinydji stands with his knives crossed. Bangana’s 
father was named after that knife. As Yolngu say, his name is on that 
knife— Lawarrwarkk; it also means stingray.
There’s a special ritual sound for that knife. In Djalkiri #1 we hear 
it when the ritual leader hits his steel tools above his head (it doesn’t 
matter what steel is actually used). Men sing that sound too: Ngarrk 
yarrk. Ngarrk yarrk. In the gallery it rings out: voices, clap sticks, 
hands and steel in unison. 
As Bangana’s brother-in-law explained, an imagistic poetics not simply 
of place but also of emplacement unfolds as the video loops across 
the bark:
The yiki (knife) clears the ground in preparation: the grader, the 
backhoe any blade can be used … With the yiki they clear the ground 
to lay the anchor. That’s the foundation: the anchor, the footprint. 
That heavy anchor (the headstone) is going to be stamped in, stamped 
in forever. They’re putting down the anchor, this is where he’s going 
to stop. 
XI
Anthropologists often use the term ‘ancestral power’ to identify both 
the source and subject of Yolngu creativity. We describe the ways that 
individuals identify themselves based on clan affiliations and complex 
genealogies. The difficulty with these formulations is that they suggest 
that Yolngu art and ritual depend entirely on the creative actions of 
those who came before. This obscures the degree to which this is a 
two-way street—the way that contemporary innovation is necessary 
to enliven both current generations and the ancestral. 
Such work, however, is not without its risks. 
When Bangana died unexpectedly from a heart attack in 2002, 
Marrawakamirr, Bangana’s widow, and his children were in no doubt 
that the cause of his death was malicious sorcery, and that he was 
killed because he had exhibited a lethal combination of charisma, 
talent and wilful genius.13 The only question was who, exactly, to 
13  See Deger, 2006, 2011.
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blame. Over the years versions of the story have continued to shift and 
change according to how lives have unfolded, drawing in retrospective 
insights and changing familial alliances. What hasn’t altered is the 
degree to which they claim he was murdered because of who he 
was: a brilliant and provocative man, capable and knowledgeable in 
both men’s business and whitefella bureaucracies, an innovative and 
politically nimble intercultural broker, destined, we had all thought, 
to lead his community through the difficult times ahead. 
Designing his headstone, Marrawakamirr dug out a slightly worn and 
faded photograph—her favourite because of the look and the smile. 
She instructed me to boost the colours on the computer and then 
have the photograph framed in gold and mounted on a red stone, the 
colour of the Dhalwangu flag. This was a radical move; it was the first 
headstone in Gapuwiyak ever to feature a photograph. Ten years on it 
remains the only one. 
Bangana had died at a moment of dramatic change in how Yolngu 
treated photographs of the dead. Until that time it had been standard 
practice to destroy, or at least hide away, photographs of deceased 
family members. For me, Bangana’s funeral marked the beginning 
of a different attitude, where photographs might be incorporated 
into funerals and grieving processes, as, for example, in displaying 
Bangana’s photograph with the coffin. But the act of putting his photo 
on his headstone pushed things further than I had ever seen before. 
It performatively claimed his role as a man of ‘modern technologies’, 
as he used to describe himself. 
And so in death, as in life, Bangana assumed the stance of leader 
and innovator: fearless, singular and Dhalwangu. His grave became 




Figure 6.11: Family portrait at grave, 2007. 
source: Jennifer Deger.
I remember trying to deliberately echo Bangana’s expression when we took this shot, 
moved by the relentless good cheer of his image. But on re-encountering my slightly 
too-bright smile I feel ashamed. What I see here is another moment of an ethnographic 
clumsiness, a failure to master this subgenre of yolngu portraiture and self-presentation. 
I cannot see past my anxiety in the face of the camera. Am I imagining it, or do the others’ 




Figure 6.12: David Bukulatjpi painting Djalkiri #1, 2009. 
As a Warramirri man he shares rights and responsibilities for the stories and images 
associated with Birrinydji. As susan’s sister’s son, he was a close and trusted collaborator. 
This was the first bark he ever painted. 
source: Jennifer Deger.
The photograph above is exactly the kind of photograph that Yolngu 
never take. In every photo I have ever made with Yolngu, people have 
chosen to address themselves to the camera. In fact, often they look 
past the camera, past the particular moment and out to the future 
reciprocated gaze of family. Increasingly, I think, they look down the 
lens in anticipation of their death and its aftermath, a time when their 
relationships will live on through photographs. 
When we source archival images from museums, family are often 
very disappointed when their ancestor does not look at the camera. 
This is interpreted as an expression of disapproval, not only of the 
anthropologist pointing the camera, but of the subsequent generations 





Figure 6.13: Portrait of Bangana Wunungmurra, date unknown. 
source: Jennifer Deger.
of course not every family photo is a portrait. The image of Bangana repeating throughout 
was once simply a snapshot. It became a portrait when mobilised in some of the ways 
I have described: put into relationship with other images and figures so as to bring out and 
amplify qualities of character in ways that insistently illustrate and affirm the degree to which 
a yolngu self is always constituted in and through relationships. 
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It occurs to me now that the image above became a portrait even before 
such projects of loving, insistent remediation. For surely this photo, 
along with every other image of Bangana where he is captured face 
on, looking outward to a future not yet imagined, became a portrait 
exactly in the moment he died: in the moment when the image became 
an uncanny facsimile of a figure no longer inhabiting fleshly human 
form. Herein lies a different yet equally wrenching encounter of self 
with self. One that must be recognised by those left behind. 
XV
Figure 6.14: ONLY.FAMILY, Rowena Lay’pu Wunungmurra, 2010, 
phone-made jpeg.
source: Courtesy of Miyarrka Media.
I am not the only one returning again and again to his face, his eyes and 
his image. Nor am I the only one mixing media in new ways. Lay’pu 
assembled this family collage on a mobile phone in 2011, the very 
making of the photo performing her missing him still, this affective 
labour shown by the multiple, overlapping hearts, a sentimentality 
tempered by the losses kept near to the surface. Other elements add to 
the layered meanings. The wreath of coloured leaves around Bangana’s 
face in the top corner show him to be a reggae lover and serious smoker 
of marijuana. The leaves also stand in for an element of Dhalwangu 
identity featured in clan songs. Manjarr, a clan-specific song about a 
mangrove leaf, simultaneously gestures to images of mangrove leaves 
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floating along in saltwater tides, and Bangana’s fondness for smoking 
marijuana (something that Lay’pu also greatly enjoys, and in so doing, 
sees herself following in her father’s footsteps). 
These days, many young Yolngu assemble family portraits like these, 
often including photographs of the dead. They identify them as 
gamanungu, the same word they use for the designs painted on bark. 
Often they will add a soundtrack to such images, usually with specially 
selected manikay (clan songs). 
XVI
Figure 6.15: Djalkiri #1 (close-up), during test projections, 2009.
source: Jennifer Deger.
I like Djalkiri #1 best when the video bleeds over the lines between 
the sections, though my Yolngu collaborators prefer the video to sit 
neatly in its frame, as originally intended. Dhunupa is the word they 
use to expresses an aesthetic concern with the work of making things 
straight. The pleasure and sense of correctness that comes from this 
is not driven by a strict and unbending desire for precision, nor by a 
sense that there is something intrinsically different about this video and 
137
6 . BARkTV
its bark painting surrounds, but rather by a concern with attentively 
ordering things. Straightening something up is a  performance of 
attention and due care, a way of putting things right. 
XVII
The dynamics of encounter run deep in Djalkiri #1. In both form and 
content our work claims the transformative potential of intercultural 
incorporation. As digital sound and movement unsettle the usual sober 
rectitude of bark painting, our work confidently refuses simplistic 
categorical separations between ‘old’ and ‘new’ technologies or 
indeed ‘them’ and ‘us’. Like the ritual projected on the bark, the work 
itself materialises foundational vectors of connection, incorporating 
the use of ‘new’ or ‘foreign’ technologies through a performative 
poetics of emplacement. While probably no one reading this will ever 
know the deep stories that lie under the crossed knives and long-
chained anchors, what comes through strongly—to even the most 
casual visitor, I hope—is the confident audacity of the work. Perhaps 
this is what the digital most particularly adds in this context: a multi-
sensorial energy palpably bringing new life to old forms.
When we installed our work in Sydney, we all agreed Bangana would 
have been pleased. Hanging prominently in a Balanda institution, 
this artwork is one for posterity: one that puffs its chest just a little, 
assuming its place on the wall, eyes to the future, uniquely distinctive 
and Yolngu in equal measure.
Certainly this is not portraiture as it matters to Nancy. The inner 
psychic disunities that compel his analysis do not interest Yolngu 
in the same ways. Instead, the gesture—whether in ritual, painting 
or photography—is towards an expanded and outward-orientated 
sense of becoming-in-relationship. This brings with it a very different 
sense of the self-to-self dynamics that make us who we are, and 
consequently a very different sense of the fault lines of fragility and 
hubris that, if exposed, might allow others to see the stuff from which 
we are really made. 
If portraits compel us because of the ways they attend to the delicate 
and all-too-human relationships of selves encountering other selves, 
then this work both conforms to the definition and extends it. 
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By  ‘framing’ contemporary life in relation to ancestral figures and 
actions, Djalkiri #1 asserts—like all Yolngu art—that Yolngu selves 
extend far beyond individuated human form. Here the symbols 
of knives and anchors assert Bangana’s identity and, by extension, 
his knowledge and power, as decisively as the books in Bronzino’s 
Portrait  of Ugolino Martelli do the same for that subject. Yet what 
makes  this work unlike a ‘traditional’ bark painting—and thus 
arguably more like a portrait—is the way the pathos of the smiling 
human figure on the headstone undercuts the heroic postures painted 
directly on the bark. For those of us who live with the enduring 
fear, suspicion and blame that settled around the Djalkiri family in 
the wake of Bangana’s death, this sense of human vulnerability as an 
integral aspect of claiming and wielding ‘ancestral power’ is a palpable 
dimension of the work. In a minor and manageable way, the work 
triggered these anxieties anew. Prior to commencing there were long 
discussions between us, as well as permissions sought from others, 
in order to ensure we were not committing any transgression in the 
use of the painted figures. The last thing any of us wanted was to stir 
things up again. And yet in a way it felt inevitable. And strangely 
proper. Bangana had always made it clear to me that in order to do such 
work—to publicly show who he was through the ways he used new 
media—would always be risking criticism and jealousy from others. 
The challenge, as he explained it to me, was to be as circumspect as 
possible in regard to the revelation of ancestral knowledge, while 
finding new forms and forums for it. In this way, he managed what 
I have called elsewhere a politics of presencing.14 
Yet I too occupy a place within the bark, a fact often acknowledged 
by my collaborators, who, despite their interest and critical help in 
making sure the work satisfied all Yolngu social and aesthetic criteria, 
saw this artwork ultimately as my project. (Like the photograph on the 
gravestone, the BarkTV remains a one-off. There has been no interest 
in pushing this mixed-media further, although we have experimented 
with other forms of bark projection.) Assuming my place as 
filmmaker-anthropologist-adopted clan member—often when I film 
I am encouraged to come closer than the other women, for the sake 
of the recording—my point of view frames and fills the middle panel. 
14  See Deger, 2006.
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In doing so it invokes a shared history of media-making, locating this 
work within a trajectory of innovation and experiment begun when 
we were all young together. 
And so Djalkiri #1 materialises the verve and genius located not in 
individuals, nor even necessarily cultures, but in the foundational 
relationships that make us who we are—and who we might become. 
Although lacking the kind of recognisable immediacy generally 
expected from a portrait, this ethnographic experiment offers an 
encounter with an expanded sense of what it means to be human: an 
encounter less concerned with the fleshiness of figures or the fragile 
markings of individual character than with the pulsing substrates 
that extend beyond and beneath the span of a single life.
Figure 6.16: Jennifer Deger, Samantha Yawulwuy Wunungmurra, Antonnio 
Gurrururu Wanambi, Susan Marrawakamirr Marrawungu, Macquarie 
University Art Gallery 2009.




Many thanks especially to Marrawakamirr Marrawungu, Yawulwuy 
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